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ABSTRACT 
This research analyzes China's socialization in the international Arms Control 
and Disarmament (ACD) field. Constructing the theoretical framework of "dynamic 
interaction between state and institution" in order to reconcile the "problem of agend 
and structure" debated in IR, the research identified the formative effects on China 
during the last two decades in general and in the post-CTBT (Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty) period in particular, which engaged China in the international ACD 
institutions and regimes. The socialization effects on China are recognized at the 
three levels: China's norm internalization (perspective), institutionalization (domestic 
institutions) and comprehensive participation in the international ACD regimes and 
institutions. 
The evidence based on documentary works and a few interviews suggests that the 
engagement in international institutions is promoting a Chinese nexus in these 
institutions, creating new Chinese interests and socializing China into building 
consensus to resolving international ACD issues. The evolution and differentiation of 
Chinese perspectives on ACD issues resulted into the view that stresses China's role 
and responsibility within the regimes. The "new security concept" based on mutual 
security and restructuring of domestic ACD institutions in the late 1990s were the 
products of the socialization that "dynamic interaction" fostered. During the CTBT 
talks, China showed the norm-complying and establishing attitude. China also 
committed to the nuclear test ban norm by sustaining the nuclear test moratorium 
since 1996. The socialization process led China to more comprehensive and 
constructive participation in the international ACD institutions and regimes as China 
joined the Zangger Committee and supported the FMCT (Fissile Material Cutoff 
Treaty) after its accession to the CTBT. 
As constructivists argue that state can reshape structure by process. China 
reconstituted its interests and identities throughout the interaction with the 
international ACD institutions. China's more proactive role within ACD institutions 
and regimes will give it more constitutive socialization influence, but the role is 
basically entrenched in "state enhancement functionalism." 
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction 
A more dangerous source of a global intercivilizational war is the 
shifting balance of power among civilizations and their core states. If 
it continues, the rise of China and the increasing assertiveness of this 
"biggest player in the history of man " will place tremendous stress on 
international stability in the early twenty-first century. The emergence 
of China as the dominant power in East and Southeast Asia would be 
contrary to American interests as they have been historically 
construed (Samuel P. Huntington 1996: 312-3). 
Once we have accomplished the four modernizations and the national 
economy has expanded ... The question is whether or not China will 
practice hegemony ... China will still not practise hegemony and it will 
still belong to the Third World (Deng Xiaoping May 1978 from 
Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping II 1994: 111-2). 
There is no "logic" of anarchy apart from the practices that create 
and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than 
another; structure has no existence or causal powers apart from 
process. Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential 
features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it (Alexander 
Wendt 1992: 394-5). 
The research starts from a broad but simple question of whether China has 
adjusted itself to the international order during the last two decades' modernization. 
China with a huge population and territory, sometimes regarded as a "civilization" 
rather than a country, has become a meaningful actor in making of world history after 
colonialism and its self-imposed isolation in the 20th century. The Chinese rhetoric of 
"anti-hegemonism" symbolized its previous denial of the established international 
system (it even appears in recent official statements). Throughout the modernization 
period, has China been socialized enough to find a convergence with the international 
community? Or, has China become a threatening factor in global and regional 
stability as the rapidly rising power did in modem history? The research will give an 
answer to the questions by investigating China's engagement in the specific field of 
arms control and disarmament (ACD). 
1. 1. China Threat and Arms Control and Disarmament 
Institutions 
Since the demise of the Soviet bloc in international relations, one of the most 
challenging questions for the international community has been how a rising China 
would be managed within the international system. The history of world politics tells 
us that the international system has found it difficult to adjust to the rise of new 
powers. Great power transition was never easy and the question of how successful 
the established great powers have been in managing and peacefully assimilating 
rising, dissatisfied challengers into the internationa order has occupied historians and 
IR theorists. For Waltz, China is one of the candidates whose action could restore a 
balance in transition from the current unipolarity of the United States to multipolarity 
in the post cold war era (Waltz 1997: 915-6). More problematic for the "soft landing" 
transition is that China's perspective on international relations is premised on 
immutable state sovereignty, the Westhphalian definition of international affairs, 
which conflicts with global interdependence in which national boundaries are "highly 
permeable and eroding" (Shambaugh 1992: 92-3). Even to the Chinese leadership, 
this is a crucial task: to navigate in the globalization-driven post-Cold War era in the 
name of "socialism with Chinese characteristics." As modem China's difficulty of 
adjustment to the international order of nation-states in the 19th and 20th centuries 
came partly from the obstinate preoccupation with the great tradition of the Chinese 
world order (Fairbank 1968: 4), China encounters great difficulty in accommodating 
itself to the international system in 21 st century. 
The "China threat" debate in the early to mid-1990 was the first step toward 
resolving the problem among the international community regarding the matter. The 
main question was whether and to what degree, China, with rising economic and 
military capacity, threatens its international neighbours and community. The terms 
coined at this time such as "constructive engagement" (Clinton administration), 
"weaving the net" (Shinn 1996), "tying China into the international system" (Segal 
1995a), and "living with China" (Vogel 1997) implicitly reflect the problematic 
consciousness of how to deal with an emerging China. Some are dissatisfied with 
China's recalcitrant behaviour in relation to international norms and rules and its 
irredentist claims over regional territory. They are worried about China's 
authoritative political system and hypersensitive nationalism which replaced the 
communist ideology in the reform era. These traits are considered as incompatible 
with Western values of identity. To reduce the danger, the rest of the world should 
stand firm against China and should contain its expansionist tendencies. On the other 
hand, others are more patient and sympathetic. They argue that it is important to 
engage China and integrate it into the international system in order to encourage 
cooperative behaviour. The socializing effect on China will be sustained in the long 
run through the internalization process of the principles of multilateralism, even 
though the degree and pace of learning are still insatiable. 
3 
The divergence among observers' I arguments lies in, firstly, the perception of the 
extent of China's economic and military rise; secondly, the understanding of China's 
domestic political process and development associated with an authoritative political 
system; and finally, how the observers view the nature of the international system in 
general, and China's relationship with the world, in particular. This thesis concerns 
the third point of difference that relates China and the international system. In a way, 
the China threat debates diverged from the views of whether China could be 
fundamentally engaged in international institutions to whether it should adapt its 
interest and policy to be suitable for international norms and rules. On the basis of the 
IR theoretical position and attitude towards international institutions (either 
neoliberalist or neorealist) observers articulated their arguments. Thus, China's 
participation In international institutions would illuminate some aspects of key 
variables of the phenomenon. It would be a litmus test for evaluating China's 
cooperation and it would provide an intelligible tenet for the China threat debates. 
Since the late 1970s, China's economIC modernization drive has opened a 
window of intercourse with international society and inescapably has led to increased 
interaction with international institutions. This in tum has exposed China to a wide 
range of global issues under the pressure of international regimes and organizations. 
China's participation in international regimes and institutions has grown greatly. 
China has been compelled to develop more suitable and concrete policy responses to 
international standards and rules. As Kim argues, "the politics of mutual adjustment -
1 The term, 'ohservers: that I use, means the analysts and scholars who are involved in Chinese affairs. 
They are inevitably limited to seeing the "Chinese phenomenon in international relations" by their 
epistemological boundary. 
how the world organization might adjust to the ambitions and prerogatives of a rising 
China and how a rising China might adjust to the principles, norms, and objectives of 
the world organization" - poses one of the major challenges of the post-cold war 
world order (Kim 1999: 44). 
However, like the dichotomy in the "China threat debate," the evaluations of the 
process of China's enmeshment in international regimes and institutions are 
divergent. The negativists argue that although China is increasing its cooperative 
international behaviour, it "surely does not include engagement in its asserted, 
implied, or enacted policies" (Robinson 1998: 200). The dominant character of 
Chinese behaviour in international organizations has been described as "state 
enhancing functionalism." A neo-mercantilist realist approach that rejects many of 
the cooperative and transnational implications, indicates that the learning is 
"conditional and partial" (Yahuda 1997: 14). While the criticism of negativists is 
based on a rigorous assessment of China's overall international behaviour in absolute 
terms, the positivists are rather relative and restrained about the change in Chinese 
behaviour. Some observers note that, compared, historically, to other expansionist 
powers at similar stages of their ascent, China has been unusually cooperative 
(Economy and Oksenberg 1999: 20). 
China's engagement in international regImes and institutions has facilitated 
information exchange and social learning, apparent changes in China's domestic 
institutions, policies, organizations. legal frameworks and attitudes toward the world 
in relative terms. One of these fields is China's arms control and dis .. umament (ACO) 
policy. China's longtime mistrust and suspicion of the NPT regime was replaced by a 
more cooperati ve policy toward international nonproliferation nonns and rules. 
Following the UN General Assembly's decision to replace the Taiwan representative 
with one from China on October 25 in 1971, the PRC finally joined the U.N.-centred 
global system with an accompanying engagement in the myriad activities of multiple 
international institutions. As one of these processes, China participated in the 
Conference on Disarmament (CD) in 1980. 
From the late 1950s to the 1970s, China was a radical challenger to the 
superpower nuclear monopoly and the Western-dominated nonproliferation regime. 
For example, China rejected the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) on the grounds that they were discriminatory and 
helped to maintain the superpower monopoly of the Western bloc in nuclear affairs. 
From the mid-1980s, when the Chinese leadership readjusted its foreign policy toward 
to a more pragmatic course, the longtime mistrust and suspicion of the 
nonproliferation regime began to melt away. During the 1990s, China began to 
participate more fully in a range of international arms control and disarmament 
(ACD) institutions, mainly within the UN system. 
China has signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT, 1992), the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC, 1992) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT, 
1996). China has agreed to bring its technology export practices more fully into 
compliance with international norms. In 1997 China joined the Zangger Committee, 
which, under the NPT, coordinates nuclear export policies. China accepted more 
safeguards in the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime). There is no question 
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that its current arms control and nonproliferation practices are significantly closer to 
international principles than they were a decade ago. 
1.2. Research Questions and Overall Purpose of the 
Research 
In fact, China's participation In the international ACD institutions has been 
brought by its open-door policy since the late 1970s. The participation In the 
Conference on Disarmament (CD) corresponds approximately with Deng Xiaoping's 
re-evaluation of Mao's "People's War" thesis. This revision itself was related to the 
need to build a peaceful international environment for domestic economic 
development. However, the participation has not been designed and performed by 
China's consistent grand strategy or blueprint with a clear purpose as the Chinese 
economy has grown out of its plan (Naughton 1996; Lardy 1998).2 Moreover, 
security issues are believed to be more difficult to draw cooperative behaviour among 
states than economic issues by IR scholars. It is hard to believe that China's 
participation has been concomitant with a strategic objective in its unwilling 
engagement in the security regimes, which might undermine China's ambition of 
military modernization ingrained in its growing nationalism. 
2 For example, Naughton argues that Chinese leadership did not foresee or design economic reforms in 
advance. So, reforms have been gradual and evolutionary, and so the elements of the reform have 
incscapably been time-dependent. China's reform without a blueprint, neither the process nor the 
ultimate objectivc, are incapsulated in the Deng Xiaoping's catchphrase, "groping for stones to cross 
the ri \t~r" (Naughton 1996: 5). 
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Those two explanations justify starting to raise the first research question in /zOH'-
based terms rather than why-based terms. How gradually but significantly has China 
participated in the international ACD institutions and regimes? Chinese engagement 
in international security regimes was conspicuous in the 1990s. This shift over time 
led to accession to both the most general treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 
1992, and the most restrictive one, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 
1996. In what mechanism has the engagement increased in the international ACD 
institutions in contrast with general concern about China's worrisome military 
modernization? To find the mechanism of the engagement, the research bases its 
theoretical framework on the metatheoretical debates in IR rather than an individual 
IR theory, which limits itself to one variable for explaining the interplay between 
China and international institutions. The explanation for the significant engagement 
will illuminate the key policy option of how to accommodate the rising China to the 
international system in the 21 st century. 
Evolving perspectives and institutions of China's nuclear arms control and 
disarmament (ACD) community suggest a clue to identifying the mechanism of 
engagement. They have been created and fostered by the increasing interactions with 
international ACD regimes and institutions. The specific record of China's expanding 
involvement in ACD regimes reveals a wide variety of motivations and calculations 
and raises the question of the impact on the restructuring of Chinese perspectives and 
domestic institutions. Thus, the second research question is to identify the realization 
and evaluate the internalization of international ACD norms in China, both at the 
Chinese perspecti ve and the institution level. 
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More specific question can be raised in why-based terms, given the mechanism of 
explaining the China's engagement in the international ACD institutions. Why China 
agreed to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 is the third 
research question. Above all, the CTBT was the most complicated and difficult one, 
because the treaty significantly constrains China's nuclear development programme 
and security interest that China primarily considers an inalienable dimension of 
sovereignty. Although the CTBT has not entered into force so far, the accession to 
the CTBT means that China accepted an inferiority of nuclear weapons capability to 
the US and Russia. In fact, this strategic importance made many observers wonder if 
China would join the CTBT finally, because they regarded China's military ambition 
as strong and threatening. The importance of the CTBT, a case study of this 
dissertation, also lies in the fact that it was the first multilateral framework in which 
China participated and negotiated from beginning to end. By analyzing Chinese 
discourse and negotiating behaviour, the third research question will be answered. 
The previous three research questions raise the fourth question of the Chinese 
way of socialization into the norms and rules of the international system: how China 
reasons, learns, and utilizes knowledge in one specific issue area; arms control and 
disarmament (ACD). This will unravel the riddle of how China can accommodate 
itself to the international system on the one hand, while aspiring to become a great 
power on the other hand. The problem is how to measure the socialization effects on 
China. The exposure to and the participation in a multilateral negotiation process 
provide unique experiences, which bridge subsequent negotiations with which the 
international ACD institutions are concerned. Thus, the consequent uc\c!opments of 
the CTBT participation are presumed to entail a constitutive process in nurturing 
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Chinese perspectives and developing domestic institutions. The distinctive feature of 
both levels in the post-CTBT period suggests the critical role of the interaction 
between China and the international ACD institutions. By investigating the post-
CTBT developments in China's ACD field, the research will show the way China has 
been socialized into and has internalized international ACD norms. 
1.3. The Organization of the Thesis 
The organization of the thesis has two branches. One is the examination of the 
Chinese ACD perspecti ve and institutions, which has developed as a consequence of 
engagement with international ACD frameworks throughout the last two decades. 
The other is the case study of Chinese activities in the CTBT and the investigation of 
its impact on China. Although the constitutive developments in China regarding 
ACD policy in the post-CTBT period cannot necessarily be regarded as the direct 
consequence of the CTBT participation, they are products of dynamism between 
China and international institutions. They are also overarching products of the whole 
interacting process between China and these institutions (or regimes) during the last 
two decades. 
The thesis is comprised of 9 chapters, which broadly deal with, literature review, 
the theoretical framework, methodology, and main content chapters, the intermediate 
variables at different levels and the case study of the research work, China's ACD 
participation in the CTBT. Chapter 1 presents the research question and o\crall 
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purpose. It problematizes the China phenomenon in the international arena and 
introduces the research questions of how to explain China's increasing engagement in 
the international ACD institutions. The last section of chapter 1 addresses the 
research methodology. The pertinence of qualitative and case study methodology to 
the research is examined and the unit of analysis is set out. This section is also 
concerned with the use of documentation and interviews for data collection and how 
the analysis was undertaken. 
In chapter 2, the literature on Chinese foreign policy in general will be explored 
in theoretical terms. This is followed by an examination of the literature that focuses 
on China's involvement in international institutions in general and ACD institutions 
in particular. Throughout the process, the thesis tries to distance itself from the 
previous literature and suggest a perspective based upon the theoretical framework in 
chapter 3. The domestic/external linkage is argued to be the most appropriate 
approach to explain the increasing participation in the international ACD institutions. 
Chapter 3 begins by exploring the theoretical arguments in International Relations 
(IR), which provide the theoretical framework of the thesis. Neorealism, 
neoliberalism and constructivism will be analyzed in terms of their distinct 
implications for grasping the phenomenon of the emergence of China in the post-Cold 
War era. From the analyses of these various perspectives, "dynamic interaction" 
between state and international institutions is suggested as a theoretical framework. 
This dynamism is proposed to reconcile the metatheoretical "problem of state and 
structure" debated in IR theory. 
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Chapter 4 deals with China's ACD at the epistemological level. Given the fact 
that it is not easy to interpret the epistemological shift or adjustment responding to the 
developing institutional engagement and its feedback effect, the changing ACD 
perspective in 1990s will be broadly compared with one in 1980s. However, the 
various views of the Chinese ACD experts and IR scholars will be presented in 
accordance with the ACD issues. Various views, their overarching prevalence, 
increasing discourse and the changing pattern of the discourse in 1990s will be 
demonstrated. 
Chapter 5 explores the institutional level of China's ACD policy. The 
establishment and development of China's domestic ACD institutions will be 
explored in this chapter. In the 1990s, Chinese domestic institutionalization of the 
ACD field has been conspicuous. Its evolutionary pattern has been deeply associated 
with the international interplay with international ACD institutions. Domestic ACD 
institutions interact with China's increasing engagement in international regimes and 
institutions. In other words, the structural re-arrangements at the international level in 
tum, shape the new domestic institutions that foster new interests and the ACD 
policy-bargaining process at the domestic level. For logical sequence, the influence 
of China's CTBT participation on domestic institutions is examined in Chapter 8, as 
well as the CTBT impact on Chinese perspectives. 
In chapters 6-7, China's participation in ACD at the international level will be 
explored. Because China's engagement in the CTBT is considered as path-dependent 
rather than programmed or planned with a blueprint. China's pre-CTBT development 
will be explored. The evolution of China's ACD policy and the NPT accession will 
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be described as a precondition of the CTBT. In addition, current Chinese engagement 
in international ACD frameworks and regional security dialogues will be 
demonstrated. This suggests a strengthened involvement consequent upon the 
"dynamic interaction" of the 1990s. Chapter 7 discusses the case study of China's 
participation in the Comprehensi ve Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiation process. By 
investigating Chinese activities in the negotiations, the overall Chinese attitude 
toward norm-complying and norm-creating behaviour will be examined. China's 
behaviour and standpoint in the CTBT participation are explained according to the 
constructivist point of view. 
Chapter 8 discusses the direct and indirect consequences of China's CTBT 
participation. Those consequences, the distinctive features between China tl (in the 
pre-CTBT period) and China t2 (in the post-CTBT period) will be analyzed at both the 
perspective and the institutional level. China's utilization of the "common security 
concept" and restructuring domestic ACD institutions will be illustrated. In addition, 
Chinese security interests regarding Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) will be also 
examined, given that the CTBT severely constrains Chinese nuclear weapons 
development. As a path-dependence logic, a mechanism of engagement, the 
enforcing engagement in international ACD frameworks will also be illustrated in the 
post-CTBT period. The CTBT's reconstructing effects at the domestic and 
international level will be analyzed under the theoretical conceptualization of the 
"dynamic of state and institution." The developing phenomena, that increasing 
Chinese participation in the international ACD institutions brought in the post-CTBT 
peIiod, are identified and evidenced for the justification and usefulness of the 
theoretical framework. 
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The last chapter summarises the key findings. It goes on to examine why and by 
what mechanism international ACD institutional forces led to the deeper enmeshment 
of China in the international community; how dynamic interaction works and how 
Chinese domestic institutions may be brought in. It suggests a model of how the 
socialization effects on China can be identified. It concludes by emphasizing the need 
to integrate institutional dynamism into future IR and Chinese foreign policy research. 
"Dynamic interaction" grasps how past policies produced particular (often 
unanticipated) structural arrangements that in tum shaped the new interests and 
interactions of different actors. The concluding chapter will also provide the 
theoretical implications of the research and set out briefly an agenda for future 
research based on its findings. 
1.4. Research Methodology 
1.4.1. Qualitative Research 
Given the research questions raised, the analytic framework and hypothesis to be 
tested, an attempt will be made to put the dynamic interactions between China and 
international ACD institution or regime into context. The interaction's constitutive 
force on China t1 results in the qualitative change in China t2. This process is not 
clear-cut but often ambiguous. It is an aggregating conceptualization in a certain time 
period. Being permeated by intersubjective meaning of the international ACD nonns 
in the dynamic interaction at the international level, a state (China) would be 
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encouraged to internalize a norm and establish domestic institutions in which the 
norm is embodied accompanying and creating domestic interests in transition. This 
process is incremental and, sometimes, difficult to find. What we are seeking to 
establish is not a simple correlation between the state and international arrangements 
with the direction of causal relationship left unknown. An attempt will be made, in 
this research, to demonstrate that the state qualitatively transforms itself into a state of 
converged identity that other actors might share with common interest. The 
constitutive impact on the state at different levels and the processes are not 
unidirectional but interactive and dynamic in mUltiple ways over time. 
Appreciating what these constitutive processes are like and how they work 
involves investigating what is going on within the "second image reversed.,,3 
Moreover, the tracking of changing patterns in a constitutive process and the 
knowledge of what has brought about such changes, requires a historical approach. 
The research into these un-quantifiable social processes and relationships requires 
qualitative analysis. Changing intertwined process from state t1 to state t2 can only be 
understood through analytical inferences based on more informed and in-depth 
research methods. Any significant differences between ostensibly similar phenomena 
in the different contexts may then be appreciated. The appropriate research strategies 
for examining them justify adopting a qualitative approach. Qualitative research 
strategies will be implemented by adopting a case study approach. 
3 The term reflects the distinction and correlation between international relations and domestic politics. 
The second image termed by Waltz means domestic politics. while the first image is the international 
system. For Waltz. domestic politics is an independent or at most intervening variable for international 
relations. In contrast. Gourevitch stressed the interpenetrated quality of international relations and 
domestic politics in that domestic politics is also causal resource of international relations (Waltz 1979; 
Gourevltch 1978). 
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Given the aim of the research, appropriate strategies will now be identified. The 
unit of analysis and case selection will also be dealt with in the following section. 
The last section will concern methods of data collection and analysis. 
1.4.2. Research Strategies 
Levels of Analysis and Case Study Approach 
To discover the distinctive features of China t2 as compared with China tl to 
which its dynamic interaction with international ACD arrangements have given rise, 
the analysis is divided into three levels; a) the Chinese perspective on ACD affairs, b) 
domestic ACD institutions and c) international participation in ACD arrangements. 
The evolutionary developments of the three domains, during the last decade, reveal 
the internalization of the international ACD agenda and reflect the "second image 
reversed" of the constitutive process facilitated by dynamic interaction. In reality, the 
developments of each level evolved and interacted with each other in a holistic way. 
However, for the convenience of tracking the phenomena of the distinction between 
China t1 and China t2, the present state of each level and its evolutionary pattern will 
be examined. 
The second strategy, to capture the distinctive features in China, is a case study. 
The case study will be employed to illuminate the concreteness of the constitutive 
process by dynamic interaction. The case study is an appropriate approach to this 
research because its usefulness is in attempting to understand or explain the 
phenomena by placing them in their wider context. Given the research question and 
analytical framework suggested earlier, questions of how and why China is engaged 
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in a security regime, about which the literature has little to say, can be best addressed 
by case studies which examine the social process and causal relationships between a 
number of variables. The case study approach helps us to understand complex and 
dynamic interactions between state and international institutions or regimes ina 
holistic perspective. This approach, in examining the dynamics involved in those 
interactions, also enables us to explore the constitutive processes of changes in three 
levels, perspective, domestic institution and international engagement, which 
distinguish the post-case (CTBT in the thesis) from the pre-case state itself. 
1.4.3. Methods of Data Collection and Analysis 
For accuracy and clarity of factual evidence, multiple sources of data such as 
documentation and interviews were used. 
Documentation 
The main method of data collection was documentary work. Chinese articles in 
main journals, books, and newspapers were used for the research. Given the limited 
availability of resources in UK, fieldwork in Taipei and Beijing was necessary. Two 
weeks were spent finding material at the Institute of International Relations (lIR) in 
National Chengchi University in Taiwan. The IIR, founded to research cross-strait 
relations, possesses a large amount of material related to mainland China. Especially, 
the scrapbooks that were assiduously collected cover many issues about mainland 
China's foreign affairs and were very useful. They saved time tracking facts later. 
The second fieldwork was implemented in Beijing for two months. The Renmin 
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University library was available for finding Chinese articles published by mam 
journals. Access to the China National Library made it possible to investigate salient 
data including early Chinese ACD discourse. Given that Chinese publications are 
available for an extremely short time in bookshops, it is difficult to find materials 
other than the most recently published ones. The library also made easy access to the 
Chinese military newspaper, liefang junbao, which contains military voices on 
international ACD issues. 
However, regarding the military sector, the fieldwork was not as successful as 
hoped because the associated military expertise and institutes were relatively 
inaccessible to a foreign observer. To complement the failure of the military part of 
the fieldwork, a personal network in Beijing was mobilized to collect materials, 
especially the journal International Strategic Studies. Some data was also gained at 
the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) in Korea. 
The UN Information Centre in London has a collection of the documents of the 
Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, which are invaluable for an 
investigation of the records of China's participation. Some websites are also available 
for collecting materials, because they are readily accessible. Among these, there are 
non-governmental organizations, such as the Arms Control Association and the 
Monterey Institute of International Studies, which develop and update the 
international ACD issues in detail and make them available for web-surfing. 
The examination of how the formative process led by the dynamic interaction 
fostered change in China itself through feeding in ideas and institutionalization, was 
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also carried out by tracking and updating many secondary sources such as book 
chapters, journal articles and newspaper articles on the relevant themes concerning the 
issues. Especially, it should be said that domestic ACD institutionalization (Chapter 
5) relied significantly upon secondary sources. 
Interviews 
In addition to the documentation, interviews were conducted during the 
fieldwork. But the interview method was fundamentally limited and supplementary to 
the documentary research. Two interviews were done during the fieldwork in Beijing. 
The two Chinese interviewees were each associated with the China Institute of 
International Studies (CnS) and the newly-established CACNS (Centre for Arms 
Control and Nonproliferation Studies) under the Chinese Academy of Social Science 
(CASS), respectively. Both interviewees had had long ACD-related social careers 
and delegation experiences in CD since China's initial participation in international 
ACD frameworks. The limited data collected from the interviews are evidenced in 
this dissertation. 
Methods of Analysis 
A database was created from the data collected through documentation and 
interviews by using "Procite," a reference management programme. The database 
created was very useful for producing new ideas or categories grounded on data. 
Multiple data sources have led to richer findings and a deeper understanding of 
management strategies; the constitutive process of the impact of restructUling 
perspective, domestic institutions and the next engagement in international ACD 
frameworks. In order to grasp the direction and emerging patterns of changes in 
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China t2, a historical approach as well as a current snapshot one is presented. The 
research sought to track how the current instantiations in perspective and domestic 
institution came into being by looking at the process of evolutionary developments 
over the last decade. The testing of the distinction between China t1 and China t2 
makes sense only when the evolving patterns or trends of both analytical levels are 
compared. 
In the thesis, the research tries to contribute to the field in both theoretical and 
practical terms. In theoretical terms, it takes the state (China) as the main analytical 
unit (unlike most constructivists) and explores the role of norms in international 
relations. Instead of focusing on the norms' influence on the international arena, this 
dissertation focuses on their attitudinal internalisation within the Chinese regime and 
within individual institutions. A norm, however, is not a simple given but it 
reconstitutes ideational and material conditions in the domestic milieu. In this sense, 
the thesis employs "constitutive" logic rather than "causation" logic (Wendt 1998) .. 
How the norms of Arms Control and Disarmament (ACD) interact with each other 
and how they reshape a state's interests and identity are an empirically new question. 
That is the core of this dissertation. 
By demonstrating their constitutive effects upon the state, the thesis demonstrates 
ways in which norms come to permeate the state and its institutions. How this has 
occurred in the case of China will be a unique contribution to the studies of 
international relations. In earlier decades Maoist China sought to create an alternative 
world order and wanted to playas small a part as possible in sustaining the existing 
one. Since the re-emergence of Deng Xiaoping China has moved towards a more co-
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operative and constructive relationship with the existing world order. China's 
socialization into the norms of the ACD field has come to counter-balance the 
traditional realpolitik view of a China aiming to maximise its power capabilities in 
foreign policy. This thesis argues that China reconstituted its interests and identities 
as a result of the interaction with international institutions. 
In practical terms, the research also takes a position on the best way of dealing 
with China, which was the essence of the mid-1990s China debate in the West, even 
though the research is not primarily policy-oriented. It analyses China's socialization 
in the international Arms Control and Disarmament (ACD) field. The qualitative 
changes that the interaction between China and international ACD institutions have 
brought during the 1990s indicate the socialization influence of ACD norms. By 
showing their constitutive effects on China, it is argued that the interaction played a 
definite, critical role in reconstituting the state's interest and identity. The dynamic 
role of the interaction and its constitutive effects reveal how important the 
international institutions and regimes are now to China and how they transform the 
state's interest and perception of its identity. 
It argues that the most effective way of affecting China's national interest is not 
to contain China by means of power politics but to engage China in international 
institutions or regimes. This approach also encourages the convergence of national 
interests by sharing subjective meanings with each other, the international ACD 
norms in this case. The proliferation of the ACD norms and their acceptance by 
China in the 1990s will be an excellent barometer to demonstrate the \alidity of a 
policy of engagement in the China threat debate. The shift of Chinese perspecti yes on 
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international ACD issues, Chinese domestic ACD institutionalization and China's 
growing participation in the international ACD frameworks vindicate the engagement 
policy in the international community. 
The process and outcomes of China's socialization in the ACD field suggest that 
the dynamic interaction between China and international ACD institutions (and 
regimes) can be theoretically conceptualised and practically analysed. The ways in 
which the dynamics of the interaction between state and international institutions (or 
regimes) form new state behaviour will be demonstrated in the case of China in the 
following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2. Literature Review 
The field today is fragmented into a variety of judgements about where 
China is heading. There is no authoritative view which might serve as 
the basis for consensus ... The challenge in applying contemporary 
social science theories to China calls for great creativity in 
recalibrating the concepts so as to be sure that they are measuring or 
highlighting comparable things (Lucian W. Pye 1992: 1161-2). 
Sinologists and specialists in Chinese foreign policy have analyzed and explained 
China's international behaviour using material and resources accessible from China 
and the theoretical framework established in IR theory. The literature on Chinese 
foreign policy has developed in parallel with IR theoretical trends. Kim categorized 
these approaches as external/systemic, domestic/societal and domestic/external 
linkage processes (Kim 1994; 1998). Chapter 2 will contain a review of the literature 
on Chinese foreign policy in two directions, theoretical and practical. Theoretical 
endeavours and trends employed in the previous studies of Chinese affairs will be 
examined. The literature on China that has been concerned with the issues of China's 
involvement in international system will be reviewed afterwards. For the clarification 
of my theoretical point, I will argue that we need a more comprehensive theory that 
embraces interactive and co-constitutive processes of external and domestic factors 
for the "phenomenon of emerging and engaging China." 
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2. 1. Introduction 
The evolution of contemporary studies of Chinese foreign policy, broadly China 
studies, has been a theory-seeking and applying process in order to understand and 
interpret China's development since China "stood-up" in Mao's tenn in 1949. In the 
early days, however, the field had tended to stress Chinese cultural and historical 
uniqueness rather than generalize on the basis of social science theory. The legacies 
of the sinologist tradition were criticized by Richard Wilson for its conceptual 
impoverishment, its indifference to developments in the social science, and its 
stubborn adherence to China's uniqueness (Wilson 1971: 305-15). In fact, many 
scholars have been dissatisfied with the applications of social science theories to 
Chinese studies and the field has been assessed to be a few steps behind the 
mainstream of the social sciences (Boardman 1974, Bobrow 1967, Johnson 1965; 
1982, Wei 1985, Harding 1982; 1984; 1993; 1994, Goodman 1985, Pye 1992, Kim 
1994). 
The study of Chinese foreign policy remained "almost completely untouched by 
the procedures of the social science" (Boardman 1974: 2)" and "on the whole PRC-
specific" (Goodman 1985: 344). The reason can be traced to the lack of available 
data and to the political turbulence in China. The sources and material have been 
collected mainly from refugee reports, accounts by the regime's sympathizers and 
official propaganda (Johnson 1982: 921, Halpern 1993: 120) and the prejudice and 
bias of researchers have swung between unwarranted admiration and excessive 
denigration (Harding 1982: 955; Wei 1985: 323). The fundamental problem is that 
the concepts and theories favoured in the field were developed from assumptions 
about systems which operate quite differently from China. Therefore, the task of 
challenge in applying social science theories to China requires "great creativity in 
recalibrating the concepts" (Pye 1992: 1161-2), "theory-specific studies in terms of 
precondition for take-off' (Johnson 1965: 257-8) and "more thorough analysis of the 
spatial and sectoral variations within China" (Harding 1994: 703). Kim also argues 
that "there is as yet no widely accepted metatheory that explains the well-springs of 
Chinese behaviour in any succinct and persuasive fashion." He further calls for more 
"integrated and synthetic theoretical approaches" that will "cross-fertilize and 
invigorate" the study of Chinese foreign policy (Kim 1994: 10-1). 
Despite the criticism of the lack of rigour of the studies of Chinese foreign policy 
in theoretical terms, there has been a clear tendency among China specialists to move 
from the historical-cultural approach to more empirically oriented studies, and from 
pure area studies to social science-oriented research. Extensi ve efforts have been 
made to generate testable hypotheses by building both deductive models and 
inductive research designs. A gradual merging of the theories and methods of various 
branches of the social sciences has occurred in the field, producing a mass of 
literature. Stimulating and productive scholarly debates have taken precedence over 
the relative importance of domestic and international factors in influencing Chinese 
foreign policy (Ross and Godwin 1993: 138). In this chapter, those theoretical trends 
will be categorized in three different ways: external/systemic, domestic/societal and 
domestic/external linkage approach. 
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2.2. The Theoretical Resources of Chinese foreign policy 
2.2.1. The External/Systemic Approach4 
Harry Harding explains that China studies in the 1980s paid greater attention to 
the structural constraints on the actions of agents in contrast to those of the 1970s 
which had tried to come to terms with the behavioural revolution in the social 
SCIences. According to him, the prevailing 1980s paradigm in the literature on 
Chinese foreign policy was structuralism with greater attention to the constraints that 
the international political and economic systems imposed on Chinese decision-makers 
(Harding 1993: 28-9). Apparently, this trend was coupled with the prevailing realist 
thinking in IR theory, which contributed to making unitary-actor/rational-choice 
approaches attractive and feasible for the study of Chinese foreign policy. This 
literature considers China's foreign policy as a search for security in an environment 
in which its options are severely limited by international circumstances over which it 
has little control. The literature from this strategic perspective has examined 
important developments in China's policy as a reflection of change in PRC security, 
developing from shifting trends in the balance of power between the superpowers. 
This work focuses on the impact of the bipolar world and superpower policies toward 
the PRC in explaining Chinese policy. 
Ng-Quinn argues that "if everything counts as equally important, no analysis will 
4 The term external/systemic approach does not necessarily mean the neorealist approach in IR. It is 
just used to indicate one approach that gives a weight to causation from outside of a state. system. 
However, a number of works that concentrate on external causation heavily rely on balance-of-power 
perspective. 
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be necessary and the key to understanding international relations, therefore, lies in 
differentiation and prioritization" (Ng-Quinn 1984: 84). He explains the structural 
logic which Chines foreign policy necessarily faces as follows, 
In order to survive bipolar competition, a state being courted by both poles 
usually must choose sides. Choosing sides does not preclude the possibility of 
subsequently shifting and reshifting sides, although higher costs may result 
owing to a relative loss of trust. Nor does choosing sides necessarily mean a 
total loss of freedom; Within a coalition (tight or loose) centred around a pole, 
variety or polycentricity may still be permissible in areas not directly related to 
central strategic concerns ... Structural constraints and coalition may decrease the 
freedom of states and diminish their opportunities, but they also minimize costly 
uncertainties and surprises. Interaction among states is likely to be relatively 
stable (Ng-Quinn 1984: 96-7). 
According to him, the strength of the neorealist approach is "its ability to provide 
a general or strategic outline of a Chinese foreign policy" (Ng-Quinn 1983: 221). 
Constrained by bipolarity, Chinese foreign policy fell within a narrow range of 
choices. At any given time, China might lean toward either the United States (as in 
the mid-1940s and the 1970s) or the Soviet Union (the late 1940s and the 1950s). 
Having an alternative between the two poles, China had bargaining leverage and the 
ability to shift sides also prevented the two poles from considering China as a 
permanent part of the enemy's camp. Eventually, the only uncertainties were China's 
choices of with whom to align and the extent of that alignment. The patterned 
continuity can be distinguished from the other variables in analyzing specific policies 
and events (Ng-Quinn 1984: 102). 
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A number of studies concentrated on the international constraints of Chinese 
foreign policy with specific purposes. In an effort to fonnalize understanding of 
China's role between the superpowers, scholars have tried to generalize, using such 
concepts as bipolarity and alternatively the US-Soviet-China "triangle" (Segal 1980; 
Garver 1980; Dittmer 1981; Yahuda 1983; Pollack 1984; Sutter 1986; Kim 1987; 
Cumings 1989; Ross 1995; Tow 1994; Nathan and Ross 1997). The literature on 
China and the superpowers is in some aspects a discussion of alliance politics, 
emphasizing China's rational-choice approach to security relationships. China's 
regional security policy has been seen as also strictly tied to bipolar competition and, 
in the context of PRC security concern vis-a-vis its superpower adversary (Ross and 
Godwin 1993: 148). As a result of China's strategic participation in a balance of 
power game, China has been considered as "a firm believer in security as a function 
of power, alliance and manipulation of friends and enemies" (Robinson 1994: 560). 
However, there is self-reflection in the field that admits that the limit and 
reductionism of this approach leaves room for a more comprehensive and 
supplementary framework. The systemic/external approach cannot account for 
variations and details within a given pattern (Ng-Quinn 1983: 221). This shortcoming 
basically results from the "lack of differentiation and overdetennination in stressing 
the continuity of a single pattern of world politics" (Kim 1994: 29). Thus, to presume 
that capabilities are the driving force behind China's foreign policy is to risk the 
danger of reducing the whole dynamic process of Chinese policymaking to one 
"systemic" variable which does not confonn with the past history of the PRC (Wu 
1980: 57). The research efforts to consider the timing and content of particular 
initiatives and major decisions in Chinese foreign policy have not been made and 
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some more dynamic domestic variables in certain sensitive issues and relationships 
have not been sufficiently attended to (Yu 1994: 240-1). For example, the Chinese 
government's ability to maintain a neutral position in some issues or an independent 
foreign policy has been underplayed (Zhao 1996: 14) 
Johnston argues that most of these kinds of studies tend to "fudge the causal 
weight attributed to structural effects or balance of power consideration." According 
to him, Nathan and Ross (1997), for example, start from an "avowedly neorealist 
perspective but rely on ideological and domestic political variables, the very un-
neorealist concept of obligation to international rules," to explain variations in 
Chinese foreign policy (Johnston 1998: 82). He problematizes the traditional balance-
of-power perspective in the study of Chinese foreign policy and proposes that a 
"normative structure" might be employed, which would create other external 
conditions that limit the policy options available to Chinese decision-makers. 
Adopting a social constructivist perspective in IR which is ontologicaIIy separate 
from material structure, Johnston argues that 
Neorealists are right, but not especially insightful when they argue that for all 
these different basic foreign policy strategies ... China is using membership in 
prominent international institutions to enhance its identity as a high-status major 
power. .. Distributions of material capabilities and their systemic effects are 
indeterminate~ their effects are determined by intersubjective interpretation. 
Normative structures are the shared expectations about appropriate behaviour 
held by a community of actors ... So for constructivists, generally speaking. 
neorealists get only half the story when they refer to the constraining effects of 
structure. There are also enabling or empowering effects, where normati ve 
structures provide tools and incentives for actors to try to change. ameliorate. and 
alter the constraints (Johnston 1998: 68-9). 
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The normative structure is assumed to be the causal factor of Chinese foreign 
policy. Chinese status is measured in part by participation in international institutions 
that increasingly has created a tension between China's desire to appear a responsible 
major power and to minimize commitments and constraints. It is an interesting 
finding for IR theory and Chinese foreign policy studies. The application of theory to 
the study of China can contribute to IR theory (Johnston 1998: 77). 
China's foreign policy options are delimited not only by international power 
structures but also by international norms. International norms affect Chinese foreign 
policy behaviour in at least two obvious ways. First, international norms define the 
terms of the international discourse in which states seek to justify their policy or 
action, in addressing the puzzle of why powerful states obey the seemingly powerless 
international rules. Legitimacy is defined in terms of the normati ve potency of a rule 
or rule-making institution. International institutions influence the participants toward 
compliance even among powerful states because their functions accord with generally 
accepted principles of right process. Second, Chinese foreign policy behaviour is 
affected, in varying degree, through international socialization and subsequent 
changes in domestic decision-making structures and processes. With China's 
growing participation in multilateral regimes comes a more solid empirical base for 
testing various theories - learning theory, epistemic community theory, neoliberal 
institutional theory, and social constructivist theory - to see how and why old norms 
compete with new norms in the course of China's social interactions with other actors 
in various international regimes and how and why some norms are jettisoned, where 
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others are reproduced in the input, output, and feedback processes of the Chinese 
foreign policy system. 
Given that China has been subject to all the external pressures and dynamics that 
are characteristic of an increasingly interdependent and interactive world, the 
literature that concentrates on the centripetal pressure of global integration rather than 
balance-of-power perspective is relatively small and only recently pursued. In the 
1990s, the striking economic growth and enhanced international position of China 
attracted increasing concerns regarding the management of a rising China. The 
literature which has explored China's position in the world system and the 
international community will be reviewed in the third section. 
2.2.2. The Domestic/Societal Approach 
Scholars of Chinese foreign policy have made efforts to seek the causal 
relationship between specific foreign policy and any unique and characteristic 
domestic aspects of China. Ideologies such as Marxism-Leninism, Maoism and 
nationalism, factional coalition, elite beliefs and perceptions and decision-making 
processes have been given primacy in the shaping of Chinese foreign policy. The 
focus of this approach has been developed from the central level of elites and 
bureaucratic institutions to the sub-level elites and institutions in parallel with the 
gradual opening of China's reform policy and the greater access by outsiders to 
policy-making institutions and to some of their key personnel. 
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In the early days, the prevailing paradigm of the approach was the "Mao-in-
command" model of the 1950s and earl y 1960s, or the facti on ali sm of the late 1960s 
and 1970s, both of which focused almost entirely on the central elite. The leadership 
of Mao's ideology and policy preferences was analyzed as having a dominant impact 
upon Chinese foreign policy (Kim 1977; Oksenberg 1976). The factionalism focused 
on the struggle in political circles over the appropriate PRC response to external 
challenges. For example, the domestic origins of US-China rapprochement were 
explored by the factionalism approach (Garver 1982). However, as Ross argues, the 
relevance of factionalism and the influence of policy debates among their servants 
remains marginal, while the overarching role of the preeminent leadership of Mao and 
Deng was considered as determining by these scholars (Ross 1989). 
With relatively more open access to materials and resources in China since the 
mid-1980s the domestic approach has developed the field in two different directions. 
One was to examine the policy-making mechanism of specific sectors below the top-
level decision-makers. The other was to explore the debates and writings of foreign 
policy specialists and illuminate their perceptions, which presumably reflect the 
deeper structure of Chinese thinking and its impact on Chinese foreign policy. These 
works were an embodiment of the changing pattern of Chinese foreign policy 
decisions, "from vertical to horizontal authoritarianism," which, as Quansheng Zhao 
argues, are now made by several discrete power bases coordinated at the centre with 
multiple command channels reflecting different interests and policies of bureaucratic 
organization (Zhao 1992). 
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The growing bureaucratic interests and institutionalization that the refonn policy 
fostered has been captured in a model of "fragmented authoritarianism." This model 
was employed to explain the characteristics of the bureaucratic structure of Chinese 
authority and decision making in which consensus-building is central and a policy 
process is protracted, disjointed, and incremental (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988: 
Lampton 1987; Lieberthal 1992; Shirk 1992; Hamrin and Zhao 1995). The literature 
on policy formulation and implementation highlights the extent to which decision-
making in post-Mao China has become incremental in nature. The need for leaders to 
build consensus and maintain balance among various functional and geographical 
interests that would otherwise resist central initiatives, consumes time and waters 
down policy outcomes. In the absence of well-institutionalized mechanisms for 
conflict resolution, leaders must rely on ad hoc measures such as boundary-spanning 
conferences or the exploitation of personal connections. The result is a policy process 
where the most insidious aspects of bureaucratic politics reinforce a traditional 
political culture that emphasizes the personal ties of guanxi (Lampton 1987: 16-7; 
Shirk 1992: 76). 
A more sophisticated explanation has been sought in order to understand Chinese 
policy-making mechanism and institutions. The first comprehensive map of Chinese 
foreign policy institutions and processes was initiated by Barnett in 1985. Following 
Barnett's pioneering work, the specific bureaucracies began to be analyzed. The role 
of foreign investment and trade bureaucracy was separated from diplomatic and 
strategic affairs with the result of economic reform process. The extension of the 
foreign trade bureaucracy into domestic bureaucrcies was discussed (Breslin 1990: 
Halpern 1989). The detailed work on China's national security research institutions 
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was endeavoured (Shambaugh 1987). The military's role and involvement in national 
security policymaking was illuminated and military influences over foreign policy 
were also probably on the rise, as military views were increasingly expressed (Swaine 
1996). In the arms control and disarmament field, Johnston researched China's 
growing arms control community as a consequence of transnational linkage to an 
international epistemic community (Johnston 1996). 
Equally, ground-breaking efforts to understand Chinese foreign policy have been 
made to identify the politically significant perceptions/misperceptions of the foreign 
policy community and to determine how they actually influence policymakers 
(Rozman 1987; Whiting 1989; Shambaugh 1991). This literature examines the mind-
set of the Chinese toward Soviet Union, Japan and the United States respectively. 
Shambaugh's work is not purely perceptual in that he identifies the structure and 
interrelationship between various agencies of China's foreign policy-making 
community and the perceptions of them. Thus his work bridges both institutional and 
cognitive approaches and offers more dynamic and plausible implications for Chinese 
foreign policy toward United States (Yu 1994: 247-8). The interpretation of Chinese 
foreign policy in psycho-analytic terms has been followed by more sophisticated 
works that have focused on specific aspects of the changing Chinese perspectives 
such as nationalism, identity and redefinition of national interests that have been 
reformulated by a persistent reform policy (Dittmer and Kim 1993; Unger 1996; Deng 
and Wang 1999; Zheng 1999). China's strategic thinking has been explored by 
heavily detailed documentary works of two different periods, ancient and 
contemporary (Johnston 1995a; Pilisbury 2000). Chinese perspectives on arms 
control resulting from the increasing involvement in multilateral security institutions 
have been analyzed (Garrett and Glaser 1995). Those researches into the Chinese 
mind-set on security issues have concluded that Chinese strategic thinking remains 
dominated by realpolitik. 
In sum, the studies of Chinese foreign policy that focus upon causation from 
domestic factors have moved from the early politics-centred approach toward a 
specific and sophisticated research agenda of growing and conflicting bureaucratic 
institutions and perspectives with vested interests. 
2.2.3. DomesticlExternal Linkage 
The theoretical review of the literature on Chinese foreign policy demonstrates 
that all the previous achievements are stepping stones of attempts to integrate 
domestic and external variables into a more comprehensi ve theoretical framework. 
Quansheng Zhao suggests a demarcation of levels of analysis into macro and 
micro levels. His analytical lens departs from the "symbolic macrostructure" of 
Beijing's interpretation of the external environment via institutional analyses such as 
rules, norms and mechanisms of the policy-making process, sources of power, the 
issue of legitimacy and foreign policy strategies and tactics (Zhao 1996: 26-7). 
However, his division of these dimensions has not taken into account the centripetal 
forces of external factors. China's growing involvement in the international 
community, for example, multilateral economic institutions as the subject of IR 
theories, would be not considered as determinant and restructuring variables in 
Chinese foreign policy. Hence, his approach is not sufficient for understanding the 
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dynamics of Chinese foreign policy because he stresses the mutual influences and 
mechanisms among the elements at the micro and macro levels only (Zhao 1996: 27). 
The dimensions should be open and the interplay should be not only between micro-
and-macro levels but also between internal-and-externallevels. 
Kim argues that the impact of globalization dynamics on Chinese foreign policy 
requires the intensification of the domestic and external linkage approach. The 
factors that influence Chinese foreign policy behaviour no longer "fall neatly into the 
dichotomous categories of domestic/societal and external/systemic variables" (Kim 
1998: 22). 
Chinese foreign policy is seen here as the outcome of a continuing interplay 
between decisionmakers' perceptions of needs, interests and beliefs and their 
perceptions of and responses to international material and normative 
pressures ... This approach recognizes the restructuring impact of external 
pressures on foreign policy decisionmaking, but it also stresses the importance of 
domestic political institutions and policies in the timing and framing of specific 
responses to such external pressures (Kim 1998: 23) 
The increasingly demanding domestic/external linkage approach has been 
addressed by other scholars. Bin Yu argues that more relevant studies of Chinese 
foreign policy will be needed to focus on the interplay between policy-making 
institutions and individuals and the broader societal and systemic factors. 
Consideration should be given to when international and domestic factors will affect 
each other because of the changing perceptions of decision-makers and specialists 
(Yu 1994: 259). Ferdinand indicates that the external factors might re-allocate 
domestic power relationship between central government and provincial governments 
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during China's open-door policy. The provinces have been able to attract extra 
capital, technology and know-how and expanded their economic interest and links 
with the rest of Asia, which increasingly return to affect Chinese foreign policy 
making, especially in regional affairs. This analysis shows that the provincial and 
domestic regional factor, boosted by external factors, has become a much more 
important component in Chinese foreign policy (Ferdinand 1990: 135-58). 
The domestic/external linkage approach is conspIcuoUS In the literature that 
considers China's involvement in international institutions. In the next sub-chapter, 
the recent literature on these issues will be reviewed. 
2.3. The Literature on Emerging and Engaging China 
2.3.1. China Threat Debates 
It is not clear why and by whom China threat debates were initiated abruptly in 
1990s. When the American news media published numerous articles that fuelled 
fears of a rising Chinese military threat in 1995, the debates began to attract public 
concern.5 The policy-analysts and scholars expressed their views and discussed it in 
the Soviet-disintegrated global arena and then the discourse expanded to the public 
and to China's neighbouring countries. Here, the debates will not be wholly explored 
in detail, but addressed for their theoretical implications. On the surface. the debates 
5 On those numerous articles published in the news media, see David Shambaugh (1996a : 3)-4). 
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considered the policy directions necessary to deal with China but, In fact, each 
articulation has its own implied theoretical position in nature. 
Scholars of international relations and specialists of East Asia argue that East 
Asia could be the most destabilizing region of the post Cold War era with the 
increasing importance of China which has a huge territory and rapidly growing 
economy since the reform policy in 1979 (Scalapino 1991-2: 26-36; Calder 1996: 12; 
Betts 1993-4: 34). East Asia is characterized by major shifts in the balance of power, 
skewed distributions of economic and political power within and between countries, 
political and cultural heterogeneity, growing but still relatively low levels of 
intraregional economic interdependence, poor security institutionalization, and wide-
spread territorial disputes that combine natural resource issues with postcolonial 
nationalism. In a milieu with these characteristics, the growing concerns about an 
emerging China have been highlighted over the debate between the containment 
school and the engagement school. 
The containment school foresees the rise of a belligerent power, a process that 
will inevitably destabilize Asia and challenge vital US interests. It argues that a 
powerful China will be intent on achieving a long list of unrealized territorial and 
political ambitions, and insists that the United States must respond to China's rise by 
strengthening its alliances on the Chinese periphery and increasing U.S. military 
deployments in Asia to put Chinese influence in check. Only if pressure IS 
maintained, will China's policy remain softer. So far China's involvement In 
international institutions has done little to modify and constrain its behaviour. China 
is not prepared to accept the constraints inherent in real interdependence with the 
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outside world. Therefore, a policy intended to constrain China should be much more 
like the one that managed relations with the Soviet Union (Kristof 1993; Roy 1994: 
Bernstein and Munro 1997). 
The containment school subscribes to the realistic logic that a rapid rise of a new 
power may lead to dangerous consequences. In the past the emergence of all the great 
powers was accompanied by wars, as with Germany and Japan, or intense struggle, as 
in the case of the Soviet Union and the Cold War. It follows that a rising power such 
as China will inevitably find the existing system nonconducive to its interests, which 
in turn necessarily conflicts with those of the reigning hegemon, the United States. 
Furthermore, a widely accepted democratic peace theory has provided an 
additional framework to interpret the phenomenon of rising China. The thrust of the 
theory holds that democracies never resort to force against other democracies, even 
though internally democracies may not necessarily be more peaceful than 
nondemocracies. Logically, in the eyes of democracies nondemocracies are the major 
threat to democracies (Russet 1993). The democratic peace tenet has made significant 
inroads in the official thinking guiding the U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War 
era. The Chinese communist regime that repressed the democratic movement of 
Tiananmen Square could not be respected as a democratic country. A great deal of 
Chinese international behaviour has been criticized by this school. China's arms sales 
and unabated human rights abuses reflect the recalcitrance to the rules and norms of 
international society. Moreover, according to the school, China in transition may be 
even more dangerous, to the extent that the coexistence of the legacies of the old 
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regime and the fragility of new institutions may unleash destructive nationalism and 
chauvinism beyond any control (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). 
Using the same theoretical assumption of a theory of "democratic peace", the 
engagement school is more optimistic about the transformation of Chinese society. A 
more open and democratic China can be achieved by further domestic reform and 
international interdependence. International enmeshment facilitates China's social 
learning in terms of the values, norms, principles, and rules of the international system 
and creates China's stake in the existing institutions and order. China's worldview 
and definition of national interests can be modified toward greater compatibility with 
the international community within the context of transnational activities and 
networks, including tourism, academic and cultural exchanges, and commercial ties. 
Susan Shirk shows how internationalization has generated domestic social groups, 
sectors, and regional interests in support of continued reform in China: "Once the wall 
between China and the world economy was partially dismantled, international 
economic forces evoked positive domestic responses to China's reform drive." (Shirk 
1996: 196). According to this optimism, the changes are noteworthy and are 
fundamentally transforming Chinese society. 
The engagement school agrees that China is growing stronger but argues that 
Chinese intentions remain fluid and that premature adoption of belligerent policies 
risks creating a self-fulfilling prophecy: treat China as an enemy and it will be one. 
They assert that expanded economic relations and official dialogues on security 
issues, human rights, and the global norms will maximize the prospect that China will 
use its power in a manner conducive to U.S. interests. The Chinese government has 
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sought to assure the region that China does not seek hegemony now, nor will it do so 
in the future, even when it is economically developed (Shambaugh 1994a: 1996a; 
1996b; Christensen 1996; Ross 1997; Andrey and Patrick Cronin 1996). 
Johnston and Ross define the term "engagement" as 
The use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status-quo elements of a 
rising major power's behaviour. The goal is to ensure that this growing power is 
used in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in regional and global 
order (Johnston and Ross 1999: xiv). 
"Non-coercive methods" include such strategies as accommodation of legitimate 
interests, transformation of preferences, and entanglement in bilateral and multilateral 
institutional constraints. In contrast to "containment," it is argued that "engagement" 
seeks neither to limit, constrain, nor delay increases in China's power nor prevent the 
development of influence, commensurate with its greater power. Rather, it seeks to 
socialize the rising power by encouraging its satisfaction with the evolving global or 
regional order (Johnston and Ross 1999: xv). 
They both share the perception that the rising China is a new challenger in the 
region. In both the theoretical and the historical view, the worrying point is that, at 
first, there is a historical precedent which clearly suggests that nations in economic 
transition tend to be externally assertive, and that accommodating a rising power into 
the established order has proved difficult and disruptive. Continuing overexpansion 
of industrialized power led finally to war as world history has experienced in 20th 
century (Snyder 1991: Rosecrance and Stein 1993). And there is a strong correlation 
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between states in political transition from authoritarian to democratic systems and the 
incidence of war. Both schools share the similar objective of wanting to make China 
less recalcitrant and more adaptive to enmesh it into the international regime and 
institutions, even though their methods are different. 
However, the notions of engagement and containment are, as Segal noted, 
inherited from the legacies of Cold War, and for that reason alone they are insufficient 
categories of analysis for the special problem of coping with a rising China (Segal 
1996: 108).6 The international order has been undergoing profound systemic change 
at the very time that the post-Cold War and international system is itself in great flux. 
The international agenda and balance of power are increasingly dominated by global 
issues and international regimes, which China finds onerous given its emphasis on 
strict state sovereignty and non-interference in what it deems "internal affairs." 
Furthermore, this debate lacks a sophisticated analytical framework, research and 
evidence, in part because the China issue has emerged so quickly and suddenly on to 
the official and academic stage, and in part because Chinese foreign policy is a 
severely understudied subfield of international relations. In this sense, studies of 
Chinese foreign policy need to be reinvigorated by IR theory. 
The debates over the China threat and the relevant policy considerations reflect a 
dilemma faced by leadership and policy-makers of the related countries, especially the 
United States. Both sides suffer from the lack of much solid empirical evidence. The 
next sub-chapter will review the limited and recently undertaken works to illuminate 
6 Segal was uncomfortable with the dichotomous terms of engagement and containment. Instead. he 
proposed a new term, "constrainment," that combines elements of both (Segal 1996). 
the relationship between Chinese foreign policy behaviour and international 
institutions. 
2.3.2. China and International Institutions 
The politics of mutual adjustment - how international institutions or regimes 
might adjust to the ambitions and prerogatives of a rising China and how a rising 
China might adjust to the principles, norms, and objectives of them poses one of the 
major challenges of the post-cold war world order (Kim 1999: 44). 
The literature on China's involvement with international institutions has been 
developed more recently. The consistent outcomes of its reform policy and the 
economic entanglement with the global economy necessarily have produced the 
corresponding examinations about the ongoing phenomena of China's involvement 
with the international community and the concomitant problem of management and 
adjustment. The interest of this literature is to analyze how China's involvement in 
international institutions and regimes has affected its foreign policy behaviour. Those 
works assesses the extent to which PRC membership in international institutions is 
promoting a Chinese nexus in these institutions, creating new Chinese interests and 
socializing China into building consensus to resolving international conflicts. 
Kim, m his article, assesses the reciprocal impacts of China's growmg and 
widening engagement with the United Nations and U.N.-sponsored global 
conferences (Kim 1999). He explores a number of policy shifts over such global 
issues as arms control and disarmament, U.N. peacekeeping, North-South relations, 
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human rights, science and technology, and environmental protection and sustainable 
development. He evaluates the most significant impact of Chinese participation in 
U.N. activity as its learning effects rather than enforced ones like supervision of 
implementation and imposing sanctions. The standard-setting, norm-clarifying and 
lawmaking processes of U.N., if initially engaged, engendered the continuing 
repetitive process of China's multilateral integration into each of the U.N. organs and 
conferences (Kim 1999: 82). Because of high normative pressures and image costs, 
China can be forced more easily to shift in more cooperative directions and to 
restructure certain policies, principles and even institutions and policy-making 
mechanisms. 
Practically all the multilateral economic, science, and technology regimes in the 
U.N. have been utilized as sources of China's modernization drive. A critical factor 
in China's efforts to construct a modem economy has been to gain access to foreign 
loans, credits, investment and trade, jettisoning the principle of self-reliance of the 
communist model. An important aspect of China's adoption and integration into the 
global economic system has been its active participation in a number of international 
economic institutions. The development of China's involvement with international 
economic institutions has drawn attention to China's growmg economy and the 
implications for world economy. 
Jacobson and Oksenberg trace the evolution of China's attitude to the IMF, the 
World Bank and GAIT. the considerations that made China wish to join them and its 
subsequent dealing with them since the United Nations agreed to give China the seat 
previously occupied by Taiwan in 1971 (Jacobson and Oksenberg 1990). They 
illuminate the contingent and problematic process of China's participation in those 
key global economy organizations. The initiated contact, the process of engagement. 
internal preparations and negotiations are empirically described. They argue that the 
three broad factors: a propitious international environment; wise leadership and 
epistemic communities on both sides make for mature and sensitive approaches 
(Jacobson and Oksenberg 1990: 18-20). 
Feeney follows Jacobson and Oksenberg's efforts with more detail about the 
period following China's engagement in the international economic arena. Feeney 
explores the historical evolution of China's relationship with the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) , the World Bank Group(WBG) - the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IDRD) or World Bank, and its affiliated 
agencies the International Development Association (IDA) and the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC). Feeney argues that China's participation has been "an 
important hedge in China's shift to a market economy" (Feeney 1994: 247). He 
mainly explores the benefits that the membership of these institutions has endowed. 
Membership enabled China to draw upon valuable foreign professional economic 
expertise to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese economy, for 
example, to draft jointly a long-range development blueprint and broad and 
diversified training for large numbers of Chinese experts and officials. Those 
institutions provided a huge pool of lending capital in grants, loans, and concessionary 
rate credits. Thus, China could cope with temporary monetary and trade imbalances 
and finance an ambitious array of infrastructure and development projects. Through 
close personal and professional contact with foreign experts, China's bureaucratic, 
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technical, and emerging entreprenerurial elite has been trained and fostered not onl\ 
to implement policy requisites of successful economic development but also to create 
vested career interests (Feeney 1998: 260). Overall, Feeney argues that those 
economic institutions have functioned to enmesh China more firmly into the 
international community. 
In contrast to Feeney, Pearson concerns himself more with the domestic effects of 
the international institutions. On the basis of the yardstick of Johnston's 
conceptualization of "engagement," Pearson argues that the efforts of multilateral 
economic institutions appear to have been successful in encouraging China to play by 
the rules of the game (Pearson 1999a: 207). First, the engagement strategy employed 
by the major institutions is not the only cause of China's expanded cooperative 
behaviour in the global economic regime. Discipline imposed by the global market, 
bilateral pressure from the United States government, and especially the desires of 
domestic political actors, have also promoted China's cooperative behaviour. Second, 
its impact is not direct, but rather is channelled through domestic perceptions and 
domestic structures. Pearson's analysis finds positive evidence that mechanisms for 
engagement implicit in regime theory and transnationalism are at work, but also that 
domestic political structures and politics are crucial for mediating the effect of 
external influences on China. Evaluating the engagement strategy of international 
institutions, Pearson is still doubtful of Chinese cooperative behaviour. He argues 
that China's behaviour is "not totally cooperative compared with other major powers. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to conclude that the engagement is a crucial factor because 
cooperation increased when Chinese leaders were already moving in the direction of 
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cooperation and an ideology shift already eliminated the hindrance of the penetration 
of the norms of institutions" (Pearson 1999a: 229). 
In another article, Pearson discusses the empirical record of China's integration 
into the international trade and investment regime between 1978 and 1996 and 
examines the impact on both China and the regime itself (Pearson 1999b). He 
identifies that the factor most responsible for integration into the regime was the 
Chinese leadership's willingness and commitment. The gridlock of negotiation over 
China's entry into WTO reflected the difficulty of deeper integration attributable to 
Chinese leadership's cautious approach and a growing cognizance of the costs. 
However, even if this external factor remains only marginal in influence, he proposes 
that Chinese policy-makers eventually respond to international market forces that 
coercive foreign pressures are relatively effective in obtaining Chinese cooperation 
(Pearson 1999b: 191-6). 
By the same token, China's increasing participation in international financial 
markets has been explored (Lardy 1999). Lardy assesses that China has conformed to 
the implicit norms of the international financial system. He identifies the impact on 
the Chinese economy that interactions with the IMP provided not only long-term 
funding but also technical assistance and strategic advice on China's economIC 
transformation. For example, the IMP played an advisory role in encouraging China 
to move towards achieving current account convertibility by the end of 1996 (Lardy 
1999: 210). He also points out that China's exposure to international financial regime 
brought restructuring impacts on the domestic economy, for example banking and the 
establishment of financial institutions. 
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2.3.3. China and International ACD Institutions 
Unlike the international economic institutions, which provide useful information 
.and an environment congruent with the interest of China's economic modernization, 
the arms control and disarmament (ACD) institutions, which would supposedly 
constrain China's security interest, appear to be quite controversial. Their intellectual 
assessment and examination basically depend on the Chinese attitude toward their 
practical and functional utility. In this sense, the various views on Chinese ACD 
behaviour are another version of the contending theoretical streams in IR. The subject 
of China's engagement in international ACD institutions has a potential contribution 
to make to the development and sophistication of IR theory. 
The neorealist approach7 does not gIve much credit to international ACD 
institutions or regImes for inducing China's cooperative behaviour. Malik 
demonstrates that there has been little substantive change in China's operational 
policy. Malik argues that China's nuclear arms control policy is instrumental rather 
than purposive serving for its strategic objective. China's ACD policy is still 
"oriented towards enhancing its nuclear capacities rather than reducing its arsenal." 
China even utilized the ACD process as a means to reduce and weaken US and 
Russian forces, because the Chinese perspective on ACD remain "basically 
unchanged." For Malik, national security policy provides the best perspective from 
which to "analyze, measure and predict" Chinese behaviour (Malik 1995). Malik's 
7 The terms are coined as neorealist. neoliberalist. and constructivist approach. The scholars do not 
designate their approach in their research. Nonetheless. I use those terms here to distinguish and 
recognize the various views on China's engagment in international ACD institutions. This would lead 
on to the theoretical distinction as explored in chapter 3. 
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security-first approach has explanatory power, in that the Chinese leadership has long 
sought for its security and it has developed the nuclear bomb for that reason. 
However, this approach narrowed down the research scope and failed to predict 
China's accession to the CTBT and support for the Fissile Matrerial Cut-off Treaty 
(FMCT) which are, in Malik's words, "seen as damaging to Chinese security." Thus. 
he focused on China's security strategy in dealing with China and its engagement in 
institutions or regimes to an extreme degree. Security is one of cost-benefit 
calculations. Even the concept of security is changing. 
Even after China committed itself to several treaties in the 1990s, the neorealist 
approach finds Chinese ACD behaviour vague. 
"But this mindset has evolved in recent years, as has China's understanding of arms 
control issues. The truth is that Beijing's arms control policies are ambiguous and in 
flux. Beijing may see arms control as part of an integrated set of policies aimed at 
enhancing national security and international stability. It may also view arms control 
negotiations as a way to increase leverage in bilateral ties with Washington, or as part 
of a larger effort to impose constraints on American freedom of action. And finally, 
it remains possible that Beijing pursues arms control at the rhetorical level but not in 
a way that has any actual impact on military decision" (Roberts, Manning and 
Montaperto 2000: 61). 
China has provoked wornes for the international community, violating 
international rules and norms in its clandestine arms sales. China's foreign and 
domestic motives for missile exportation supercede the commitment to the regime 
(Mullins 1995: 152). China has hesitated to join the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR) and has denounced it as discriminatory. In a sense, this has 
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introduced into the suspicion and ambiguity over Chinese ACD behaviour the image 
of untrustworthiness. 
Rather than treating China as an unitary actor, which has personified intention, 
some observers locate the reason for the deficiency of Chinese implementation at the 
institutional level. They attribute the violation to the weakness of its export control 
system and domestic military establishment interests (Hu Weixing 1994~ Davis 1995). 
For example, Davis explains the gap between China's declared nonproliferation 
policy and its failure to end controversial exports, by examining China's nascent 
export control system. He argues that political and military officials regulate exports 
within the limits of their authority, which results in two different arms control 
systems, civilian commodities and military-sensitive exports (Davis 1995: 595-600). 
Lewis, Hua Di and Xue Litai also focus on domestic institutions, China's defence 
establishment, to find a means for "solving the arms-export enigma." The military-
industrial extablishment and its economic-political incentives seek for hard cash for 
modernization by arms exports (Lewis, Hua Di and Xue Litai 1991). John Lewis and 
Hua Di also noted that the technologies, strategies, and goals relating to China's 
missile programmes must be better understood by the concerned international 
community, in order to overcome its confrontational stance with China and to build a 
cooperative regime. Just as the Chinese leadership no longer considers complete self-
reliance a necessary or wise policy for its modernization efforts, including those 
related to strategic and tactical missiles, so, too, does it no longer place itself outside 
the global norms of peace and cooperation. It would therefore be a mistake to regard 
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China's aspirations towards defence development as being any more sinister than 
those of other great powers (Lewis and Hua Di 1992: 39) 
Nonetheless, overall, China's ACD behaviour is regarded by neorealists as the 
maxi/mini strategy - maximization of its security interests by benefiting the 
superpowers' ACD negotiation and minimization of its own commitments and costs 
(Kim 1994: 420). It is very much circumscribed by a "neo-mercantilist realist 
approach" that rejects many of the cooperative and transnational implications 
(Yahuda 1997: 14). Thus, the learning effect, which can be expected from China's 
engagement in international ACD institutions, is conditional and partial. Johnston 
takes the position that China's ACD behaviour can be read as adaptation, rather than 
learning, which accompanies a paradigmatic shift of perspective. On the basis of his 
two previous researches about Chinese nuclear strategic thinking and the Chinese 
arms control community (Johnston 1995b; 1996), Johnston examines Chinese 
involvement in arms control regimes. In a joint article with Michael Swaine, he 
proposes that China's increasing involvement in arms control regimes "consists 
primarily of realpolitik adaptation to a changing security environment" rather than 
learning. Evidence for the transmission of the concept of common security, or the 
security dilemma, remains "murky," although the growing Chinese arms control 
community and its contact with Western arms control experts contributed to the 
development of an interagency decision-making process and worked in favour of the 
signing of the NPT and CTBT in 1996 (Swaine and Johnston 1999: 117-8). Overall, 
Swaine and Johnston argue that China's greatly expanded participation in various 
forms of arms control, basically expressed in their adaptation policy and realpolitik 
approach to the changing international arms control agenda, has occurred alongside an 
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attempt to minimize constraints on its own military capabilities. However. Johnston 
admitted the function of ACD institutions for constraining China's security interest in 
the long tenn. Ceteris paribus, he argues that "the primary constraint on China's 
nuclear modernization will come from multilateral anns control processes" (Johnston 
1997: 311). 
Neoliberalists evaluate the effect of ACD institutions and regimes on China more 
positively. Frieman argues that "open channels of communication and dialogue are 
generally preferable to isolated camps of mutual suspicion". The ultimate effect will 
be whether China changes its view to support national security rather than undermine 
it despite its constraints on sovereignty (Frieman 1996: 28-9). Hu Weixing argues 
that China has moved up "a steep learning curve" on ACD policy since it joined the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) in 1984, concentrating upon China's 
growing compliant behaviour. Hu gives a broad sketch of China's access to NPT as a 
learning effect rather than a simple policy adaptation.8 He argues that China 
consciously adjusted its policy to NPT regimes through a learning process. 
The socialization with the nonproliferation regime requires conscious efforts to 
adjust behaviour to international standards. Because of China's distinct strategic 
and tactical culture in dealing with the international society, the process of 
learning and socialization with international nuclear regime is slow and unique 
(Hu Wei xing 1999: 127) 
8 The concept of "learning" is distinguished from "adaptation" in that policy change is fundamental and 
shifts the central paradigm. New information about the external environment is internalized by 
decision-makers. meanwhile adaptation means tactical adjustment to changing external conditions. 
Tactical learning involves change in means but not in ends; whereas cognitive learning involves a 
modification of goals as well as means (Levy 1994). 
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The development of regulation of China's nuclear export control examplifies 
China's efforts to meet the safeguards laid down by lAEA. According to Hu, in the 
learning process, the U.S. role served as an "inducer and enforcer" to facilitate 
China's involvement in the NPT. The nuclear experts in institutions like the CNNC 
(China National Nuclear Corporation), played the role of agents for change. For 
instance, they introduced internationally shared nonproliferation concepts (safeguards, 
export controls and inspection) into the policymaking process. Hu also regards the 
accession of the NPT as a "major shift in Beijing's perceptions of the NPT regime as 
well as its approaches to arms control and international security" (Hu Weixing 1999: 
119). 
On the basis of the broad and detailed interview with the Chinese ACD experts, 
Garrett and Glaser further argue that China is now beginning to accept "limited 
security interdependence." China's decision to the CTBT "would constitute an 
unmistakable signal of Chinese acceptance, however limited, of security 
interdependence" (Garrett and Glaser 1995: 76). The above assessment has been 
supported by Lampton since China joined the CTBT. 
"More broadly, China's agreement to join the NPT represents a major shift in 
thinking about security, moving toward the recognition that security cannot be 
achieved solely through unilateral action. China's agreement to the CTB in late 1996 
signals an even larger step in this direction" (Lampton 1997: 127-8) 
Indeed, China's accession to the CTBT has been a watershed to evaluate Chinese 
ACD policy and behaviour. It raises the question of a major shift in China's 
perspective on ACD but also generates a normative approach. The implication of the 
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treaty is that it freezes China's nuclear modernization programme and China accepts 
international norms and the concept of limited security interdependence. Chinese 
analysts also regard it as "China's sacrifice for the CTBT." Zou Yunhua stressed that 
the treaty will have a significant impact on China's "fundamental security interest." 
The treaty will impose "severe limitations on any further modernization of the 
Chinese nuclear arsenal" (Zou Yunhua 1998a: 26-7). Sun Xianli 9 analyzes the 
relationship between China's nuclear strategy and its desire for testing and explores 
the reason why China decided to join the CTBT. Sun concludes that a CTBT would 
place greater constraints on China's nuclear programme than on those of the other 
treaties. Sun suggests that the progress of international arms control negotiations, a 
further reduction of nuclear arsenals of nuclear powers, no-first-use (NFU) 
commitment by all nuclear states, and adherence to the ABM treaty, would reduce 
China's concern and encourage China to make even greater contributions in the post-
CTBT era (Sun Xiangli 1997: 12-4). 
Given the fact that the CTBT constrains China's security interest, some scholars 
attribute the reason for China's acceding, to the international "normative structure" or 
pressure. Facing the unprecedented events of China's accession to the CTBT, 
analysts tried to suggest how China might adjust to the principles, norms and 
objectives of international institutions and this has become the focal point of Chinese 
ACD studies. Jia Hao explains China's nuclear nonproliferation policy within the 
framework of regime theory (Jia Hao 1999a). He deduced that the evolution of 
China's nuclear arms control policy was significantly influenced by international 
-------------
9 Sun Xiangli i:-- a research fellow in the Arms Control Research Division of the Institute of :\pplied 
Physics and Computational Mathematics (lAPCM) in Beijing. 
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regimes and he used the NPT, the CTBT and the MTCR as chosen case studies. He 
employed three variables, China's costlbenefit calculations, its policy coordination 
between bureaucratic institutions and each regime's normative power to explain 
China's policy and behaviour. He argues that the international regime's normati ve 
power, in the case of the CTBT treaty, made China join, albeit reluctantly, because it 
constrained China's relative power and froze the future possibility of upgrading its 
nuclear capacity (Jia Hao 1999a: 340). 
Johnston also finds the international "normative structure" to be the reason for 
China's CTBT accession. In pursuing its realpolitik interests in military 
modernization, China inescapably became sensitive to its international image as a 
peaceful leader of less-developed countries. The traditional sovereign-centric identity 
with modem Chinese nationalism has made China act as a responsible power. This 
new identity has created the desire to present itself as an active participant in 
international institutions and to avoid being isolated (Johnston 1997: 311-2; Swain 
and Johnston 1999: 120). Johnston and Evans argue that its image concerns might 
play a more important role in eliciting cooperation in high-profile multilateral 
institutions rather than in lower profile bilateral relationships. They suggest that the 
image costs might explain China's agreement on CTBT, sacrificing relative nuclear 
power costs (Johnston and Evans 1999: 252-3). Therefore scholars argue that 
multilateral engagement is very effective because it capitalizes on China's desire to be 
included as a "great power" and to be perceived as a responsible world leader (Kan 
and Davis 1994: 159-60). 
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Johnston further develops his approach with "path-dependence" logic. In a joint 
article, Johnston and Evans explore the process of Chinese involvement especially in 
CTBT on a global level and ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) on a regional level. 
They find no evidence of material incentives (promises of technology transfers, threat 
of economic or technological sanctions) for China's involvement and argue that "a 
path-dependent" process has eased the evolutionary development of participation. 
The concept of "path-dependence" is employed to explain an incremental engagement 
over time. According to them, "path-dependence" means that China's initial 
involvement In international security institutions placed China in an environment 
where there were incentives to becoming more involved. Increasing levels of 
involvement lead to increasing returns from participation. These returns can entail 
everything from organizational gains from increased participation and access to new 
information and resources of use to these organizations, to social backpauing from 
participation in a large, highly legitimate community (Johnston and Evans 1999: 239-
40). 
For instance, the development of arms control expertise in the nuclear weapons 
community helped China to develop the research infrastructure and interagency 
process necessary for serious participation. The concept of mutual security has been 
introduced in Chinese debates since China actively participated in ARF and CSCAP 
(the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific). They anticipate that the 
gradual changes that "a path-dependent" evolution has brought about would extend to 
a rethinking of Chinese interests and a normative devaluation of some of the costs of 
commitments, given that the Chinese arms control policy making process is extremely 
inaccessible. They suggested that far more research will be needed to focus on the 
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evolving thinking of policy makers and the mechanism of the policy making process 
in anns control. Involvement in the CD and accession to treaties require that China 
act, speak and negotiate. The intellectual and organizational requirements of 
participation m international security institutions entail research, expertise and 
content. In tum, this requires institutional support for this behaviour. China's 
participation in multilateral global international security institutions has not dri ven the 
agenda or evolution of these institutions themselves. China has been relatively 
passive in this respect, preferring to respond to processes, as these are pushed by 
others, but the frequency of these responses has increased over time (Johnston and 
Evans 1999: 244). 
Gill and Medeiros suggest that a balanced approach to vIewmg the vanous 
external and internal factors influencing China's arms control and nonproliferation 
policies should be developed (Gill and Medeiros 2000). They analyze the foreign and 
domestic influences on Chinese decision-making related to arms control and 
nonproliferation and argue that China is relatively concerned over prestige and image 
rather than absolute gains in security, in signing the CTBT. They identify the 
multilateral and unilateral pressures and domestic context of Chinese decision-
making, influencing Chinese arms control and nonproliferation policy through three 
case studies: China's negotiations and participation in the CTBT, China's military 
technology exports to Iran, and China's views on military transparency in its 
publication of white papers in 1995 and 1998. China's decision to join the CTBT 
appeared to be driven largely by international pressures and a fractious internal debate 
which ended favourably for the sake of China's international image and some 
possibly relative, long-term gains in Chinese security (Gill and Medeiros 2000: 68-9). 
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They argue that the internal "fractious" debates over signing the CTBT were divided 
into PLA and MFA groups. The Chinese leadership was convinced by the MFA 
argument, and decided against the military's recommendation for continued testing. 
They denied the view that the Chinese perspective on "mutual security" and more 
relaxed internationalism, would play some role in this decision and instead argue that 
the reasons for this decision "were couched in the language of Chinese national 
interests" (Gill and Medeiros 2000: 90). 
In sum, the literature of China's engagement in international ACD institutions 
can be categorized in two different ways, pessimism and optimism, like the China 
threat debates. Those who place more credit on the effect of a multilateral framework 
are optimistic about the paradigmatic shift of China's perspective and policy. They 
believe that the multilateral institutions have a socializing function and learning 
effect. A wide range of contacts, regular meetings, negotiation, the policy advisory 
roles of the staff and training programme of the institutions in their Chinese 
counterparts, all of these have made Chinese policy-makers familiar with the 
international norms and procedures of institutions and enabled them to understand the 
concepts and information provided by participation. 
Those who suspect Chinese intentions from the hard realpolitik perspective are 
pessimistic. This suspicion comes partly from the configuration of China' s identity 
with growing nationalism and its enthusiasm to be a great power. mainly from 
confirmation that Chinese perspectives and interests have not changed fundamentally 
and the effect of restructuring on policies are insufficient to define the process as 
learning. They argue that China is not likely to assimilate international norms and its 
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intention always lies in cost-benefit calculation. Even when China accepted the 
limited security interdependence, China was reluctantly persuaded by international 
pressure. 
2.4. Conclusion: Critique and Research Agenda 
Achievements and Critique 
The recent literature on Chinese foreign policy has expanded its research scope to 
the "second image reversed." The process of domestic politics initiated by external 
factors and interplay between China and international institutions has been tracked 
down in parallel with China's increasing engagement in international community. 
The works previously examined has developed the external/domestic linkage 
approach by investigating the domestic impacts caused by China's exposure to and 
interaction with international regimes and institutions. They have committed to find 
the key clue for recognizing the mechanism of how China might be socialized and 
accommodated to the international system. 
In particular, there are some successful achievements in the literature on China's 
ACD policy. Firstly, the protagonists of the normative approach to China's accession 
to the CTBT opened a new horizon for interpreting Chinese foreign policy within the 
norm-bound framework, constructivism. Given China's increasing interaction with 
the international institutions, the normative approach started to regard international 
ACD norms as a variable to explain the shift of China's ACD policy (Jonston 1997, 
1998~ lia Hao 1999a). For example. 10hston argues that the function of international 
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ACD institutions lies In constraining China's security interest In the long tenn 
(lonston 1997: 311). 
Secondly, the domestic-external linkage approach has advanced the field. 
According to this approach, the socialization and learning process are mediated, 
facilitated and consolidated by the domestic internalization process. New ideas and 
knowledge transmitted through frequent contacts with epistemic communities in 
transnational relationships foster the spreading of expertise in the domestic arena. 
Policy coordination for specific issues creates institutions to deal with them and with 
vested bureaucratic interests. The developments of the "second image reversed" in 
China's ACD field have been explored in the various sectors, such as perspective 
(Garrett and Glaser 1995) and institutions (Lewis, Hua and Xue 1991; Lewis and Hua 
1992; Johnston 1996; Johnston and Evans 1999; Gill and Medeiros 2000). 
Those works opened the black box of a "unitary actor" (state) and illuminated 
how Chinese ACD domestic process operated. For example, Lewis and Hua Di 
substantiate that the gap between China's declared ACD policy and its actual practice 
caused by the domestic institutional mechanism violated the international nonn 
(Lewis and Hua 1992). Gurtov and Hwang identify two main conflicting perspectives 
in Chinese foreign policy. They recognize that both "nationalist and internationalist," 
the dual characteristics in China's foreign policy, are rooted in domestic political 
priorities. China's foreign behaviour is a revelation and manifestation of domestic 
political process. This view offers a more appropriate framework, rather than seeing 
China an inseparable unit and an impersonified actor like a "calculated ambiguity to 
mask ambitions." This framework enables us to see different views and policy 
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options, while Chinese internationalists and nationalists share certain nonns and 
perspectives in foreign and military affairs. They differ in their policy preferences 
with respect to the fundamental question, which concerns the optimum strategic 
environment that will enable socialist modernization to succeed in China (Gurtov and 
Hwang 1998: 57) 
Thirdly, there is a little advancement in explaining the socialization effects in the 
field, but in tenns of unsubstantiated argument. Johnston's "path dependence" logic 
articulates the process of how engagement can be realized. The logic is more 
sophisticated than his previous "nonnative approach." It is similar to Kim's 
"entrapment effect" (Kim 1999: 81) of enmeshment with international institutions. 
This further developed approach adds a time variable and places a case in the context 
of overall involving process in international ACD frameworks. He claims now that 
one step forward in international ACD institutions inevitably requires the 
readjustment or restructuring of Chinese policy. The policy readjustment effect also 
comes from the impact of the previous policy on the perspective and bureaucratic 
restructuring. The sequential cause-effect gradually becomes conspicuous and finally 
brings a significant change of perspective, institutions and policy. However, his 
argument remains untestified and needs empirical research. 10 
Despite the theoreitical and methodological development of the approach, some 
10 Johnston subsequently develops his argument about socialization process, arguing that predominant 
IR theories "ignore the possibility of socialization or are unprepared or unwilling to theorize about it." 
He proposes to treat international institutions as social environment in which socialization occurs by 
microscopic process, such as persuasion and social influence (Johnston 200 1). However. this 
dissertation concerns the macro-process of socialization effects rather than micro-process that Johnston 
hrought in. 
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limitations stU remain. Firstly, the field lacks objectivity in dealing with the evolution 
of China's ACD policy. Basic attitudes toward the object (China's ACD policy) are 
inevitably subjective, being occupied by their values and beliefs. Overarchingly, 
however, most scholars concerned with the subject are very limited to their 
epistemological boundary, because they start by seeing the object in policy-oriented 
terms, how to deal with China rather than how to see a fact in China. China's long 
isolation and the allegedly provocative violation of rules made the pessimists see 
China as a defector and free-rider. So, China is a pupil to teach and tame so that it 
complies with the rules. Thus, the pedagogic approach sincerely tried to find a way of 
admonishing and taming China, a way of making the Chinese learn to comply. Davis 
notes an epistemological point while dealing with China. 
The evolution of China's nonproliferation policy is not unlike that of other countries, 
including the United States ... From a comparative and historical perspective, China's 
nonproliferation policy is not unique but it is at an earlier stage of development than 
the policies of the established members of the regime. The challenge for the United 
States and other proponents of nonproliferation will be to foster rapid progress to the 
next stage of China's policy. The success or failure of China's export controls could 
determine the fate of the nonproliferation regime (Davis 1995: 603). 
Although he does not forget to suggest a policy instruction, he argues that 
China's ACD policy is "not unique" and is not different from that of the US. China's 
ACD policy and its engagement in international ACD frameworks are at the initial 
stage. The obsession with Chinese realpolitik character might make observers miss 
the positive and developmental aspects of them. This approach would treat China as a 
passive object that should be consistently constrained by international pressure and 
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led eventually to an external structure-detenninant answer, as the literature on 
Chinese foreign policy sought for system-constraining factors. 
Secondly, the way of dealing with nonn as a variable is not appropriate. The 
works only focused on the nonns' constraining function to China's ACD policy 
(Johnston 1997; 1998; Jia Hao 1999a). Johnston's "nonnative structure" is nothing 
less than the systemic/external approach, when Johnston gave an answer about why 
China joined the CTBT. Johnston defined China's ACD policy as an adaptation 
policy, rather than a learning one. He turned to and relied on the international 
"normative structure," or pressure when China joined the CTBT that are supposed to 
constrain China's security interest seriously. As Bachman noted, China's accession to 
the CTBT is "hard to imagine," and "such anomalies" (Bachman 1998: 46-48). Jia 
Hao also attributes the uneven course and perfonnance of China's ACD policy to the 
regime's "normative power," which resulted in the relative effectiveness in case of the 
CTBT compared with the MTCR. According to him, because the MTCR is seen by 
Chinese leadership as a Western countries-created and controlled by the United 
States, China "feels little multilateral normative pressure" (Jia Hao 1999a: 340-1). 
In other words, the policy-oriented approach that considers China as an object of 
constraining or taming, has focused necessarily on the external factors and failed to 
capture the positive and developmental factors, which might be more determinant 
sometimes. Thus, the case of the CTBT is seen as an anomaly. An external factor. 
"nonnative structure" (a mixing word, nonn and structure) is suggested to explain it. 
Moreover, it is also noteworthy that China's "image concern" caused by international 
pressure is neither a norm nor a shared nonn. Constructivists imply that by treating 
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institutions as social institutions "around which actor expectations converge" the 
socialization becomes the process by which this intersubjective convergence takes 
place (Kratochwill and Ruggie 1986). The point is how the intersubjecti ve meaning 
of nonns is internalized and in what ways the internalized norms can be assessed. 
The nonn-internalization process suggests a methodological solution for dealing with 
China's ACD policy. 
Wu Yun criticized Johnston's view that made the Chinese passive and subject to 
external pressure. He argues that China probably used the pressure as a chance to 
declare a change of policy rather than pressure forcing change, because the guiding 
principle of China's arms control and disarmament policy is that no arms control and 
disannament measures should undennine China's security. Although it is undeniable 
that China is not immune to outside pressure, it is also hard to consider that outside 
pressure could force China to do something that would undermine its fundamental 
interest. Thus if outside pressure changed China's policy, this change must have been 
seen to be in China's interest (Wu Yun 1996: 605). Wu Yun's argument shows a 
different way of dealing with China, passivity or activity and subjectivity or 
objectivity. 
In sum, the above-mentioned literature on China's ACD field does not provide 
substantial evidence of Chinese shared norms. Instead, It stresses international 
pressure, especially from developing countries, which the Chinese leadership might 
face in the context of international isolation after the Tiananmen Incident. In this 
respect, Garrett and Glaser's works based on the massive interview with the Chinese 
ACD experts enriched the subjecti vity of hOH' China is thinking in the field (Garrett 
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and Glaser 1995). They explored Chinese ACD perspectives. mostly in military 
sector, on the specific issues associated with the CTBT negotiation. The sketched 
works well illuminated the Chinese thinking at that historical time. However, their 
works did not shown the evolutionary pattern of Chinese thinking related with the 
engagement in the international institutions. 
Therefore, thirdly, in the field, there is no objective method to evaluate the degree 
of China's socialzation and learning effects fostered by the international institutions. 
For instance, preoccupied with Chinese hard realpolitik, no literature adequately 
predicted China's accession to the CTBT, even though the field does not require 
acumen of prediction necessarily. The assessments are based on arbitrary sense and 
instinct. They defined China's ACD policy as a policy adjustment (Johnston 1995b, 
1996; Malik 1995; Swaine and Johnston 1999; Gill and Medeiros 2000), a positive 
learning (Hu Weixing 1999), or a relative vageness couched in the middle-ground 
term "limited interdependence" (Garrett and Glaser 1995; Lampton 1997; Godement 
1997). It is quite striking to see the underdevelopment of method to evaluate the 
socialization effects on China, ACD policy in particular, in spite of their achievements 
in the field, as examined before. Inability of demonstrating the socialization effects is 
caused by the way of treating the international institutions. One reason is that the 
approach regarded the international institutions as only a constraining factor in 
China's policy in a gi yen situation. The other reason is that observers have not been 
concerned about investigating the interrelationship between the subsequent domestic 
developments in China's ACD sector, both perspective and institution. and China's 
participation in the specific institutions. The previous researches on the issues - both 
China's ACD perspccti ve (Garrett and Glaser 1995) and institutions (Johnston 1996~ 
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Gill and Medeiros 2000) - illuminated the general developments in broad terms. but 
have not identified the dynamic effects by the international institutions. They have 
not demonstrated the socialization effects. 11 
Research Agenda 
The limitations of the prevIous literature illustrate the research agenda. The 
alternative approach on this issue covers the following research agenda. First. the 
research concerns the comprehensive evaluation of China's ACD norm internalization 
during the last decade. The Chinese ACD perspective on a specific issue needs to be 
examined in depth. How have the Chinese perspectives evolved and become 
differentiated? A detailed perspective on a specific issue can be reviewed and 
interrelated in the broader overview of slightly changing general concepts, such as 
national interest and interdependence, which involve the basic mainstream 
perceptions of the Chinese leadership. The various bureaucratic branches and arms 
control communities have apparently a variety of policy opinions and preferences. 
And the evolutionary pattern and the shift of Chinese perspectives on the issues 
should be explored. Those characteristics of the perspectives might be interrelated 
with China's interplay with the international ACD institutions. The broad exploration 
of Chinese ACD perspectives might lead to the differentiation among the vanous 
views avoiding recognizing them in a unitary way. 
Second, these perceptions can be integrated with institutional development 
II This is not to say that their empirical works are not important or negligible. In fact. this research is 
inspired by their pioneering achievements. The point is how to demonstrate the socialization etfects 
brought in by the international institutions. which is being treated as a simple constraining factor D! 
them. 
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associated with specific issues. Johnston and Evans did ground-breaking work to 
unearth Chinese arms control institutionalization but Chinese intra-policy 
coordination and mechanism is still unclear. Most of their findings depend upon 
interviews with Chinese arms control experts, so more documentary work would be 
necessary to gain the whole picture of China's ACD institutionalization. This agenda 
will require to combine with the literature on Chinese foreign policy bureaucratic 
institutions and to integrate into the previous achievements about the Chinese ACD 
institutions. 12 
Third, socialization effects will be demonstrated. As have been argued, the 
previous literature has not successfully specified the socialization effects of the 
international ACD institutions. The dynamic impact on China caused by the 
engagement in the certain regime indicates the socialization effects. How a specific 
regime or norm might influence the Chinese ACD perspectives and institutions? In 
this research, a norm is not a simple constrainment factor. It creates new interests and 
materializes their foundation by restructuring domestic institutions. The heuristic 
effects of the specific engagement expand the scope of a norm variable to a 
constitutive process. The dynamic interaction between China and international 
institutions over the negotiation will be explored by the case study of the CTBT. This 
agenda requres to research more empirical evidence in the recent development of the 
field. 
J 2 It should be said that the chapter 5 is dedicated to synthesize and re-interpret the previous works of 
China's foreign policy bureaucracy in general and the ACD institutions in particular. 
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Fourth, China's norm-boundary behaviour will be examined throughout the 
CTBT negotiation process. How the international institutions might adjust to the ill-
disciplined and prejudiced behaviour of nationalistic Chinese policy-makers and how 
they might adjust to the principles, norms and objectives of the institutions and 
regimes will be explored in the dynamic context. This will give an answer to the 
question why China joined the CTBT. 
Fifth, China's engagement in the international ACD regimes and institutions will 
be explored comprehensively. The previous works tended to evaluate Chinese ACD 
behaviour based on the specific ACD regime like the MTCR and the CTBT. They 
failed to catch a whole picture of the engagement. The eclectic way of evaluation is, 
somehow, due to politicy-oriented approach and inescapable in order to deal with the 
specific issues. However, the overall evaluation of Chinese ACD policy and 
behaviour has not been so much concerned about. Under the United Nations system 
or other ACD and nonproliferation regimes, the degree of how much China has 
participated will provide the objective yardstick to evaluate China's ACD policy. 
This research will embrace the above agenda. The development of Chinese ACD 
perspectives, institutionalization, participation in the international ACD frameworks 
and its dynamic effects on China as socialization will be examined overall and in the 
context of the case study of the CTBT. The above research agenda is believed to 
demonstrate the mechanism of socialization occurred when China has been engaged 
in the international ACD institutions and regimes. That suggests a model of 
socialization process through which practices can create and instantiate one structure 
of interests and state preferences. The research is also careful in dealing with the 
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object (China's ACD field) to avoid treating China as a passive actor constrained by 
external factors. The problem is a way of embodying the dialectics of structure 
(history) and agent (volition). Certainly, it leads to the subject of how to construct the 
theoretical framework of the research. The next chapter deals with this issue. 
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CHAPTER 3. Theoretical Framework: Dynamism of State 
and International Institutions 
Theories of social morality are always the product of a dominant 
group which identifies itself with the community as a whole (E. H. Carr 
1981: 74). 
The main theoretical ontology of international relations has been global force 
which has fundamentally driven international territory over modem times rather than 
regional force, or local force in which one country is engaged. Critical phenomena 
such as bipolarity, cooperation, interdependence and regime have been identified and 
the explanations have been labelled variously by theorists of IR as: "explaining and 
understanding"(Hollis and Smith 1990), "objectivist and subjectivist"(Onuf 1989) and 
"rationalism and reflectivism"(Keohane 1989). In this respect, Chinese foreign policy 
and behaviour has not attracted theoretical consideration throughout the development 
of IR theory. China's relative isolation from the international scene has meant that 
the "China factor" has remained peripheral in the development of IR theory. 
However, China's rapidly growing military capacity and economic development has 
generated debates within the international community where policy analysts, scholars 
and neighbour countries have increasingly viewed China as a rising threat, posing the 
need for a new structural readjustment in the international system and creating a new 
empirical reservoir to develop present IR theory. 
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3. 1 Introduction 
To construct a theoretical framework is highly problematic, because existing IR 
theories contain ontological and epistemological differences in their nature. Seen 
against the larger context of order-building practices in contemporary world politics, 
the epistemological biases of cooperation under problematic anarchy are particularly 
glaring (Alker 1996: 379-80). Furthermore, such so-called scientific activities are 
actually promotional ones in disguise, consciously or unconsciously reinforcing the 
self-understandings and tactics of only one pattern of world order-building practice. 
Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism present different views of international 
institutions and regimes. These differences need to be explored because China's entry 
into the CTBT affects the interpretation and understanding of the regime. More 
substantially in theoretical terms, the structure-agent problem will be reviewed. This 
was initially proposed by Wendt (Wendt 1987) and caused "third debates" among IR 
scholars since the late 1980s. Keohane labelled "third debates" in the 1980s 
"rationalists and reflectivists" (Keohane 1989), what others have seen as the advent in 
IR of continental philosophy, postmodernism and the humanities (Lapid 1989; 
Neufeld 1993). Metatheoretical issues will be addressed here, along with 
constructivism in order to attempt to bridge the gap between state-centrism and 
rational institutionalism In the presentation of the theoretical framework for this 
research, which will try to reconcile the controversy between structure and agent in 
the concept of "dynamic of state and institution." 
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3.2. Do in terna tionai institutions or Regimes matter? 
The longstanding and fundamental metaphor used to characterize international 
systems is the state of "anarchy." Hobbes' phrase of "war of all against all" has been 
interpreted to mean that there is no authority in international society, which has 
therefore been termed "anarchy." On the shared premise of anarchy and identically 
operated rationalism, neorealism and neoliberalism investigated the evolution of co-
operation and whether international institutions or regimes matter. 
3.2.1. The Approach of Neorealism 
Despite the end of bipolarity and realism's inability to predict it, many IR scholars 
believe that realism is not likely to disappear and it is currently the most pervasive 
and powerful research paradigm (Jervis 1998; Waltz 1993; 1997). For Waltz, 
structure, specifically the anarchic nature of the international system, is presented as 
the single most important factor affecting all other behaviour (Waltz 1995: 74). For 
Waltz, like Morgenthau, a fundamental law of international politics is the balancing of 
power, revealing certain repeated and enduring patterns. He believes that a self-help 
system "stimulates states to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of a balance 
of power" and that these balances tend to form, whether or not some or all of the 
states consciously aim to establish them (Waltz 1979: 116-28). Yet Waltz sees the 
balances as automatic whereas Morgenthau posited that balances are consciously 
intended and must be sought by the statesmen who produce them. 
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In this sense, for Waltz, classical realists are "reductionists" because they were 
not careful enough to distinguish sufficiently between subjective and objective aspects 
of international political phenomena. They explained the "attribute" of actors' 
subjective perceptions as an important factor in constructing and and re-constructing 
the international "system." They thereby failed to grasp the general law as an 
objective social fact in international politics (Waltz 1979: 62-7). Furthermore, as 
Ashley acknowledged it, classical realist "concepts and knowledge" never reach 
Popper's "third world of objective knowledge," because classical realists thought that 
the truth and law of international politics can be discovered and interpreted only in the 
situation-bounded context (Ashley 1984: 231). For the neorealists, however, the state 
is ontologically prior to the international system. The system structure is produced by 
defining states as individual units. The international system is formed by "coaction of 
self-regarding units" (Waltz 1979: 91) or "an aggregation of diverse entities united by 
regular interaction according to a form of control" (Gilpin 1981: 26). 
Waltz's neorealist research paradigm gained great currency because of its 
simplifed state-system causation and gave rise to much empirical research which 
resulted in the refinement and clarification of concepts and it also enabled new issues 
to be considered (Rosecrance and Stein 1993; Walt 1987; Schweller 1997). However, 
some scholars argue that it suffers from "proliferating emendations" (Vasquez 1997). 
One of its central assumptions is that states are unitary actors and must be treated as 
an unproblematic unity. The assumption treats the unitary actor as exogenously 
gIven, which means that the state's existence, boundaries, constituencies, 
legitimations, interests, identity and capacities to make self-regarding decisions can be 
unquestioned. 
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The state-centrism of neorealism has been criticized by another school of IR 
theorists. For example, acknowledging that the reasoning of the neorealists school is 
in very large measure attributable to structuralist tenets, Ruggie argues that Waltz 
ignored one important analytical component (Ruggie 1983: 261-4). Ruggie considers 
that there are three analytical components of Waltz's political structure - an 
organizational principle, the differentiation of units and the degree of concentration of 
the state's capabilities. According to him, a dimension of change is missing from 
Waltz's model because he drops the second analytical component of political 
structure, the differentiation of units, when discussing international systems. 
Furthermore, he ignores this component because his interpretation of the sociological 
term "differentiation," is inappropriate. He takes it to mean that which denotes 
difference rather than that which denotes "separatedness" (Ruggie 1983: 273-4). And 
in so doing, Waltz eliminates the attributes of the state as a unit of analysis. The 
analysis of domestic politics and bureaucracy falls outside the neorealist approach. 
Ruggie's critiques were not primarily about methodology, but about the 
neorealists' image of the world, their alleged state-centrism, preoccupation with 
power, and indifference to domestic and transnational processes of world politics 
beyond the state's political-military sphere. Therefore, international institutions are 
unavailable to the neorealists as analytical units because "institutions are basically a 
reflection of the distribution of power in the world." They are "based on the self-
interested calculations of great powers, and they have no independent effect on state 
behaviour" (Mearsheimer 1994: 7). Moreover, neorealists believe that the interests of 
the nation-state also supercede the collective interests of the international community 
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and therefore of supranational institutions like the United Nations, which serve 
primarily as arenas for the pursuit and exercise of national power and should never be 
allowed to become a substitute for national units or to compromise national 
sovereignty. By making national interests sacrosanct and global interests subservient, 
neorealism eschews supranational institutions that limit the freedom and 
independence of national competitors. For instance, Krasner argued that the nature of 
institutional arrangements is better explained by the distribution of national power 
capabilities than by efforts to solve problems of market failure. "Changes in the 
relati ve power of states have led to changes in international regimes" (Krasner 1991: 
336). 
Critics of neorealism believe that it distorts and severs classical realism from its 
critical roots and converts it into a problem-solving device for the foreign policy 
makers of the most powerful states. According to these critics, neorealism, which is 
very largely an American product of the Cold War, attempts to construct a technology 
of state power. It computes the components of the power of individual states, and 
assesses the relative chances of moves in the game of power politics. Its 
epistemology is positivist and it lacks any dimension of historical structural change. 
The world of inter-state relations is a given world, identical in its basic structure over 
time. There are no changes of the system, only changes within the system (Cox 1986: 
208-10; 1992: 169). Seen in the context of its historical emergence, neorealism is a 
coherent tradition demarcated by denying basic and qualitative progress in 
international relations in contrast with neoliberalism. Neorealism has found different 
ways to argue human nature. structure. philosophy of history. and pessimism of 
knowledge (Waever 1992: 33-49). 
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3.2.2. The Approach of Neoliberalism 
The growmg interdependence of the world economy creates pressures for 
common policies, and hence for procedures whereby countries discuss and coordinate 
action. The need to interpret these procedures was phrased in terms of regional 
integration, transnati on ali sm, interdependence, and a pluralist system of numerous 
sub-state and trans-state actors. Hence, the structural condition of anarchy does not 
necessarily lead to a complete "war of all against all" (Keohane 1983: 148) and 
neorealism "can be modified progressively to attain closer correspondence with 
reality" (Keohane 1986: 191). Patterns of cooperation and discord can be understood 
only in the context of the institutions and regimes that help define the meaning and 
importance of state action and affect incentives facing states (Keohane 1989: 11). At 
the root of Wilsonian idealism and tradition of liberal philosophy, international 
institutions and regimes 13 began to be conceived as possessing a changed condition of 
materialistic reality, an intensification of interdependence in the international 
economy. 
The neoliberal institutionalists basically argue that even if the neorealists are 
correct in believing that anarchy constrains the willingness of states to cooperate, 
nevertheless, states can work together and can do so especially with the assistance of 
international institutions. Interdependence can create shared values, meanings, rights, 
13 International regimes are defined as implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules. and decision-making 
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area (Krasner 1983: 2). 
Keohane defines institutions as persistent and connected sets of rules that prescribe behavioural roles, 
constrain activity. and shape expectations (Keohane 1988: 383). In this dissertation. those terms will 
be given the same meaning here but the concept of international institution will include any substanti \c 
organizational entity whereas this will not necessarily be the case with "regime'" 
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and obligations and within the anarchic condition, interdependence can pave the way 
for a redefinition of the interests of states in ways that can embrace human interests 
(Puchala 1981; Crawford 1991; Rosenau 1990). International institutions enhance 
cooperation by improving the quality of information, reducing transactions costs, 
facilitating tradeoffs among issue-areas, facilitating enforcement of accords, and 
enhancing ethical concerns of states (Keohane 1984: 257). Regimes make it more 
sensible to cooperate by lowering the likelihood of being double-crossed, so they 
incorporate the norm of reciprocity and delegitimize defection (Axelrod and Keohane 
1985: 234-38; Keohane 1984: 77). 
Regimes are examples of cooperative behaviour, and facilitate cooperation, but 
cooperation can take place in the absence of established regimes (Haggard and 
Simmons 1987: 495). Regimes facilitate the making of substantive agreements by 
providing a framework of rules, norms, principles, and procedures for negotiation. 
Regimes are much more important in providing an established negotiating framework 
(reducing transactions costs) and in helping to coordinate actor expectations 
(improving the quality and quantity of information available to states). The most 
important functions of these arrangements are to establish stable mutual expectations 
about the patterns of behaviour of others and to develop working relationships that 
will allow the parties to adapt their practices to new situations. International regimes 
perform the function of reducing uncertainty and risk by linking discrete issues to one 
another and by improving the quantity and quality of information available to 
participants. Another means of reducing problems of uncertainty is to increase the 
quantity and quality of communication. Keohane suggests the possibility that 
international institutions can help to compensate for eroding hegemony by reducing 
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organization costs and other transaction costs associated with international 
negotiations (Keohane 1983: 166). Once established, then, regimes often prove 
robust when confronted with challenges stemming from changes in the perceived 
benefits and costs of living up to commitments, the distribution of power among the 
participants and the overall relationship of the parties (Levy, Young, and Zurn 1995: 
290). Cooperation mediated by institutions, however, "may be unattainable because 
of domestic intransigence, not because of the international system" (Milner 1992: 
493). 
Neoliberal institutionalism is basically a market oriented theory: on the basis of 
an analysis of relative prices and cost-benefit calculations, actors decide which 
regimes to buy into. Despite Grieco and Keohane's disagreement over whether states 
are relative or absolute gain calculators (Grieco 1990), in general, states are expected 
to join those regimes in which, for them, the benefits of membership will outweigh 
the costs. Neoliberal institutionalism, however, has not covered all the historical issue 
areas. The cost-benefit exchange of rationality is not enough to explain on its own 
why international institutions were created in some issue areas rather than in others. 
Empirical research shows that historically, opportunism and defections produced 
higher interest rates. Thus, Keohane admits that the neoliberalist approach "leaves 
open the issue of what kinds of institutions will develop, to whose benefit, and how 
effective they will be" (Keohane 1988: 388). 
From the outside, neoliberal institutionalism has been criticized for not taking 
into account the impact of social processes of reflection or learning on the preferences 
of individuals or on the organizations that they direct. Nye argues that regimes may 
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foster organizational learning by creating or reinforcing institutional memory. ""The 
reason that regimes playa larger role in incremental learning is because they establish 
standard operating procedures, constrain certain ideologies and reward others. and 
provide opportunities for contacts and bargaining among leaders" (Nye 1987: 398). 
More specifically, he posits that "the institutionalization of regimes can, first, change 
standard operating procedures for national bureaucracies, second, present new 
coalition opportunities for subnational actors and improved access for third parties, 
third, change participants' attitudes through contacts within the framework of 
institutions, and fourth, provide a means of dissociating changes in a particular issue 
from the overall political relationship by regular, formal meeting" (Nye 1987: 400-1). 
The analysis of neoliberal institutionalism tends to be limited to regional 
groupings and the Western alliance system. Its predecessor, integration theory and 
functionalism, were also articulated when the United States, in cooperation with its 
European allies, was "putting a clearly liberal normative stamp on the international 
institutions, the nongovernmental networks, and the national political system of the 
noncommunist world" (Ruggie 1992). On the other hand, while within the Western 
world there was a growing image of liberal interdepedence, outside of that sphere 
there was an acceptance of realpolitik (Zacher and Matthew 1995: 138-9). 
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3.3. The Problem of Reconciling Agent and Structure 
While neorealism and neoliberalism were becoming more commensurable with 
the shared rationalist research paradigm using game theory, the reflectivists, as they 
were called by Keohane, emerged in the mainstream of IR (Keohane 1988: 382). 
Criticizing the rationalist approach in IR, they initiated metatheoretical debates and 
identified agent-structure problems in IR.14 This articulation is fundamentally, 
ontologically and methodologically different from the rationalist programme, and 
implies a new theoretical alternative to interpret world politics. Put more generally, 
all social scientific theories embody, at least, an implicit solution to the agent-
structure problem. The reflectivists in IR launched the criticism against solutions of 
the problem which make either agent or structure the sole ontological primitive, and 
then attempt to explain the other by reduction to it. 
3.3.1. The Unbearable heaviness of structure 
Singer raised the problem of the levels of analysis in IR. This has to do with 
determining which level of social arrangements offers the most promise for building 
theories that explain the behaviour of state actors: the nation state or the international 
system, and, in subsequent extension of Singer's framework, domestic politics, 
bureaucratic politics or individual psychology (Singer 1961). The articulation of the 
reflectivists is slightly different from that of Singer who simply proposed the divided 
14 Despite many different terms such as agent-structure, parts-wholes, actor-system. and micro-macro. 
there are imperatives to conceptualize the relationship between social actors and the circumstances that 
surround them in social science. For this research. the term "agent-structure" which was raised by 
Wendt in IR (Wendt 1987) has been selected. 
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dimension of objects for analytical sophistication. According to them, the agent-
structure problem contains ontological features which emerge from two 
noncontentious truths about social life: first, that human agency is the only moving 
force behind the actions, events, and outcomes of the social world; and second, that 
human agency can be realized only in concrete historical circumstances that condition 
the possibilities for action and influence its course (Dessler 1989: 443). These truths 
impose two demands on our scientific explanations: first, they acknowledge and 
account for the properties of agents and second, they recognize the causal relevance of 
structural factors, that is the conditions of action. The agent-structure problem refers 
to the difficulties of developing a theory that successfully meets both demands. "The 
problem with all this is that we lack a self-evident way to conceptualize these entities 
and their relationship" (Wendt 1987: 338). 
For Wendt, Waltz's definition of the structure of the international system is 
heavily based on the attributes of the agent (state) and the distribution of power. 
Furthermore, Wendt argues that Waltz's structure has the function of constraining the 
agent's choice rather than generating features of the agent's action. Thus, Waltz's 
way of solving the agent-structure problem is by "situational determinism, by a model 
of action in which rational behaviour is conditioned or even determined by the 
structure of choice situations" (Wendt 1987: 342; 1991: 389). In fact, by this 
theoretical simplification, as Waltz says, neorealism lays bare the essential elements 
in play and indicates the necessary relations of causation and interdependency (Waltz 
1979: 1-13; 1997: 913). However, Waltz's reduction to structure at the expense of the 
agent has been central to the critique of the other research paradigm. Because of 
"utilitarian statism" (Ashly 1 98 .. t.) , neorealism fails to provide a basis for developing 
81 
an explicit theory of the state (Jervis 1988: 324-5; Wendt 1987: 342; Hollis amd 
Smith 1990; Dessler 1989) and retards the development of a cumulative research 
paradigm focused on domestic politics in IR (Milner 1998: 766-7). 
3.3.2. The Approach of Constructivism: the third way, possibility and limit 
A structural approach then suffers from an inability to identify adequately the 
nature and sources of interests and preferences because these are unlikely to derive 
solely from the structure of the system. Therefore a theoretical framework is needed 
which will explain interests and preferences. Constructivism posits that there is a 
mutually causal relationship between general values or regimes on the one hand, and 
the nature of actors and their interests on the other hand (Ruggie and Kratochwil 
1986; Wendt 1987, 1992a; Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 1989). It seeks to identify the 
common norms, principles and knowledge that orient action across states and shape 
actor preferences themselves. Constructivists argue that the epistemological position 
of the regimes of the neoliberalists, positivistic in orientation, fundamentally 
contradicts the ontology. Because "international regimes are commonly defined as 
social institutions around which expectations converge in international issue-areas," 
convergent expectation recognizes their constitutive basis as "an inescapable and 
intersubjective quality." Hence, "the ontology of regimes rests upon a strong element 
of intersubjectivity" (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986: 764; Dunne 1995: 380). John 
Ruggie makes this point in his critique of neorealism, that it ignores changes in the 
values or intersubjective understandings that distinguish international systems by 
analyzing the transition from the medieval to the modem international system. 
According to him, the shift from the medieval to the modem international system, 
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implying a fundamental change from a "heteronomous" institutional framework to an 
international system defined in terms of "sovereignty," constituted nothing less than a 
fundamental redefinition of the nature and power of the actors in this system (Ruggie 
1986: 141-6). The state gained its present currency only as a consequence of this 
institutional revolution of the international system. It is a recognition of both the 
historically contingent and mutually constitutive nature of the agent-structure issue in 
state-to-state interactions. 
Constructivism maintains that the world is socially constructed by human 
practice, and seeks to explain how this construction takes place by stressing the 
importance of intersubjective meanings and understandings and the interaction 
between agent and structure (Powell 1994: 322). As recognizable patterns of rules 
and related practices, institutions make people into agents and constitute an 
environment within which agents conduct themselves rationally. We more commonly 
think of agents as operating in an institutional context that gives them at least some 
opportunities for choice. Any stable pattern of rules, institutions, and unintended 
consequences gives society a structure, recognizable as such to any observer. 
Regimes and the balance of power in international relations are both regarded as 
"rules and related practices" (Onuf 1989: 70; 1997: 7-17). The norm is the keyword 
for constructivist explanation of the transactional phenomenon of world politics. The 
nOIm is defined as "the collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with 
a given identity" (Katzenstein 1996: 5). The norm is more ideational than material. 
Identity is incalculable and goes beyond the neo-utilitarianist's world. In short, 
constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life (Ruggie, 
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1998: 856). Nonns may be shared, or commonly held, across some distribution of 
actors in a system. Alternatively, however, nonns may not be widely held by actors 
but may nevertheless be collective features of a system - either by being 
institutionalized (in procedures, fonnal rules, or law) or by being prominent in the 
public discourse of a system. Nonns backed by a great power are more likely to 
become widespread and effective than otherwise similar norms, originating in a small 
country (Katzenstein 1996: 490-1; Onuf 1989: 70). Norms create patterns of 
behaviour in accordance with their prescription and can be articulated in discourse 
because they are "intersubjective and collectively held" (Finnemore 1996a: 22-4). 
The constructivists argue that international society should be regarded not as 
anarchy but as "imagined society." Through intersubjective understanding and 
practices of nonns, agents (states) and structures are mutually constituted, whereas 
constructivism treats identity as an empirical question to be theorized within an 
historical context (Hopf 1998; Wendt 1992a). Thus, from a constructivist perspective, 
international structure is detennined by the international distribution of ideas. Shared 
ideas, expectations, and beliefs about appropriate behaviour are what provide the 
world structure, order, and stability. In ideational international structure, idea shifts 
and nonn shifts are the main vehicles for system transformation (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998: 894). 
Constructivists have succeeded in broadening the theoretical contours of IR. By 
exploring the issues of identity and interest bracketed together by neoliberalism and 
neorealism, they have demonstrated that their sociological approach leads to new and 
meaningful interpretations of international politics. Moreover, they are set to rescue 
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the exploration of identity from postmodernism's deconstruction of IR theory. 
Nevertheless, constructivism lacks a theory of agency. Risse-Kappen argues that 
"ideas do not float freely" and they must be mediated (Risse-Kappen 1994). 
Constructi vism overemphasizes the role of social structures like norms at expense of 
the agents who help create and change them in the first place. Checkel argues that 
"without more sustained attention to agency, these scholars will find themselves 
unable to explain where their powerful social structures (norms) come from in the 
first place and, equally important, why and how they change over time" (Checkel 
1998: 325). Without a theory of agents, especially at the domestic level, 
constructivists will not be able to explain in a systematic way how social construction 
actually occurs or why it varies across nations. I5 In this sense, constructivism lacks 
the point that norms are sometimes created and evolved among states which seek 
national interests within structural constraints like a balance of power. Norms 
themselves can be formed and developed in close relationship with rational 
calculation, as neoliberal institutionalists stress in the name of "regime." 
More sophisticated research is needed to find out under what conditions norms 
can be operated and facilitated in both the structural and agential process. A more 
extended view of norm could allow the analysis to reach strategic interaction among 
states within regimes and might shed more light on China's engagement process in 
international security regime and how China has redefined her identity since reform 
policy was launched. Variation and changes in state identity affect the national 
security interests and policies of a state. The configuration of a state's identity affects 
15 Exceptionally. for Wendt, the state is still the unit for analysis. Wendt hopes to construct an identit:-
and interest formation theory with the states' interaction (Wendt 1994. 1999). 
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interstate normative structures like security regImes or security communities. 
Henceforth, as Desch argued, constructivism may not offer general theories of all 
state behaviours but may suggest theories for a particular state's foreign policy 
behaviour over time (Desch 1998: 155). 
3.4. Theoretical Framework: The Dynamic of State and 
Institution 
3.4.1. Resuscitating the state 
Many IR scholars have identified deficiencies in both the neorealist and 
constructivist approaches in explaining the mechanism whereby engagement in 
international institutions influences the internal policymaking practices of states and 
the internationalization of states (Cox 1986; Gourevitch 1978; Putnam 1988). Milner 
suggested that there are three reasons why a consideration of domestic politics is 
important in this context. Firstly, it elucidates how preferences are aggregated and 
national interests constructed. Secondly, it explains the strategies states adopt to 
realize their goals. Thirdly, it traces the process of domestic ratification that 
governments face after cooperative agreements (Milner 1992: 493). 
For many purposes it may be appropriate to develop a level of analysis for 
variables that fit between structural and agential characteristics. The problem is how 
to find the linkage, which stands basically between structural force and agential 
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characteristics. Haas suggests that "transnational epistemic communities" reshape 
their state's definition of national interest (Haas 1992). An epistemic community is "a 
network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain 
and issue-area" (Haas 1992: 3). He identifies a transnational epistemic community 
and argues that it works through the domestic political arena to change national 
preferences enabling greater compliance with internationally agreed practices. 
Like Haas, Putnam tries to revitalize the state as agent in another direction. For 
Putnam, the politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a 
two level game, interpreting the term "state" as "central decision-makers" (Putnam 
1988: 430). At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring 
the government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by 
constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national 
governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while 
minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two 
games can by ignored by "central decision-makers," so long as their countries remain 
interdependent, yet sovereign (Putnam 1988: 434). Instead of eliminating the state as 
an analytical unit, Putnam's two-level approach recognizes the inevitability of 
domestic conflict about what the national interest requires. It recognizes that the 
"central decision-makers" strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives 
simultaneously. The implication of this approach is to give weight to the process of 
the agent's reaction which constitutes structure. Through this process, the state could 
be resuscitated from and relieved of reification of structure. 
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3.4.2. De-neutralizing the Institution 
Carr emphasized that "theories of social morality are always the product of a 
dominant group which identifies itself with the community as a whole" (Carr 1981: 
74). Certainly, the rationalist approach which operates in neoliberal institutionalism 
does not completely abandon the power relationship between states: Keohane stated 
that "hegemonic structures of power, dominated by a single country, are most 
conducive to the development of strong international regimes, whose rules are 
relatively precise and well-obeyed" (Keohane 1980: 251). Yet, their assumption that 
regimes are cooperative, even though benefits might accrue to the coerced actors, 
ends with the identification of national interests. Their concern stops at the threshold 
of an institution's functional efficacy for cooperation. So, they necessarily and 
unconsciously, neutralize the power relationship and implicitly accept the prevailing 
order as their own framework (Cox 1986: 230). 
Cox criticizes the "unconscious ideology of positivism" because of its pretensions 
to escape from history, because "it claims to transcend history and propound some 
universally valid form of knowledge" (Cox 1986: 247). He argues that in a 
hegemonic order, the dominant power makes certain concessions or compromises to 
secure the acquiescence of lesser powers to an offer that can be expressed in terms of 
a general interest. It is important, in appraising a hegemonic order, to know both that 
it functions mainly by consent in accordance with universalist principles, and that it 
rests upon a certain structure of power and serves to maintain that structure. Whether 
Cox's point is always true or not, he accentuates the power relationship implicitly 
embedded in world order. In that sense, the neorealists' claim that international 
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institutions and regimes are nothing but a reflection of power-seeking products seems 
straightforward and persuasive, even though obsessed with one power variable and 
one reified structure of power concept. For the purpose of this thesis, institutions will 
be regarded as terrains of power-seeking practices de-neutralizing the concept of 
international institutions and regimes. In part, this conceptualization will be 
necessary because the Chinese epistemological world works mostly in an orbit of 
power relationships with a strong passion for modernization after long historical 
humiliation. 
3.4.3. The Dynamic of State and Institution 
The discussion of "the agent-structure problem" has illuminated the claims that, 
at any given moment, agents and structure are the products of continuously 
constitutive co-determination. The problem is to how to avoid reducing one to the 
other and to embody satisfactory research in the reality of "duality of structure.,,16 
Here an attempt will be made using the concept of the "dynamics of state and 
institution. " 
In one way, the state is still the most important unit to be analyzed in IR, despite 
the outstanding feature of interdependent world politics and the global economy. 
Susan Strange senses "the state and national governments as the final determinants of 
outcomes" and criticizes the "woolly and obfuscated" concept of regime (Strange 
1983: 338-51). As she says, underneath "regime," there are conspicuous actions and 
16 According to Anthony Giddens. the duality of structure means the essential recursiveness of social 
life. as constituted in social practices: "structure is both medium and outcome of the reproduction of 
practices. Structure enters simultaneously into the constitution of the agent and social practices. and 
t:xists in the generating moments of this constitution" (Giddens 1979: 5). 
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bargains between states. On the one hand, sovereign states have their own self-
respecting perspective and interest in the decision making process while this 
perspective and interest would interact dynamically with external arrangements~ for 
example, regimes and international institutions. For analytical purposes, the attributes 
of the state should be explored first of all in terms of its perception and interest in 
specific issues. Then, the attributes of the state should be analyzed as they evolve 
over time not only their codetermination with structure but also their internalization, 
domestic politicization. Dynamic interaction, the state's internalization of structural 
pressure and vice versa will be explored with the instrumental linkage of "epistemic 
community" for instance. 
In another way, the sovereign state is continuously conditioned and constrained 
by external arrangements such as a balance of power, international regimes and 
institutions. The phenomena have been described by the scholars in JR, as "system 
effect" (Jervis 1997), "structural causation" (Waltz 1979), and "generative deep 
structure" (Wendt 1987; Buzan 1993). As pointed out by Keohane, "the way in which 
leaders of states conceptualize their situations is strongly affected by the institutions 
of international relations: states not only form the international system, they are also 
shaped by its conventions, particularly by its practices" (Keohane 1989: 6). The 
various international institutions or regimes at all times underlie and underwrite state 
praxis within the international system. A number of questions arise: How do they 
precondition the policy choice of a state? How do they interact with a state's 
preferences and interests? How do they impact on domestic politicization? How can 
an individual state strategically interact with other states within an operating regime? 
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How should the state's actions be distinguished between regime-bounded action, or 
power-struggle? How do they constitute a state's interest and identity in the long run? 
All these questions must be addressed in conceptualizing the process of dynamic 
interaction between state and institution. In order to develop a framework for 
analyzing foreign policy actions in terms of a dynamic account of the ways in which 
such actions are continually being constrained and enabled by contextually defined 
structures, and how these in tum are affected by human agency, the practice of 
viewing foreign policy in terms of separate and distinct actors possessing discrete, 
divisible, and comparable properties, whose behaviour can be encapsulated 
inductively in terms of discontinuous event-behaviours proceeding serially in 
temporal increments must be jettisoned. As Ruggie has written, "the relevant facts for 
analysis here are institutional facts, and institututional facts inherently are 
intersubjecti ve facts, not brute or palpable facts, requiring that we probe beyond the 
palpable here-and-now until we come to see the historicity - the historically 
contingent subjectivities - of the pertinent social grouping as they see it themselves" 
(Ruggie 1989: 29). In such a context, history embodies its destiny of not only the 
extensive periodicity but also its inherently systemic character: the quality that 
provides structures with their constitutive nature, defining the essentially institutional 
character of agential understanding (Ashley 1984: 254-61). 
Such a synthesis relates to the way of making analytically operational the core 
assumption that both agents and structures interact reciprocally in determining the 
foreign policy behaviour of sovereign states. It could lead to a fruitful re-examination 
of shifts in preferences and interests that emerge from complex interactions between 
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the operation of international institutions and the processes of domestic politics. Both 
Waltz's "second image" and Gourevitch's "second image reversed" need to be taken 
account of, in different ways (Waltz 1979; Gourevitch 1978). 
Figure 3.1. demonstrates the distinctive world view that the IR approaches and 
the "dynamic of state and institution" present. 
Figure 3.1. Different images of IR Theories 
Neorealist Approach 
Organizing Principle: Distribution of Power 
States 4 • System (Anarchy) 
Constraining force on State (Structural Determinism) 
Neoliberalist Approach 
States (absolute gain) 4 • Regimes and Institutions 
Distribution of Idea (Rationalist Calculation) (Cooperation) 
U n 
States (relative gain) .... -----------.. System (Anarchy) 
Distribution of Power 
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Dynamics of State and Institution (or Regime) 
History of Institution or Regime: Constitutive Process in time tn (process J) 
) 
Institution or 
Regimen> 
State tl 
System (structure)t 1 
Dynamic Interaction 
Intersubjecti ve understanding 
Expectation possessed by and 
Constitutive of State 
) 
History of State, Constitutive Process in time tn (process 2) 
History of System, Constitutive Process in time tn (process 3) 
Institution or Institution or 
Regime 12························ Regime tn 
State t2.................................. State tn 
System t2 ............................. System tn 
Neorealists see the world as consisting of states (agents) and system (structure). 
The distribution of power among states constitutes a system, which plays a 
determinant role in constraining state action or behaviour. Thus, states (agents) are 
seriously under the influence of system (structure) and the states' behaviour and 
choices are basically constrained by the previously given "structure." This paradigm 
provides a research option for illuminating the structural constraint that states face and 
prescribes the state policy and behaviour. There is no room for international 
institutions or regimes (another agent or structure) to be allowed to playa constitutive 
role in world politics. The system is constant and always anarchic. It is not given any 
momentum to change, as Ruggie criticized. Regarding the question of how and why 
China entered into international ACD regimes, such as NPT and CTBT, the 
neorealists would view China's engagement with the lens of economically rational 
behaviour under the constraints of system. In their eyes, China is using these 
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international organizations to maximize its global status and access to multilateral aid, 
infonnation, and technology while minimizing sovereignty-restricting conditions. 
The broad point here is not China's nonnative conversion to a functional approach to 
world order but its discovery in the post-Mao era of the new self-serving truth, that 
international organizations can be transfonned into positive enabling and empowering 
instruments in the service of Chinese national interests. 
Unlike the neorealist approach, the neoliberalist approach recognIzes the 
increasingly important role of regimes and institutions in highly interdependent world 
politics. Incentives to cooperation, such as gaining infonnation and obliterating 
uncertainty, make states converge on the expected procedures of praxis, which draw 
states' cooperation and make the system not just competitive but cooperative in a 
given condition. Despite the consistently untransfonnative anarchic system, the 
neoliberalist approach makes efforts to find the condition in which states cooperate 
with each other based on utilitarian cost-benefit calculation, rationalism. Thus, by the 
distribution of ideas (rationalist calculation), states can reduce the uncertainty and 
competitiveness that anarchy brings. The continuously patterned procedures of praxis 
(nonn or regimes) further facilitate cooperation. 
The neoliberalist approach could divide its focus into two directions, domestic 
and international. Those who focus on domestic institutions could argue that China's 
joining international ACD institutions and regimes resulted from the independent and 
strategic interaction between domestic actors with various interests. The main task of 
this research is to highlight and characterize this interaction and its strength is that it 
illuminates the preferences of the actors. A state (an agent) is no more seen as a 
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passive actor constrained by the international system (structure). Foreign policy in 
this approach is now a result of the explicit aggregation of diverse domestic 
preferences within political institutions, and the collective systemic outcome is a 
function of the explicit strategic interaction among these groups. Those who have 
more concern with the independent life of regimes or international institutions are 
interested in their influencing effect on state's behaviour. International regimes and 
institutions would create a readjustment of China's interest by providing information 
and other benefits. The realization of "market failure" would be assumed by Chinese 
calculation and readjusted behaviour can be examined in the context of regimes' 
feasibility. 
"Dynamic of state and institution" (or regime) presents a co-constitutive effect on 
both agent (state) and structure (institution or regime) on a time-sequence axis in 
order to reconcile the problem of agent and structure. Avoiding reducing one to the 
other, each actor (state and regime) has its own individual structural development in 
the process, while the system (whole structure) itself also evolves during the process. 
As figure 3.1. demonstrates, dynamic interaction provides state and regime with 
constitutive momentum. During the interactive process, state t1 changes into state t2 
(process 1), meanwhile the regime t1 developed into regime t2 (process 2). Process 3 
concerns the entire evolutionary process of system (whole structure) transformation. 
System tn is the result of dynamic interaction between state tn and regime tn, and 
symbolizes the complete convergence among interest and identity of state tn. 
In this theoretical framework, it is useful to rethink the achievements that the 
constructi vists exploited. The constructivist approach assumes that the gi yen system 
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(structure) is not immortal. It is transformed by the interaction of state (agent) and 
system (structure). The international system is unceasingly changing under the 
condition that the interaction constitutes both state (agent) and system (structure). 
Ruggie and Wendt are interested in reconstructing the process 3 in IR history. As 
explored in the previous section, Ruggie captured the concept of "sovereignty", as the 
constitutive norm in modern state history and tracked down its historicity, which has 
been a key element of modern states in forming international system. For Wendt, 
whether a system is conflictual or peaceful is a function not of anarchy and power but 
of the shared culture created through cultural instantiation that the interaction 
constitutes. Anarchy has no determinant logic, only one of embodiments of cultural 
instantiations. States can reshape structure by process and they can reconstitute 
interests and identities toward more other-regarding and peaceful means and ends 
(Wendt 1992b). In other words, the constructivist approach added a time variable, by 
which process states reshape structure in history. Anarchy, the concept of the 
neorealist, is just a historical product that states created. But, by extending shared 
culture, and intersubjective meaning, such as norms, beliefs, and values, states can 
converge on homogeneous identity that reconstitutes a new structure, no more 
anarchic in nature. Finnemore is much concerned about norm or regime itself 
(process 1). Thus, the condition in which certain norms can animate their 
development is more concerned by Finnemore (Finnemore 1996a; 1996b). In sum, 
the constructivist approach counters that structural realism misses what is often a 
more determinant factor, namely the "intersubjectively shared ideas" that shape 
behaviour by constituting the identities and interests of agents (Copeland 2000: 187). 
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As far as this research is concerned, process 2 will be the main domain of the 
theoretical framework, the dynamic of state and institution (or regime). In other 
words, China's dynamic interaction with international ACD regimes will be presented 
by way of illuminating distinctive developments (socialization) of state t2 (China in 
the post-CTBT period) from state tJ (China in the pre-CTBT) and. Figure 3.2. 
indicates this process. 
Figure 3.2. Dynamic interaction of China and International ACD regimes 
Engaging path 
China 1 ~ 
perspective J 
domestic institution J 
Time t CI ========:::::::=-
Dynamic Interaction with 
International A CD 
arrangements (e.g. CTBT) 
Constitutive process 
-----.... China 2 
perspective 2 
domestic institution 2 
China's interaction with international arrangements will be construed in terms of 
an intersubjective and constitutive process. The distinction between China tJ and 
China t2 will be presented on the bases of two different parameters, perspective and 
domestic institutions. The framework assumes that the dynamic interaction between 
China t1 and international ACD arrangements would reconstitute China t2, which 
acquires a constitutive feature by the interaction and will be presumably assessed by 
its degree of development in perspective and domestic institutions. The first main 
focus of the research will be China's internalization of norms and rules and the 
learning effect through interaction with international ACD arrangements (Chapter -+). 
Nonns and rules will be handled as a mediator to create China's interest and identity 
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as a result of China's participation in the international ACD frameworks (a nuclear 
test ban norm in the case of the CTBT). 
The second wave of the constitutive process IS its impact on the domestic 
institutions (Chapter 5). The institutionalists, rationalist and constructivist, argue that 
the strength of a norm is a function of its level of "institutionalization," which means 
the embedding of the norm's tenets in the state's constitutional, regulative, or judicial 
system (Cortell and Davis 2000: 67-8). Development of domestic institutions is an 
institutional embodiment of a certain norm in an internal process and it gives 
consistent procedures of norm-bounding praxis, which conditions access to the 
policy-making process. 
Agents (states) and structure (institutions) are the products of continuously 
constitutive co-determination. The measurement of the distinction between China tl 
and China t2 will involve investigation of changes in the national discourse 
(perspective (2), the states' institutions (domestic institution (2) and state policies in 
ACD arrangements in the post-CTBT period as the research is concerned (chapter 8). 
This framework will lead to a better understanding of the domestic base of support for 
international institutions, a significant weakness of existing neoliberalist regime 
theory. This framework will also meet the requirement of an "external/domestic 
linkage" approach explored in the previous chapter. 
In sum, the "dynamic interaction of state and institution" has been provided to 
reconcile the problem of agent and structure discussed in metatheoretical debates in 
IR. Agents and structure are the products of continuously constitutive co-
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detennination, avoiding reducing one to another. The constitutive effects on the state 
by the dynamic interaction are recognizable when the state is resuscitated by way of 
developing a level of analysis in domestic nonn-internalization process. The research 
divides the internalization process into the perspective level and the institution level. 
The state transfonns itself by this process of the dynamism. At both levels, the 
constitutive effects on China will be tracked down and discussed as a result of the 
dynamic interaction with international institution (the CTBT). 
Identifying the constitutive effects on the state enables us to recogmze the 
socialization that the "dynamic interaction of state and institution" brought in. The 
task substantiates the socialization effects in a specific and historical context, which 
the "dynamism" operates in. Thus the theoretical framework of "dynamic interaction 
of state and institution" provides a model of socialization process through which a 
state transfonns its interests, preferences and identity after all. 
In the research, the way of treating the international institutions and regimes is 
distinguished from both the neoliberalism and the constructivism, which identify the 
nonn as a variable to explain international relations. The international institutions are 
an environment not only in which socialization takes place but also in which strategic 
interaction among states competes. By de-neutralizing international institutions and 
regimes, the research will keep the state (China) an analytic unit to find its strategic 
interests and preferences. That also helps identify China's reaction objectively over 
and against the view that China is a passive actor constrained by the external factors. 
From the next chapter, Chinese volition will be discussed as a consequence of 
dynamic interaction with the international ACD institutions. 
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CHAPTER 4. Evolution and Differentiation: the Chinese 
perspectives on ACD 
If self-interest is not sustained by practice, it will die out (Alexander 
Wendt 1999: 369). 
Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is in 
China's interest (Li Peng, a statement during a visit to Japan in 1991). 
4.1. Introduction 
A study of perceptions becomes important because people in the same situation 
behave differently (Jervis 1976). The problem of causal linkages between perceptions 
and actual behaviour has been an interesting topic. For example, why do Chinese 
leaders see events differently from leaders of other states? What are the determinants 
of their distinctive perceptions? Ng-Quinn confines himself to a discussion of three 
specific variables as possible determinants of Chinese perceptions: culture, ideology 
and idiosyncracy (Ng-Quinn 1983: 206). Wang Fei-Ling also gives determining 
credit to a perspective level, "intentions" rather than "capacities" in characterizing 
China's emergence. He criticizes western scholars' China threat theory and their 
inaccuracies in estimating Chinese power and its impact, which was arguably caused 
by "western analysts' epistemological limits or their evil intentions of manipulating 
world opinion and hurting China" (Wang Fei-Ling 1999: 22-7). Whether his point is 
right or not, he regards the intentions of the rising power as the main factor that 
determines whether the rising power is challenging and able to be accommodated or 
disastrous. 
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Chinese international behaviour suggests that security calculations remam an 
inherent force in the minds of Chinese foreign policy decision-makers. "A siege 
mentality" in the PRC government has demonstrated a profound concern bordering on 
a strong sense of insecurity (Shambaugh 1994b). Thus it is true that many scholars 
argue that Chinese leaders, officials, and foreign policy institute analysts still view the 
world in largely balance-of-power, realpolitik terms. They have an innate belief that 
the history of international relations consists of repetitive cycles of rising and falling 
hegemons. This orientation underlies China's foreign policy and military strategy in 
general and its nuclear weapons programme in particular. There is also widespread 
support in China for the view that the development of a strong military capability, 
including substantial nuclear forces, will enhance China's comprehensive national 
strength, thus enabling China to assume its rightful place as a great power. However, 
given the process of reform and open-door policy in the last decades, China has 
increasingly become a part of a larger world that provides opportunities for, as well as 
constraints on, its policy options. Chinese policy-makers have become more and 
more sensitive to China's position in the changing international environment, as 
China has taken part in more and more multilateral frameworks. The end of the Cold 
War has also left China room for greater international assertiveness by enhancing 
China's external security. 
This chapter will examine the Chinese perspecti ve on the international ACD and 
its agenda. Since China joined the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992, the way 
the Chinese think and assess this new field has significantly evolved. In fact, the 
multilateral ACD frameworks have functioned as an interacting point between China 
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and international community in the security area. The development of the Chinese 
ACD perspective has been interwoven with the development of Chinese cooperative 
security arguments justifying increased participation in ACD. It is evident that a 
range of the perspectives exists among military and civilian leaders and analysts 
(Glaser 1993; Johnston, 1996; Shambaugh 1999a). The ingrained realist approach is 
rejected by a growing body of Chinese experts that view the world as increasingly 
interdependent in both economic and security terms. 
Thus, identifying China's new perception of "interdependence" becomes 
increasingly important because it is the necessary first step to analyze China's ACD 
policy. As have seen in Chapter 2, previous works lack a systematic evaluation of the 
evolution of the Chinese ACD perspectives during the last decade. This chapter will 
also explore three different but interrelated dimensions of the Chinese perspective, 
national interest, military doctrine and multilateralism. China's ACD perspectives are 
rooted in and influenced by the shift in these basic mindsets. However, although 
these perspectives are apparent in numerous articles and interviews, it is difficult to 
recognize any influence on the Chinese leadership and policy-making process. It is 
also difficult to recognize that international norms and rules might influence the 
beliefs and behaviour of domestic actors. Instead, this chapter will demonstrate the 
significant change in Chinese discourse on the international ACD and the related three 
dimensions which was fostered by entanglement with international ACD institutions. 
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4.2. Growing New Paradigm of Chinese perspective 
4.2.1. Debate over Interdependence: nationalism versus internationalism 
For the last two decades, the practice of an open-door policy for economIC 
development necessarily brought with it interdependence with the outside world. This 
interdependent phenomenon became one of the most controversial subjects not only 
for outside observers but also for the Chinese leadership. The following Chinese 
official pronouncement shows their wariness over the encroachment of external 
powers and indicates their fundamental attitude about "interdependence." 
Historical experience tells us that to ensure the security of all countries, apart from 
disarmament and arms control, what is more important is that the independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country should be respected and maintained, 
in particular that the big, rich and strong countries should respect the independence 
and sovereignty of the small, weak and poor ones, and that all acts of hegemonism, 
aggression and expansion in whatever form should be opposed and prevented. This 
is the key to and a prerequisite for ensuring regional security (Qian Qichen, Chinese 
foreign minister at the UN Conference on Disarmament and Security Issues in the 
Asia-Pacific Region in Shanghai on August 17, 1992, Beijing Review Aug.31-Sep.6 
1992). 
For the Chinese leadership, immutable state sovereignty and strict non-
interference is the abiding norm in implementing foreign affairs. This sensitivity to 
external influence and a Westphalian definition of international affairs has grown out 
of China's modem historical and revolutionary experience. A proud Chinese 
civi lization suffered from long historical humiliation and colonialism. Mao's 
revolution was intended to restore China's dignity and its rightful place in the world 
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by unifying the territory of greater China, expelling neocolonial influences and 
transforming China into a modem socialist country (Shambaugh 1992: 92). 
Therefore, the concept of "interdependence" was regarded as western encroachment 
on Chinese sovereignty or a Western strategy of "peaceful evolution" to subvert 
communist rule until the early 1990s. But subsequent events in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, such as the Tiananmen Incident, the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, the 
resultant end of the Cold War and the Gulf War seriously called into question at least 
some of the underpinnings of this way of thinking. The new era of multilateralism 
and cooperation in international affairs has been assumed since then. As the 1990s 
proceeded, the terms of "interdependence," and "multipolarity" became increasingly 
frequent in Chinese discourse. 
Huan Xiang, the former director of the Centre for International Studies, defines 
the current era as an age of "peace and development," originally formulated by Deng 
Xiaoping. He characterizes contemporary international relations as a cycle of 
competition-conflict-cooperation and argues that "conflict can not be inescapable but 
cooperation is more fundamental to avoid greater loss" (Huan Xiang 1987: 33). Jiang 
Zemin, the president of PRC, made a speech at the Special Commemorative Meeting 
on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the UN. He expressed the view that 
"countries' economic interdependence and mutual complementarity of relative 
advantages have grown all the more obvious as they become increasingly closer in 
their relations" (Beijing Review 6-12 Nov. 1995). He further stated that "the 
internationalization of economic life requires that all countries conduct extensive 
exchanges and cooperation in the economic, technological, financial, trade and other 
fields". In Chinese IR writings, there is also an identifiably growing recognition of 
interdependent reality in the world. Chinese analysts further propose that China 
should playa more activist international role and assume greater responsibility for 
global and regional security. They maintain that increased willingness, by many 
countries, to seek political solutions to regional conflicts demands that China actively 
participates in the peace process. 17 
Although Chinese analysts have started to recognIze the reality of 
"interdependence," this does not mean that their neorealist approach can be 
automatically discarded. Most Chinese analysts are suspicious of "interdependence." 
They doubt the nature of the interdependence phenomenon and maintain that 
"interdependence" can accentuate interstate conflict by trampling on the sovereignty 
of nation-states, by preventing them from controlling their economic, military, and 
political resources, and by providing opportunities for states to interfere in the internal 
affairs of others. The reality is that systemic anarchy renders all interdependence 
asymmetric, and asymmetric relationships are essentially zero-sum power struggles 
(Zhao Huaipu and Lu Yang 1993: 36). It is wrong to stress only peace, cooperation 
and mutual interest, which discard various conflicts and collisions in international 
relations. The seriousness and complicity of various conflicts and competition cannot 
be underestimated. Cooperation alone cannot solve the problem of anti-hegemonism 
and power politics. In spite of today's deepening interdependence, power politics still 
exists. Hegemonism cannot vanish in this stage of history and international conflicts 
cannot be extinguished in a day (Zhao Yi 1996: 17-9). 
17 These liberal views that concern "interdependence" or "globalization" are Wang Yizhou (1995), Zhu 
Wen Ii (1996). Wang Jisi (1995), Yan Xuetong (1993), and Li Shenzhi (1994). 
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Nonetheless, the growmg legitimacy of "interdependence" in the age of 
globalization has generated a powerful compliance pull, undennining the validity of 
Chinese realpolitik views. In the late 1990s, Chinese debates over interdependence 
evolved into the concept of "globalization." Trying to interpret a newly emerging 
globalization phenomenon, Chinese arguments have been refined and have converged 
into the concept of the "complexity ifuzahua)" of international relations. In some 
sense, the tenn, "complexity," reflects their controversial dichotomy (Song Yimin 
1999; Wang Hu 2000). The dilemma of "interdependence," in other words, 
reconciling external encroachment and state sovereignty is posing a challenge for 
Chinese intellectuals. Observers describe the two contradictory Chinese intellectual 
tendencies as a dichotomy; internationalism & nationalism (Gurtov and Hwang 1998), 
continentalist & maritime ("browns and blues", Yahuda 1997) and globalism & 
nationalism (Hughes 1997). For example, Gurtov and Hwang offer a distinction 
between the Chinese perspectives, internationalism and nationalism (Gurtov and 
Hwang 1998: 7_8).18 
The multi polarization of world political economy, the regionalization of 
economic growth, and especially the distribution of scientific and technological power 
are considered central issues in China's ability to achieve peace and development. 
For Chinese internationalists, those issues make it impossible to secure China with 
military capabilities alone, since economic and technological forces will profoundly 
shape the PRC's ability to catch up with the top-ranked industrialized states 
18 Gurtov and Hwang are indifferent to the distinction between concepts of "Chinese nationalism." In 
fact. there are various concepts of "Chinese nationalism," positively defined, such as "affirmative 
nationalism" (Whitting 1995), "confident nationalism" (Oksenberg 1986) and "pragmatic nationalism" 
(Wang Jisi 19(4). Gurtov and Hwang's nationalism is more generally xenophobic in nature, the same 
as "asscrti,c nationalism" distinguished by Whiting (Whiting 1995: 295-316). 
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eventually. Internationalists stress the need for "comprehensive security" (zonghe 
anchuan) or "comprehensive national strength" (zonghe guoli), which emphasized the 
non-military dimensions of national power. Such a perspective puts a premium on 
international cooperation such as through diplomacy, trade, and technology transfers. 
to provide the "quiescent international environment" that is conducive to China's 
modernization. To the extent that Chinese foreign-policy makers are able to 
demonstrate the usefulness of relying on global interdependence to modernize China, 
they are more likely to gain domestic support for abiding by international agreements 
and norms - provided that China is party to the making of the rules. Such seemed to 
be the case during most of the 1980s when the internationalists, led by Deng 
Xiaoping, pursued modernization at the expense of China's military budget and 
manpower, China began to show some interest in multilateral arms control, reflecting 
the new belief, which was formalized by its joining the NPT, which prevents the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, nationalists centred 
in the defence establishment headed by the CMC (Central Military Committee), apply 
narrower national interest calculations to security issues. Nationalists see themselves 
as the guardians of Chinese patriotism; protecting China's national identity and 
upholding its sovereignty within China's overall strategic objective of making the 
international arena safe for socialist development and restoring China's rightful place 
in the world. They sometimes disparage the workings of diplomacy and maintain the 
readiness to use force to meet the new kinds of security problems China confronts. 
The interplay of the two tendencies makes Chinese security and foreign policy 
more complicated and less predictable. It is accompanied by the politicization of 
bureaucratic interests, which has been fostered by the process of economic 
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development. Nonetheless, China's increasing enmeshment in multilateral 
institutions has facilitated information exchange and social learning. This trend 
becomes more and more evident in the experts' perspectives (chapter 4.4.), domestic 
institutions (chapter 5), and participation in international institutions (chapters 6 and 
7). The growing prevalence of the "interdependence" discourse demonstrates that 
those views are gaining some legitimacy in the Chinese conception of the world, 
facilitating at least tactical even if not cognitive learning. The following sections will 
examine those discourses. 
4.2.2. Reassessment of the New Security Environment 
The international security and military policy of China has three major goals. In 
order of priority these are: (1) maintenance of internal political stability; (2) 
maintenance of external security against invasion or encroachment; (3) achievement 
of great power status in the international system, regionally and globally. The end of 
the Cold War and the collapse of communism in the Soviet bloc created two 
fundamental challenges for these matters. (1) how to maintain their legitimacy when 
confidence in Marxism has vanished, and (2) what role to play on the world stage, 
now that Moscow is no longer an immediate threat and the United States has emerged 
as the unipolar superpower. On the first matter, the Chinese leadership seeks to 
assure the internal security of the existing party-state primarily by fostering economic 
growth. Jiang Zemin, in his speech at the closing meeting of Fifth Plenary Session of 
the 14th CPC Central Committee in 1995. placed the relationship between reform, 
development and stability as the first priority in the 12 relationships of the principles 
of the modernization dri ve. He stressed that, 
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practice has shown that by handling properly the relationships between 
reform, development and stability, we will be able to grasp the overall 
situation and ensure a smooth economic and social development. 
... Development is indispensable in enhancing China's comprehensive 
strength and improving people's lives, consolidating and improving the 
socialist system and maintaining stability... (Beijing Review 6-12 Nov. 
1995). 
There is a broad consensus among the Chinese leadership that the current 
leadership is basing much of its appeal on continued high levels of economic growth 
(Denoon and Frieman 1996: 422). Economic interests and domestic priorities are 
playing important roles in transfonning China's security agenda, because the Chinese 
leadership now views them as both the means and ends of national security. National 
security is now more broadly defined. The objective of national security policy is not 
just war, peace, and national survival. Military modernization can only be realized by 
increasing "comprehensive" national strength in which military power is a dependent 
rather than an independent variable (Hu Weixing 1995: 118-21). While the internal 
security priority preconditioned the external security, China began to view world 
peace and development as the main themes of today's world affairs. With the 
prevalence of pragmatism, the Chinese leadership emphasized that foreign policy 
must serve domestic priorities and work for China's modernization programmees. 
The goal of Chinese foreign policy was defined as 
to strive for a favourable international environment for China's reforms, opening to 
the outside world and economic construction (in Jiang Zemin' s political report to the 
14th CCP Congress. Rellmill ribao 21 Oct. 1992) 
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This inside-out way of foreign policy thinking provides a totally new foundation 
for future security policy and defence strategy. For example, in 1985, Deng 
Xiaoping's strategic changes in the guiding thoughts of national defence constructions 
and army building abandoned the perception that a world war and massive invasion of 
China were imminent. China's strategic military began to shift away from preparing 
for "early, large, and nuclear war" with the Soviet Union. With the breakup of the 
Soviet Union, China's strategic military concern is changing toward how to deal with 
regional instabilities and territorial disputes on China's east, southeast and southwest 
periphery. Furthermore, the new cooperative approach to the resolution of border 
disputes with neighbour countries in early 1990s demonstrates a redefinition of the 
main threat to Chinese security in the new international strategy environment. The 
need for improved relations with neighbours and for a stable regional environment 
was indispensable since rapid economic development was addressed. The 
disengagement of the region from superpower rivalry also gave China's leaders the 
opportunity to develop a regional policy for the first time, and the opportunity was 
provided by the reluctance of countries within the region to follow the Western lead 
of imposing sanctions on China in the wake of the Tiananmen crisis (Yahuda 1997: 
18). 
While this changing view provides a new role and responsibility to participate in 
international institutions for the sake of economic interests, China's assessment of the 
post-Cold War era also outlines a foundation for it. According to Chinese official 
characterization, the international system in the post-Cold War era is in transition 
from the bipolar structure of international politics to a multipolar world system 
(Rellmill ribao 30 July 1991). Suisheng Zhao argues that China's perception of a 
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multipolar system is an wishful purpose rather than a reality. Because China 
perceived the multipolar system as its goal, China made efforts to encourage 
multipolarity (Zhao Sui sheng 1992: 71-82). China has found a unipolar reality in the 
post-Cold War era and has accommodated to it through its foreign policy 
readjustment. In fact, China suspects that U.S. forces are increasingly deployed 
against a resurgent China, and there are hardliners in the US government who are 
trying to manufacture China as a principal threat to replace the Soviet Union and 
justify some of its nuclear forces against China, with the continued maintenance of 
troops in Japan and Korea as evidence of an emerging containment strategy against 
China (Shambaugh 1994b: 7). The fact that China has adjusted its policy priority to 
the Asia-Pacific region and has taken cooperative actions in international institutions 
may be interpreted as China's understanding of the need for a regional base and to be 
an independent but responsible partner in a multipolar world. From this perspective, 
it may be asserted that China might participate more actively in multilateral 
frameworks to transform a unipolar reality into a multipolar alternative while making 
rules at the negotiating table and constructing a new international order. 
4.2.3. Redefinition of National Interest 
Exploring Chinese views on national interests provides China's broad assessment 
of the nature of international relations and the paradigmatic thinking governing its 
foreign policy. It also provides the basic outline for an ACD policy in the prism of 
"national interests." How the Chinese leadership defines and redefines its national 
interest depends on the reordering of the state's internal and external requirements. 
As Peter Katzenstein argued, cultural and institutional norms shape state identity. 
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which in tum affects the definition of a state's national security and national interest 
(Katzenstein 1996: 52-65). Many scholars criticized the Chinese government for its 
allegedly narrow-minded and backward view, especially on issues concerning human 
rights and irredentist claims. The Chinese realpolitik worldview has little ingrained 
liberal thinking and maintains that the international system consists essentially of 
atomistic nation-states locked in a perpetual struggle for power. China's foreign 
policy is based on an outmoded Westphalian notion of sovereignty in a world where 
state sovereignty is being eroded and the traditional notion of national interest is being 
undermined by the unprecedented phenomenon of "interdependence." Nonetheless, it 
can be said that China's identity is in transition from being a revolutionary power 
promoting a world ideology, to an Asian power reorienting itself toward regional 
interests and to a prospective world power participating in multilateral cooperation 
(Chung Chien-peng 2000: 176). 
In the post Mao era, the concept of national interest, which was regarded as the 
interest of the ruling class, was freed from an ideological perception and reformulated 
independently. National interests are interpreted as the embodiment of the nation as a 
whole and their pursuit is the natural and inalienable right of the nation-state. 
Furthermore, many Chinese scholars argue that national interests are ontologically 
existent and should be studied with "scientific methods." Deng Xiaoping's major 
intellectual contribution was his emphasis on national interests as the "highest 
principle" of resolving problems and governing international relations. Deng was 
hailed as being single-handedly responsible for shifting China's erstwhile approach in 
drawing its foreign policy lines according to the social system and ideology to a 
rightful emphasis on dealing with international relations based on national interests. 
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Wei Yang stresses that national interests take precedence over everything, since the 
fierce competition among states for comprehensive national power has been based on 
the nation state unit since the Cold War (Wei Yang 1997: 1). Xu Wenquan argues 
that national interest is the precondition of national survival and development. It is a 
recurring feature of a nation's overall behaviour. Xu explores the several conceptual 
attributes of national interests: abstraction! concreteness, universality/particularity, 
heterogeneity/homogeneity, dynamic/static and class/nationalism. The author 
concludes that national interest does not equal the interest of the dominant class 
because national interest represents the common interest of all the people (Xu 
Wenquan 2000: 34-6). 
Viewing international politics as essentially a struggle for power, the Chinese 
have not found it difficult to acquire the concept of national interest as it is defined in 
a Westphalian world of modem states. Deng Xiaoping just dispelled the ideological 
colour that Mao Zedong had painted in the name of "revolution." A Chinese scholar 
even argues that the Chinese are more accustomed to analyze international relations 
from the perspective of practical interests than westerners. They are less likely to 
believe that some spiritual beliefs (values, religions and ideologies) can also be a 
driving force behind diplomacy. The Chinese see international exchanges more in 
terms of the motives of interest and their gains-losses (Wang Jisi 1995: 189-90). 
However, the redefinition of "national interest" implies that "national interest" exists 
out there to be empirically tested by the modernization process. Because the 
epistemological foundation of this conceptualization is fundamentally empirical, the 
guideline of "seeking truth from facts" leaves room for a new argument to be tested. 
In the I 990s, the realist definition of national interest is coming under increasing 
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challenge, stemming from emerging new norms prevailing in international society. 
Responding to them, there are emerging perspectives on national interest, which 
interpret it in cooperative terms rather than in realist terms. For example, Yan 
Xuetong argues that Deng Xiaoping's perspective on national interest is different 
from the narrow chauvinistic national interest of nationalism. According to him, 
Deng Xiaoping recognized the necessity of interest conflicts among nations. He 
understood that the way to resolve conflicts is to seek for common things and mutual 
interests which can lead to cooperation (Yan Xuetong 1994: 31-2). 
4.2.4. Reformulation of Military and Nuclear Doctrine l9 
Military doctrine is an important indicator of military's intention and capabilities. 
It reflects China's views on global strategy and the nature of war and the military 
follows these in preparing for war. China's first military doctrine was "people's war" 
as formulated by Mao Zedong. It was developed through the experience of 
revolutionary war. The key tenets of the doctrine were the primacy of people over 
weapons, the strategy of using a weak force against a strong force, the mobilization of 
the masses to fight a protracted war against invasion, and the multiple roles of the 
People's Liberation Army (PLA). The Maoist doctrine of the "people's war" was 
later complemented by Deng's doctrine of the "people's war under modem 
conditions" (Joffe 1987; Godwin 1987; Li Nan 1997). The revision of the concept 
depended on three assumptions. First, the military concluded that a future war would 
19 Scholarship on Chinese military doctrine and security strategy has been hindered by the 
inaccessability of authoritative materials. But in recent years some research has been done with the 
relative tlood of military journals and books published by strategists associated with the Academy of 
Military Sciences, the National Defence University. the General Staff Department. and the Strategic 
Missile Forces of the PLA. This section relies partly on those achievements of research. 
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be large-scale and employ sophisticated weapons. Second, the war would inevitably 
escalate, making China a main battlefield. Finally, at the beginning of the war, the 
enemy would possess highly technologically advanced arms. The elements of 
"people's war" remain and the war would be prolonged and costly, but in the end the 
people would prevail (Lewis and Xue 1994: 212). 
By the late 1980s, with the eroding Soviet bloc and the new regional 
environment, new thinking emerged concerning military doctrine and modernization 
related to national economic development. The new Asian-Pacific environment has 
changed China's threat perception and helped to form a consensus on the kind of war 
for which the PLA should prepare in the future. The overall trend in world politics 
was toward a multipolar system and further diminution of superpower pre-eminence 
created quite distinct dangers in the future. The growing military strength and relati ve 
independence of regional powers in a multipolar world could increase the incidence of 
local wars. PLA decided to abandon the state of combat readiness for "an early war, 
an all-out war, and a nuclear war." The Chinese leadership abandoned the perception 
that a world war and massive invasion of China are imminent. Instead, to meet the 
security challenges arising from regional instabilities and territorial disputes, the 
PLA's military strategy is now more oriented toward dealing with what is called 
"jubu zhanzheng" (local war) and "tufa shijian" (contingencies) around China's 
periphery (Hu Weixing 1995: 124). 
In early 1986, the Central Military Commission (CMC) decreed that global 
nuclear war was no longer inevitable. For the foreseeable future, the world scene 
would be characterized by "limited and regional wars" (Deng Xiaoping's speech on 
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April 24, 1986 in Renmin ribao, FBIS-CHI-86-144, July 28, 1986 from Jencks 1994: 
70). The characteristics of local war are quite different from those "people' s war" 
traditions. The concept of "people's war" emphasized protraction, attrition, large land 
manoeuvres, and the mobilization of the whole society, while local war is associated 
with speed, surprise, a short duration, and limited scope, which require high quality 
military training, and a lethality and variability in the weapons used. Only advanced 
modem weapons can provide the long-range power projection, mobility, rapid 
reaction, and off-shore manoeuvrability which the PLA needs to meet the challenge of 
local war. But all these are key weaknesses of the Chinese armed forces, and reasons 
why the Chinese leaders consider defence modernization in the post-cold war era to 
be both urgent and necessary. The Gulf war quickly became a lesson for the PLA's 
modernization programmes. General Liu Huaqing, China's most senior officer and 
the military official responsible for overseeing the technical updating of China's 
armed forces, stated in 1993 that the PLA "failed to meet the needs of modem warfare 
and this is the principal problem with army-building" (liefangiun bao 6 August 1993 
from Godwin 1997: 209-10). This problem would be met, he stated, by the 
"vigorous" importation of foreign technology and accelerating the modernization of 
weapons and equipment through improvements in China's own defence industries and 
R&D. 
Unlike military doctrine, it is striking to see no evidence that nuclear doctrine had 
been developed and appropriately positioned in military doctrine until the late 1980s 
(Lin 1988; Lewis and Xue 1988; Lewis and Hua 1992~ Johnston 1995b; 1997: Gurtov 
and Hwang 1998). It was because Chinese strategists were unable to reconcile 
nuclear weapons with Mao's doctrine that preferred people's power over nuclear 
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weapons. Mao himself and the Chinese leadership evaluated nuclear weapons as a 
general military and political utility in the face of the nuclear threat by the United 
States in the Korean War and Soviet military threat in 1960s. In his "On the Ten 
Great Relationships," Mao said that China 
does not need more airplanes and cannon but needs atomic bombs. If we are 
not to be bullied in this world, we cannot do without the bomb (Wang 
Xiaohua and Wang Wei 1999: 20). 
Nuclear weapons had been regarded as improving both China's influence and 
status in international politics, as well as its ability to deter the US and Soviet threat. 
As a result, the ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programme has been a top 
priority of the state scientific technology, and military bureaucracies, which, 
according to the CIA, consumed about two-thirds of military R&D funds through the 
late 1970s (Johnston 1995b: 8). Lewis and Xue argue that Mao's stress on "people's 
war" "seemed immutable and increasingly unrelated to China's actual defence 
program." They demonstrated that Chinese defence programme from 1955 to the 
1970s rigidly adhered to Mao's earlier aspiration for the atomic bomb (Lewis and Xue 
1994: 217). Henceforth, neither the government statements nor articles by Chinese 
military strategists discussed China's nuclear deterrence theories after its first nuclear 
experiment in 1964. Lewis and Hua argued that technology rather than nuclear 
strategy determined the direction and pace of China's nuclear weapons development 
programme (Lewis and Hua 1992: 19-20). 
Traditionally. Chinese analysts denied nuclear deterrence strategy. They 
criticized it by saying that it aggravated the US-Soviet relationship, caused the nuclear 
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arms race and increased tension during the Cold War. For example, Chen Peiyao 
regarded nuclear deterrence strategy as an actual factor in power politics and 
hegemonism which had been unfavourable to the multilateral development of 
international politics and harmful to the independence and the equality of the security 
system (Chen Peiyao 1987: 44). From the late 1980s, Chinese strategists increasingly 
accepted and used the concept of "deterrence" to characterize the mission of Chinese 
nuclear forces. "To construct deterrent power, it is necessary to study deterrence 
theory" (Chen Weimin 1989: 47). Some analysts introduced western deterrence 
theory in order to enlarge recognition of the concept of nuclear deterrence in China's 
nuclear strategy. Li Zhengxin accepts that nuclear deterrence has definitely played a 
positive role in international relations. According to him, however, this operation is 
not necessarily the subjective intention of the nuclear superpowers (Li Zhengxin 
1990b: 55). Chinese analysts refined descriptions of China's deterrent strategy, 
variously calling it "defensive," "counterattack," "minimum," and "limited.,,2o 
Chinese strategists argue that China's nuclear strategy is defensive and limited in 
nature and offers minimum nuclear retaliation against the first strike. After exploring 
the nuclear strategy of the US and the Soviet, Wu Zhan stresses that China has always 
pursued a policy of minimum nuclear security. "China's nuclear capacity is similar to 
that of Britain and France in that it is for defence," and the number of nuclear 
weapons are small. He justifies China's possession of nuclear weapons for breaking 
the superpowers' nuclear monopoly, protecting its own independence and security, 
and preserving world peace. He concludes that Chinese nuclear strategy can be called 
20 'Minimum deterrence' means that a small number of warheads sufficient to intlict unacceptable 
damage on a handful of enemy cities constitute a credible deterrent. Meanwhile. the term. 'limited 
deterrence.' which appeared in 1987. stands between two extremes, minimum and maximum. 'Limited 
deterrence means having enough capabilities to deter conventional. theatre, and strategic nuclear wan, 
and to control and suppress escalation during a nuclear war (Johnston 1995b: 19). 
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a kind of deterrence, but it is against hegemonic threat and has no threatening 
intention (Wu Zhan 1988: 44-9). 
Maximum deterrence is denounced as a doctrine for hegemonistic powers 
because its stress on first strike capability would be inconsistent with China' s 
defensive intentions. However, some Chinese strategists now argue that the minimum 
deterrence capabilities are in practice too vulnerable to a disarming first strike, and 
thus have little deterrent value. China "should seek for constructing a nuclear 
capability with an unlimited nuclear deterrent mindset" which can effectively deter 
great war intentions (Chen Weimin 1989: 49). Johnston argues that the Chinese 
debates about nuclear deterrence ironically disclose that there is a large gap between 
limited nuclear doctrinal arguments and China's present nuclear war-fighting 
capability. It implicitly suggests that Chinese strategists are not as confident as in the 
past. The deterrent is frail and more concerted efforts will be needed for military 
capability (Johnston 1995b: 31-7). Gurtov and Hwang also argue that China's 
promotion of a No-First-Use (NFU) pledge might be perceived as suggesting Chinese 
vulnerability, utilizing the NFU to assist its deterrence (Gurtov and Hwang 1998: 125-
6). 
It is not clear that limited deterrence has been explicitly endorsed by the most 
senior political and military leaders. In contrast, He Zuoxin claims support for his 
minimum deterrence view, from numerous specialists in many fields whose views 
were solicited by the top party leaders (interview with He Zuoxin from GurtOY and 
Hwang 1998: 125-9). In sum, despite the request of Chinese strategists for nuclear 
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doctrine revision, nuclear strategic doctrine still remains "minimum deterrence" until 
the requirements for "limited deterrence" can be met. 
4.3. New perspectives on Security Interdependence 
In the 1990s, a "security interdependence" perspective among Chinese analysts 
became conspicuous. A growing number of Chinese analysts and officials accepted 
the mutual security notion that one's own security is more assured only when other 
states also feel secure. They also started to advocate multilateral collective security as 
they believed it would enhance China's national interests. They are still a minority 
and their views are fundamentally based on, what Yahuda calls, "state enhancing 
functionalism," while most Chinese scholars and analysts remain deeply rooted in the 
realist approach of "balance of power." "Security interdependence" is nevertheless 
playing an increasingly important role in China's national security and foreign 
policies. The Chinese have come to realize that a self-help approach alone is 
inadequate as well as politically untenable for ensuring a peaceful and stable 
international environment in which they can pursue their top national priority of 
economic development and modernization interdependence (Garrett and Glaser 1995: 
76). These perspectives are rapidly growing in Chinese security discourse and 
influencing Chinese regional security policy and ACD policy. Those perspectives 
were eventually formalized by the Chinese government in 1997, after the participation 
in the CTBT, in the name of the "New Security Concept" (NSC. Chapter 8.3.1.). This 
section explores the logic and implications of nascent Chinese mutual secUtity 
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discourses, which would be a necessary preliminary for analyzing Chinese 
perspectives on ACD. 
4.3.1. The nascent mutual security perspective 
Chinese security analysts used to take a zero-sum VIew of alliances and the 
mutual security concept was unacceptable to Chinese realpolitik security thinking. 
Moreover, Chinese analysts strongly suspected that the alliances involving United 
States in the Asia-Pacific region, like the US-Japan alliance are aimed at containing 
China. However, the mutual security concept does present the most systemic and 
official exposition of the Chinese prescriptive view of how international relations 
should be conducted and security maintained in parallel with Chinese views that pay 
more attention to globalization and interdependence in the post-Cold War era. Yan 
Xuetong, director of the Centre for Foreign Policy studies at the China Institue of 
Contemporary International Relations, recognizes two different security systems. 
First, under an individual security system, the individual state's security depends on 
its own strength. Second, under a collective security system, the security of the 
individual state is protected by collective security arrangements as well as the state's 
own defence. He further develops his arguments and distinguishes a collective 
security system from a military alliance. A collective security system differs from a 
military alliance in that the former does not target a predetermined third party (Yan 
Xuetong 2000: 91-110). Tang Tianri' s article also demonstrates the interdependent 
perspective of security. He describes the world as a "global society with high 
interdependence where one country's security and other countries' interests are 
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crucially interrelated." Protecting the common interest of global security IS 
increasingly becoming a universal concord." (Tang Tianri 1997: 44). 
There is growing support in China for the view that cooperative security to reduce 
mutual threats can provide meaningful complements to self-help measures to enhance 
Chinese security as well as being politically useful in deflecting criticism of China's 
nuclear weapons policies. This nascent "security interdependence" perspective has 
been influenced in part by the exposure of Chinese nuclear scientists, military 
strategists, and civilian analysts to Western concepts of arms control through 
education in the United States and interaction with US scientists and arms control 
experts (Johnston 1996). The tension between engaging in security interdependence 
arrangements and relying solely on self-help measures thus lies at the heart of Chinese 
thinking about, and debates over, nuclear arms control regimes and initiatives. The 
various and nascent mutual security concepts were merged into and officially 
formulated as the "New Security Concept" at the post-CTBT era.21 
4.3.2. Security MuItilateralism 
Multilateralism has become a clear trend in the Asia-Pacific region since the end 
of the Cold War, China actively participated in not only economic but also security 
related multilateral frameworks. China's cooperation in the regional multilateral 
frameworks is a new trend of Chinese foreign policy in 1990s (Hu Weixing 1993; 
Monteperto and Binnendijk 1997; Shambaugh 1999a; Wang Hongying 2000). 
Chinese leaders found that it was necessary in order to be an influential and 
21 The 'New Security Concept' will be explored in Chapter 8 as a consequence of China's CTBT entry. 
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responsible power while promoting national interest. The Chinese perspecti\e on 
multilateralism has been derived from indigenous Chinese IR theories. The "liangge 
zhenying" (two camps) in 1950s and the ''fandui di xiu fan" (opposing imperialism. 
revisionism and reactionism) were the guiding principles of Chinese foreign policy. 
Both theories rejected Soviet revisionism and American imperialism. Necessarily. 
both ideology-oriented policies dismissed the existing phenomenon of 
multilateralism, so multilateral organizations were defined as instruments for 
imperialism. There was no legitimate reason for China to participate in them. The 
"sange shijie" (the three world) theory of the 1970s left room for selective and 
symbolic involvement in international organizations, particularly the United Nations, 
where third-world countries made up the majority and were increasingly assertive in 
pursuit of their interests. Substantive multilateralism, however, had no place in any of 
these three IR theories. Each clearly defined the enemy and prescribed differentiated 
policies toward various international groups. 
It was not until the 1980s, under the framework of "heping yu fazhan" (peace and 
development), that Chinese scholars and policy analysts began to treat multilateralism 
as a legitimate subject of research. As has been presented in Chapter 4.2.2., the 
Chinese have frequently emphasized the multipolar nature of the world to counter the 
US-unipolar world. A Chinese analyst argues the necessity of a new order that would 
place greater reliance on multilateral cooperation (Liang Shoude 1998: 1-6). 
Multilateralism is consistent with the mUltipolar structure of the Asia-Pacific region. 
Huang Zhengji proposes that "a new multipolar world would be one in which various 
forces can playa role" and requests that the Third World countries including China 
should be given full scope in the creation of "a new international political order and a 
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new international economlC order" (Huang Zhengji 1996: 39). Security 
multilateralism would also enhance mutual understanding and thus promote stability 
in the region (Xu Yimin 1996: 16-24; Shi Yongmin 1996: 41-7; 1997: 44-9). 
The promotion of multilateralism is now seen as consistent with national interests 
rather than sacrificing national sovereignty. Nonetheless, the Chinese leadership still 
stresses the independent nature of Chinese foreign policy, whereas it accepts the 
principles of multilateralism serving the national interest, as they put a great deal of 
emphasis on the principle of state sovereignty. The difficulty of reconciling the 
multilateralism and state sovereignty produces China's gradualism in facilitating 
multilateral institutions. For example, Jiang Zemin made clear the Chinese position 
of gradualism on multilateral frameworks and suggested, at the 1993 Seattle 
Conference of APEC, that China wants to cooperate only in, 
an open, flexible and pragmatic forum for econOllliC cooperation and 
consultation mechanism, rather than a closed, institutionalized economic bloc 
(Beijing Review 19 Nov.-5 Dec 1993). 
China insists that regional security arrangements should follow a gradual 
approach, taking into account the widely diverse situations of the regIon. Such 
arrangements should continue to be informal and flexible forums for dialogue and 
resist the pressure to become institutionalized. Arguing that "oriental" concepts of 
international order, based on coexistence and opposition to power politics, are more 
appropriate to regional security than are the western hierarchical system, that 
problems should be approached from bilateral to multilateral processes. China 
maintains the attitude toward regional security that regional countries should first 
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solve their problems bilaterally, and regional security cannot be established until 
hegemony and power politics are eliminated from the region (Guo Zhenyuan 1994: 
20-2). China's reluctance is largely attributable to its suspicion of the United States' 
dominant role in the region. China actively utilizes multilateralism to counterbalance 
regional military alliances and to undermine US dominance in the region. In a sense, 
multilateralism is treated as an instrument to transform old patterns of Asian-pacific 
relations to a new one in the post-Cold War era, where the US influence is 
neutralized. 
Although Chinese perceptions still maintain the tactical VIews of pursumg 
realpolitik, their perceptions are based on a multipolar trend of reality and their 
writings show an appreciation of underlying norms like the concept of mutual security 
concept and military transparency. For instance, China's support of ASEAN is 
partially because the role of ASEAN and the "ASEAN way" reflects "the trend of 
global multipolarization" (Wang Jianwei 1999: 91). In sum, compared to China's 
foreign policy before the 1990s, there is no doubt that multilateralism and collective 
security have increased in legitimacy and gained credit in China's post-Cold War 
foreign policy thinking and behaviour. Behind the changes are some new 
understandings of international relations. First, since the late 1980s, Chinese leaders 
and elites increasingly have accepted the fact that the world in which China exists is 
characterized by a high degree of interdependence, not just in economic terms but also 
in security terms. China has realized that it is only natural that a high degree of v\orld 
interdependence and strategic multipolarity will be accompanied by a new mode of 
security. In other words, multipolarization and multilateralism are closely linked and 
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compatible. Attention is being paid more and more to multilateral institutional 
mechanism by the Chinese ACD experts in particular. 
4.4. Analysis on the Chinese ACD perspectives 
4.4.1. Introduction 
There has been a proliferation of Chinese ACD articles in the last decade, largely 
as a result of participation in international ACD institutions since 1990s. As the 
Chinese leadership began to face questions, such as whether to join the NPT or the 
CTBT, the leadership came to recognize that China would have to participate directly 
in international arms control regimes and thus would need to develop expertise on the 
technical and security issues involved. Chinese scientists, diplomats and military 
analysts were encouraged to go abroad to study ACD issues and become involved in 
international ACD activities like the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (CD). 
Many small ACD groups were established in scientific and military organizations as 
well as in foreign policy research institutes at the behest of the Chinese leadership 
(Chapter 5). The new awareness of the impact of ACD on Chinese economic, 
diplomatic and security interests has developed throughout the 1990s, in which China 
joined more and more international ACD regimes and institutions. 
This section shows that the way that the Chinese perspective on ACD evolved is 
significantly interrelated with China's engagement in international ACD regimes. 
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The articles about ACD in the prominent and influential Chinese journals are first 
examined and their increasing number and pattern will be demonstrated. The contents 
of Chinese ACD discourse then will be explored in the context of the three IR 
theories, the neorealist, neoliberalist and constructivist approaches, which ha\e been 
argued in Chapter 3. 
4.4.2. The Patterns of Publishing in Journals: a quantitative analysis 
The development of the Chinese ACD perspective in the 1990s was remarkable. 
To look for patterns in ACD discourses among Chinese analysts, one could examine 
journals, which are the most direct measure of the subject itself. The following table 
compares the distribution of articles' published in the 1980s and 1990s in 
representative journals in China.22 
22 To investigate Chinese discourses on ACD, three Chinese institutions such as government, academia 
and military&defence establishments are considered and six prominent and influential journals have 
been chosen. In the government sector, International Studies (Guoji wenti yanjiu), a journal of the 
Institute of International Studies associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Contemporary 
International Relations (Xiandai guoji guanxi), a journal of the Institute for Contemporary 
International Relations associated with the State Council is chosen to examine. The World Economics 
and Politics (Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi) and the American Studies (Meiguo yanjiu) represent Chinese 
academia, while each journal is published by the sub-institutes, the Institute of World Politics and 
Economics and the Institute of American Studies respectively, under the Chinese Academy of Social 
Science. The Contemporary Military (Xiandai junshi) and the Imernational Strategic Studies (Glloji 
;:,hanlue yalljiu) express Chinese military and defence establisment views on ACD issues. The 
Contemporary Military is published by the China Defence Science and Technology Information Centre 
(CDSTIC) associated with the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence 
(COSTIND), the most powerful China's Defence establishment institute. The International Strategic 
Studies is published, but not available to the public. by the China Institute of International Strategic 
Studies which is known to be linked to PLA General Staff Department (GSD) and contains military 
views in general. An investigation of the whole series of the Imemational Strategic Studies proved 
impossible in China. The journal was collected at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security 
(lFANS) in Korea from 1997 to 2000. 
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Table 4.1. Distribution of Chinese ACD articles in 1980s and 1990s 
International Contemporary World American Contemporary International Total 
Studies International Econornics& Studies Military Strategic 
Relations Politics Studies 
1980s 10 4 8 4 - - 26 
1990s 16 11 17 9 21 13 87 
Note: InternatlOnal Studies was firstly publIshed by MFA In 1982. 
Contemporary International Relations was internally circulated until 1985 and openly published from 
1986. The internal circulated version is still not open to researchers. 
World Economics&Politics was internally circulated from 1981 and openly published in July 1987. 
The internally circulated version (Shijie jingji yu zhengzhe neican) is now open to researchers. 
American Studies was first published in 1987. 
Contemporary Military was first published in 1992. 
International Strategic Studies was first published in 1986. 
In all six journals for all years investigated (1981-2000), the 1980s account for 26 
published articles on ACD issues, while the 1990s account for 87. The great surge of 
publishing in 1990s indicates China's increasing interest in the international ACD 
agenda in China's main prominent journals. Certainly, the discrepancy might occur 
because most journals do not fully cover the whole period in 1980s. However, as the 
case of International Studies and World Economics & Politics, covering the whole 
1980 period, illustrate the overall increase of ACD issues in Chinese discourses. 
These journals account for 60 percent and 112.5 percent rate of the increase 
respectively. Given the fact that international ACD activities substantively began to 
take place from the late 1980s, a significant increase in Chinese articles in 1990s is 
very apparent. Table 4.2. shows the evolutionary pattern of Chinese discourse on 
ACD issues by the year. 
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Table 4.2. Annual Distribution of Chinese ACD articles 
86' 87' 88' 89' 90' 91' 92' 93'94' 95' 96' 97' 98' 99' 00' total 
International Studies 3 1 1 1 4 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 22 
Contemporary International Relations 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 15 
World Economics&Politics 1 1 3 2 2 4 3 3 2 1 2 1 1 26 
American Studies 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 13 
Contemporary Military 3 1 2 2 6 3 1 1 2 21 
International Strategic Studies 1 3 5 3 12 
Total 2 6 5 4 4 2 13 7 9 9 9 6 11 11 12 110 
Note: Three articles in the International Studies (83',85') and World Economics&Politics (83') are not 
calculated in the table. 
Chinese writings on ACD issues initially started in the mid-1980s and frequently 
appeared in those journals in the late 1980s. Given the fact that Chinese journals were 
much more concerned with bilateral relationship issues like the Sino-Soviet and the 
Sino-US relationships rather than international topics in general, the ACD issues came 
to attract Chinese readers, modestly, since then. The reason why the governmental 
and academic journals seemed to focus more on the ACD issues than the military 
journals in the early days is not clear. The absence of published numbers in the early 
years of the military journals (Contemporary Military and International Strategic 
Studies) is due to their late launch of publication and the inaccessibility of the 
materials. In contrast, the gradually increasing numbers of publications in military 
journals in recent years indicate that the Chinese military is demonstrating more and 
more interest in the international ACD process. The most dramatic and significant 
change in the pattern of Chinese ACD discourse is the explosive number of 
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publications in 1992. China joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992 and 
the increase in publications (12) in 1992 is explicable by this event. The figure 4.1. 
demonstrates this vertical increase in Chinese ACD writings in 1992. 
Figure 4.1. Annual Distribution of Chinese ACD articles in Chinese journals 
IS = International Studies CIS = Contemporary International Relation 
WEP = World Economics&Politics AS = American Studies 
CM = Contemporary Military ISS = International Strategic Studies 
More significantly, since 1992, the number of Chinese article in tho e journal 
continue now to increase steadily. In the late 1990s, the number of publication i in 
double digits. This suggests that the international ACD issues became no longer ju t 
propaganda criticizing the superpowers but rather a crucial agenda to be 
enthu ia tically and carefully discu ed (chapter 4.4.3.). The quantitati e increa e in 
Chin . e di cour e on international ACD i ue galvanized by China' j ininb th 
NPT in 1 92, herald d a qualitative hift in th late 1990. . Th c ntenL f th 
hin A D P 1'. P ctiv and it ' d lopm nt will b e plor d in the ne t s eti n. 
1.0 
4.4.3. The Evolution and Diversification of ACD perspective: a qualitative 
analysis 
All articles appearing in these journals for the last two decades have been sorted 
into four main categories which characterize the two decades. The categories, as 
shown in Figure 4.2., are (1) the US-Soviet (Russia) disarmament negotiations; (2) the 
general trend of international ACD; (3) the analyses of the individual international 
ACD agenda; (4) the US ACD policy. Although these four categories are rough and 
some classifications involve difficult jUdgements, the result is striking enough to 
indicate the growing pattern of the Chinese ACD discourse. Actually, the most 
complicated and recurrent problem is to distinguish clearly between category (2) (the 
general trend of international ACD) and the category (4) (US ACD policy). The 
strong sense of the realist approach of Chinese analysts usually viewed the 
international ACD developments in the framework of US ACD policy initiatives. 
Sometimes, the distinction is unclear. To resolve this problem, categories (2) and (4) 
have been sorted in terms of article titles and will be discussed separately, although 
there is a certain overlap in their content. The following figure shows an interesting 
pattern of the ACD subjects that Chinese analysts have been concerned with in the 
1980s and the 1990s.23 
l3 Various other topics besides the Chinese ACD articles appear in the journals investigated. The 
topics of them are arms transfer in the Middle East. international law. Indian .nucle~r test. the US-China 
cooperation in the ACD field and etc. Those articles appeared once or t\\ Ice In the Journals. 
131 
Figure 4.2. The Distribution of ACD subjects in Chinese journals, 1981-2000 
1990s 
1980s 
o 20 40 60 80 
US-Soviet 
(Russia) 
Disarmament 
Negotiations 
• General Trend of 
International AGO 
o Individual Treaty 
or AGO Agenda 
o US AGO policy 
Chinese interest to arms control and disarmament (ACD) was sparked by the 
external factor, the US-Soviet di armament negotiation, in the 1980. A ob erver , 
Chinese analysts had kept their eyes on the process of the negotiation ince the US-
Soviet talk of START 1. The category of the US-Soviet di armament negotiation 
accounted for 73 percent of all the articles investigated in the 1980s. Mo t article in 
the] 980s made an effort to analyze and evaluate the US-Soviet nuclear di armament 
talk. In contrast, as the international ACD agenda penetrated China the genera] 
int re t in the international ACD rose to become the main topic of concern and 
acc unted for 42 percent in the 1990 . In parallel with thi the category of indi idual 
tr aty nd the US ACD policy al 0 attracted the Chine e analy t while th ' tw 
.' ubj ct a count d for 22 percent and 11 percent re pecti . The di er:i fi ati n f 
th hin -' di Ut" n th int rnational ACD pro id d the pportunit f r th" 
isslle. t b tTl int mali d in hin thinking. 
The early Chinese writings can be characterized as the realist approach. They 
mainly focused on the evaluation of the US-Soviet nuclear disarmament negotiation. 
Explaining the US-Soviet nuclear cuts in the 1980s under the changed international 
circumstances, Wu Zhan argued that China might join the talks and discuss the 
problem in due time given the imbalance of nuclear weapons between China, the US 
and Russia. He suggested the precondition that, if the US and Russia reduced 90-95 
percent of their nuclear weapons, China might join the nuclear disarmament 
discussion (Wu Zhan 1992: 26-40). Liu Huaqiu assessed the content of the US-
Soviet's START I agreement as "relatively big progress" but argued that START still 
had its defects. It covered only tactical nuclear warheads and the United States and 
the Soviet still had a huge number of strategic nuclear warheads, 9000 and 7000, 
respectively, i.e. more than 95 percent of strategic nuclear warheads in the world. Liu 
Huaqiu accused the US and the Soviet of their unwillingness to abandon the nuclear 
deterrence strategy for the complete destruction of nuclear weapons (Liu Huaqui 
1992: 14-5). Negating the superpowers' nuclear deterrents and demanding complete 
nuclear disarmament was the main Chinese rhetoric in the early days (Chu Yuansheng 
1993: 62-5; Feng Changhong 1993: 48-52). In the Chinese view, hegemonism and 
power politics are basically underpinned by the nuclear deterrence strategy. Whatever 
the outcomes of the superpowers' disarmament negotiations, they still have a "very 
long way to go on the road to complete nuclear disarmament" (Chu Yuansheng 1993: 
65). 
With the progress of international ACD activities, the Chinese began to 
understand the inevitability of Chinese participation in ACD. The term "international 
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disarmament" first appeared in International Studies in 1989. The subjectivity of the 
ACD issues then transcended the span of the superpowers' interest and turned out to 
be an objective and universal reality in the Chinese mindsets. Xia Liping overviews 
the features of ACD after the end of the Cold War and stresses that "international 
arms control and disarmament have developed into an important stage." The ACD 
issues "already exceed the boundary of US-Soviet relations and have become the field 
of international political and military competition" (Xia Liping 1994: 64-7). The 
initial but mainstream understanding of the "universal reality" of the ACD issues, 
however, lingered on its realist approach. The realist approach of the Chinese 
perspective on the ACD reality understood the international ACD only in the context 
of the US policy initiative. After the end of the Cold War, the United States made 
technology transfer and proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical weapons and 
missiles critical issues of foreign policy and brought up a "counter-proliferation" 
policy. Chinese analysts clearly understood the strategic motive behind the US policy 
change (Tan Han 1992: 24-30; 1993: 18-22; Li Weiguo 1992: 42-7; Wang Ling 1994: 
15-7; Zhang Yeliang 1996: 76-93). 
Many authors preserved the realist approach even though they accepted that the 
international ACD trend was necessary and important for the stability of international 
peace. They criticize the asymmetry of operating regimes among the states. For 
example, Wang Ling argues that the Clinton administration's nonproliferation policy 
after the Cold War brought new contradictory developments between the US and the 
Third World because of its unfairness and double standards (Wang Ling 1994: 17). 
Liu Huaqiu also expresses a strong complaint that the defect of the NPT lies in its 
discriminative nature. On the one hand, the superpowers restrain nuclear weapons 
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development in the non-nuclear states. On the other hand, the superpowers expand 
their nuclear arsenals. Liu compares this situation to the saying that "allows 
government to set a fire and does not allow the people to light a lamp" (Liu Huaqiu 
1995: 16). 
As a co-authored article put it, the realist approach came to accept that the 
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction was the key issue of world anns 
control. They believed that the anns control model has been changed from 
"traditional US-Soviet competition model to security cooperation model," which, 
nonetheless, simply defended the western countries' national interests. In their view, 
the main objective of the international ACD was increasingly trying to control the 
Third World countries (Zhao Jingzeng, Pan Jusheng and Liu Huaqiu 1996: 15-6). 
Some authors were alerted by the US Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) plan, which it 
was argued would be an obstacle to other nuclear powers participating in the nuclear 
disannament process. Because the Chinese are worried about and strongly critical of 
the use of TMD for strategic containment of China, the issue of the US TMDINMD 
plan frequently appeared in the journals. Ironically, the Chinese analysts denounced 
the United States on the basis that the nature of the TMD infringes the international 
nonns of the international ACD regimes (Liu Huaqiu and Qin Zhongmin 1993: 1-6; 
Tan Han 1994: 27-31). 
The realist approach was relatively and strongly sustained by the military sector 
in the late 1990s. Most military analysts consider the international regimes as a tool 
of the United States which has the primary purpose of "having other countries locked 
on the curve of nuclear knowledge" (Hu Yumin 1997: 11-8). The US ACD policy is 
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a "major component of its national security strategy and an important tool" to 
guarantee the US military superiority and national security interests (Wang Zhenxi 
and Zhao Xiaozhuo 1998: 31-42). 
The common recognition of the "universal reality" of the international ACD 
regimes created more flexible perspectives on the issues. Rather than perceiving the 
international ACD regimes as US policy initiati ves, they focused more on individual 
regimes, such as the NPT and the CTBT, in which the Chinese came to sit at the 
negotiation table. The liberalist approach, a new emergent paradigm, has frequently 
and carefully posited its views on the Chinese ACD discourse. Xia Liping and Zhang 
Wuping analyze several factors that led to the proliferation of traditional and nuclear 
weapons in the Asia-Pacific region. They stressed that the NPT was useful for 
constraining proliferation (Xia Liping and Zhang Wuping 1991: 50-5). Some authors 
recognize the problems of global arms transfer and proliferation. Thus, nuclear 
nonproliferation became one of the most important issues of international society (Wu 
Peng 1994: 51-5; Xia Liping 1993: 43-6). A Chinese scholar, associated with the 
Academy of Chinese Social Sciences, divides the nuclear age into three periods. "The 
most important feature of the third period is the passionate seeking for nuclear 
weapons and proliferation at the whole global level and this new game rule is not 
established." The scholar argues that the nuclear proliferation reality made foreign 
policy and military strategy change and stresses the necessity of establishing a 
cooperati ve way through "institution" and "regime". 
If the willingness and the behaviour of the world countries could afford to 
manage and actively implement readjustment of the new problem in 
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international affairs, the establishment of institutions and regImes, a 
cooperative method of resolving this new periodical nuclear proliferation, 
will prevent a nuclear clash. Those two achievements interact with each 
other and can secure prolonged world peace in the next century (Hong Yuan 
1995: 63) 
China's participation in the international ACD frameworks, like the NPT (1992) 
and the CTBT (1996), gave the Chinese analysts momentum to rethink the ACD 
issues inside the regimes. In the mid 1990s, many authors devoted themselves to the 
analysis of the ongoing negotiations of the ACD agenda such as the CTBT (Wang 
Ling 1993: 24-6; 1996: 16-9; Zou Yunhua 1994: 5-12), the NPT (Wang Ling 1995: 
27-31; Lu Yusheng 1995: 63-8; Tan Han 1995a: 14-7), the CWC (Yu Zhongzhou 
1997: 6-10) and the MTCR (Zhang Zuqian 1994: 42-6). The Chinese analysts came 
to see the international ACD agenda as enhancing China's security as well as global 
security. The experiences and the rethinking of the international ACD agenda raised a 
new question about the role which China should play. Wang Ling expressed these 
needs in her article. 
Along with the deep-going and enlarging international arms control and 
disarmament, the United States and western countries need more and more 
China's participation and cooperation with more right to speak (Wang Ling 
1997: 22). 
China's more constructive role in the ACD agenda stems from the following self-
examination. Wang Yizhou charaterizes the international ACD trends as "still an 
unfair world." He argues that today's peace and disarmament is a kind of "hegemonic 
peace" and "forced disarmament," because the western countries, led by the United 
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States, take a superior position and the developing countries cannot help but passively 
accept the rules and institutions, which are made and arranged by them. He questions 
China's long term purpose and responsibility while "we (Chinese) search, adjust and 
establish our international strategy" in the international ACD (Wang Yizhou 1998: 
52-3). 
In the late 1990s, there are increasing numbers of the Chinese analysts who stress 
Chinese "responsibility" and an "active role" in setting the ACD agenda. Gu 
Guoliang, the present director of the Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament under 
the CASS, suggests that a "new attitude, positive and active participation in the 
international arms control and nonproliferation, attracts international praise and 
enhances the international reputation (of the Chinese)," while he assesses the 
achievements of the US-China cooperation in the ACD agenda (Gu Guoliang 1999: 
12). An author is also concerned about Chinese responsibility for the international 
ACD agenda. Jia Hao proposes that China keeps the CTBT and nuclear 
nonproliferation policy and encourages international ratification for the early 
efficiency of the CTBT despite the United States Congress's failure to ratify the 
CTBT, as well as the nuclear tests in 1998 by India and Pakistan. This is not only 
beneficial for China's security and international stability but also for the enhancement 
of China's status and influence as a responsible power. The author further argues that 
the moment is a "historical opportunity to take the leadership of responsibility for the 
global nuclear agenda (Jia Hao 1999b: 18-21). 
The evolution of a Chinese perspective on ACD has featured three kinds of 
approach to the ACD agenda since the first article appeared in International Studies in 
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1983. Two fundamental questions arose about the divergent variables for 
distinguishing between the three approaches. These were whether the international 
ACD regimes are acceptable to "'us" (Chinese) or not, and, if so, what role "we" 
(Chinese) can play in those regimes. The first question was the process by which the 
Chinese came to acknowledge international ACD activities. The early balance-of-
power oriented approach (realist approach) that had denied the international regime 
and its norms found a little different view inside the discourse. For some analysts, the 
regime and its norms were perceived to be ontologically existent and universal for 
international peace (liberalist approach). The 1990s' increasing participation in 
international ACD frameworks strengthened the belief in the regime and raised the 
further question of the role of China in the international arena (constructivist 
approach). Since the late 1990s, the Chinese ACD analysts have tried to seek a more 
influential and responsible role. 
Although Chinese argument has still been challenging the fairness of the rules 
under the ACD regimes, like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the 
shift of perspective embraces the international ACD regimes and norms in general 
rather than dismissing the regime itself. This is not to say that the constructivist 
approach has been more conspicuous in the late 1990s than two other approaches. In 
fact, there are mixed tendencies of those approaches, even in the same author's article. 
However, these three approaches have been derivatively and distinctively developed 
in Chinese ACD discourse in parallel with China's engagement in multilateral ACD 
frameworks. Among the Chinese analysts, the constructivist approach is gaining 
more and more credit in dealing with international ACD issues. For example, even a 
military analyst regards the proliferation of massi ve destructi ve weapons and deli very 
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missiles as a global problem not just for the US security strategy. He assesses China's 
role from a state-enhancing perspecti ve. 
China was actively unfolding its all-out diplomacy and took anns control and 
nonproliferation as a key link of the adjusting the relationship between big 
powers, which in tum enhanced the leverage of China (Hu Yurnin 1999a: 
17). 
Although the constructivist approach is motivated by Chinese "state enhancing 
functionalism," it can be distinguised from the realpolitik approach. The Chinese 
analysts recognize that the international ACD agenda would serve China's interest. 
They are also beginning to internalize the international ACD norms, as it has been 
argued that the Chinese came to see the issue as "an universal reality" for global 
security. The active participation in rule-making processes is believed by some 
Chinese ACD experts to create more constitutive condition for China's modernization 
process. This is combined with the Chinese pragmatism and aspiration to be a 
responsible power. As the realpolitik was embedded in "state enhancing 
functionalism," likewise, the constructivist approach is being sought by it in response 
to the international ACD agenda.24 
Based on an overall reassessment of the world strategic environment, the Chinese 
leadership has realized that the growing danger of horizontal nuclear proliferation wi 11 
24 The constructivist approach of Chinese ACD discourse, the term that I use here, is not the same as 
the one in IR. I use it because some Chinese arguments about ACD issues, first. accept the 
international ACD norms, second. stress the process and participation in rule-making and, third, are 
concerned about trying actively to create a momentum in which China might playa role at the 
international issues. This perspective is similar to the constructivists in IR, in that both lay stress on the 
constitutive process by action. Interestingly. in China, numerous articles about constructivism have 
been published and introduced in Chinese IR journals recently. 
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erode China's security interest. Many Chinese policy analysts have acknowledged 
that a greater number of nuclear states mean a greater probability of nuclear war. 
They have also recognized that the pursuit of egalitarianism in international relations 
is at the expense of world stability and national security. Instead, Chinese analysts are 
seeking for a more responsible and influential role in the making of rules in the ACD 
multilateral frameworks. The CTBT was, as a Chinese analyst put it, the first 
multilateral nuclear arms control treaty negotiation that China participated in. 
4.5. Conclusion: New Ideas, A Dynamic of State and 
Institutions 
Since ideas, such as values, beliefs, culture and information attracted the IR 
theorists, their roles and influences in international relations have not been 
underestimated. Recently, both the neoliberalists and the constructivists have 
employed international norms and made efforts to explain it as a mediating factor, 
which can glue the relationship with common interests among states. In theoretical IR 
debates, one of the important questions is how a norm penetrates the boundary of 
states to become accepted. The framework of the "dynamic of state and institution 
(regime)" was demonstrated in Chapter 3. As an aggregate of the interaction between 
states and international institutions (regimes) in a certain time span, the concept of a 
"dynamic between state and institution" illuminates how the individual state's interest 
could be influenced and transformed, whether that is evaluated as learning or 
adjustment, at the moment. 
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Chapter 4 has shown how the Chinese perspective on the international ACD has 
diversified and significantly transfonned in a more nonn-oriented direction. Unlike 
general skepticism over whether China has learned the international ACD norms 
cognitively, the Chinese analysts came to understand and believe in the necessity of 
the nonproliferation regime in the post-Cold War period. The nonn-bound belief 
spreads more and more among the ACD experts once the ACD regimes won 
"universal reality" which international society approved. This seemingly 
paradigmatic shift of the Chinese attitude is deeply related to what Yahuda called the 
"state enhancing functionalism." When the advocates of the state-centric realist 
approach realized that they could hardly achieve national interest outside regimes, the 
Chinese seemed to decide to step into the regime and actively participate. Aspiring to 
become a responsible and influential power, the Chinese ACD analysts rethought the 
international ACD field as a cooperative, as well as, a competitive battlefield. 
However, there was also some evidence of enthusiastic confidence about the 
"interdependent security" among the Chinese analysts. Those perspectives were 
deeply entrenched in the reality of globalization, which inevitably drove China to 
respond to the external centripetal force of globalization. The Chinese are 
recognizing, more and more, the importance of the mutual security concept. The 
"new security concept" exemplified the development of the mutual security concept 
in the post-CTBT period. It was substantively activated in the bilateral relationship 
with Russia, the Sino-Russian relationship, which approved the "no-first-use" (NFU). 
China's new idea is argued here to have been significantly fostered by its experience 
of engaging in international ACD frameworks during the last decade. 
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CHAPTER 5. Institutionalization: China's ACD Institution 
These internal developments are marked by greater openness to 
change and outside opmzon, less ideological rhetoric, the 
establishment and strengthening of agencies concerned with 
nonproliferation and arms control, a diffusion of expertise, and more 
sophisticated and pragmatic assessments and policies (Gill and 
Medeiros 2000: 82). 
5.1. Introduction 
This Chapter explores how Chinese domestic ACD institutions developed and 
penetrated the inter-agency bargaining process in China and also how the external 
factors such as regimes or international institutions fostered the domestic institutional 
structure. The arguments of the "China threat" debates and IR theory questioned 
whether and how "international institutions or regimes" matter (Chapter 2 and 3). 
The advocates of institutions and regimes argue that regimes create new interests and 
preferences, through readjusted calculation of costs and benefits, even for states with 
opportunistic, prisoner's dilemma-like payoff preferences. They further argue for the 
constructivist approach that international institutions can socialize states. Institutions 
provide new opportunities for experience and help to realize new interests through a 
complex set of ideational channels including transnational linkages and domestic 
constituency-building, which, eventually, can transform the state's identity. 
In parallel with the evolution of Chinese ACD perspectives (Chapter 4). there has 
been an institutionalization of Chinese domestic ACD-related fields in the last decade, 
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largely as a result of the engagement in the international ACD frameworks. Many 
small ACD expert groups were established in scientific and military organizations as 
well as in foreign policy research institutes at the behest of the Chinese leadership. 
whose interest in ACD issues came to a head in the 1990s with a new awareness of 
the impact of ACD on Chinese economic, diplomatic, and security interests. The 
institutional development of China's ACD related section runs parallel with China's 
participation rates in global ACD institutions (Chapter 6). 
China first entered the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (CD) in 1980. 
The requirements for participation in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and 
related activities led to the creation of domestic institutions, a formal process of policy 
coordination between these institutions and the growth of ACD experts in the MFA, 
the PLA and the science and defence establishment. 
5.2. Development of Individual Institutions 
Mao's paramount leadership and the dominant role of Zhou Enlai, in Chinese 
foreign affairs influenced China's foreign and security policy in general and ACD 
policy in particular in the early years of the PRC. Party and military leader Mao 
Zedong initiated and dominated almost all of the important foreign and national 
security policies including the ACD issues. Meanwhile, Zhou Enlai, during his period 
as a foreign minister. from 1949 to 1976, implemented routine foreign policy. The 
personal characteristics of the policy-making process, rather than institutional ones. 
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were the crucially detennining factors in the ACD decisions. Moreo\'er, China' s self-
imposed isolation in global affairs blanked out the interaction with international 
institutions and the concomitant institutionalization of the associated issue areas. 
Thus China's development of ACD institutions took place in the post-Mao era. 
Many observers distinguish the bureaucratic interests of the MFA from those of 
the military in foreign and security policy (Swaine 1997: Lu Ning 1997; Gurtov and 
Hwang 1998; Shambaugh 1999a; Johnston and Evans 1999). The impact of 
economic development on bureaucracy, especially the ACD associated organs, 
created different vested interests and put the MFA and military on opposite sides. 
The MFA favoured a flexible response to the international ACD agenda to facilitate 
greater cooperation with the western countries on economic and security issues, and 
to avoid the other countries' protests against the violation of international nonns or 
rules. In contrast, the Chinese military found that dramatic changes in military 
technology required enhanced Chinese defence spending. Facing cuts in the military 
budget since the early 1980s, the PLA has promoted the sale of military hardware, 
including nuclear technology and missiles, to Third World countries as a way to fund 
China's military modernization. China's attempt to increase its share of the world 
market for missiles and other heavy weapons, in turn, heightened concern about 
proliferation and strained China's relations with the United States. However. it is not 
always easy to establish a distinction between the policies of the MFA and the 
military. Swaine argues that it is an "exaggeration to state that the military and 
ci vi lian wings of this subarena (security research) are entirely separate from one 
another." The greatest level of interaction occurs between the strategists of the 
military and civi Ii an research units. They think that the communications and 
infonnation exchange influence the views of both, in part because their impact on the 
thinking of senior leaders increases appreciably if they can achieve some level of 
consensus (Swaine 1997: 125). 
At any rate, in China today, bureaucratic entities, scientific institutions and 
strategic research organizations are broadening their engagement in ACD research 
and policy implementation. Figure 5.2. shows the basic structure of the Chinese 
domestic ACD institutions. The Chinese Communist Party's Politburo Standing 
Committee, the highest decision-making body, controlls the overall ACD agenda. 
Like other foreign and security policies in the past, under the Party, the MFA 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the PLA (People's Liberation Anny) are the most 
important and competent units regarding China's ACD policy now. 
Figure 5.1. Structure of China's ACD Policy-Making Decision 
Party (Politburo Standing Committee) 
State Council .......................................... Central Military Commission 
i ........................................................................................................................................................ ; 
Note: indicates a consultative and competitive relationship. 
indicates a professional relationship. 
The institutionalization of China's ACD field is marked by the internal 
development of sub-institutes under the two main individual insitutions, the MFA and 
the PLA. The COSTIND (the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for 
National Defence) is officially supervised by the State Council but is believed to be 
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largely controlled by the PLA. The establishment and strengthening of agencies 
concerned with the ACD issues are showing greater openness to change and outside 
opinion, and less ideological rhetoric. Consequently, a diffusion of expertise, and 
more sophisticated and pragmatic assessments and policies are being implemented. A 
greater degree of intra- and inter-agency bargaining takes place along cross 
organizational lines. Indeed, the very need for China to be more active in the 
increasingly dynamic and complex international ACD agenda of the post-Cold War 
era has created a basic demand for more institutions, individuals and sources of 
experts. While it is certainly necessary to protect and to promote Chinese interests, 
this diffusion of expertise within Chinese domestic institutions has also contributed to 
the diversification and opening-up of the decision-making process inside China and 
the exposure of a growing cadre of specialists and specialized institutions to the 
international community. 
5.2.1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
Since China's newly adjusted foreign policy focused on "peace and 
development" for propitious economic development and Chinese modernization, the 
MFA's most important task was supposedly, to make and sustain a peaceful 
environment in both regional and global terms. So the MFA had an institutional 
interest in maintaining good relations with other countries and derived little material 
benefit from controversial issues like arms sales abroad. The MFA became one of the 
most influential governmental agencies in the process of China's foreign and national 
security policy-making including ACD domains. According to the research of a 
former MFA officiaL the official number of the MFA's staff exceeded that of the 
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Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MFTEC) , i.e. 3201 and 937 
respectively. The MFA is responsible to and reports directly to the Party's Politburo 
Standing Committee, through the head of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group 
(FALSG), which coordinates and formulates national foreign and security policy. 
Moreover, the staff office of the FALSG (FAO), which is under the State Council, ha 
been taken the almost entirely by officials from the MFA and headed, without 
exception by former or current high-ranking MFA officials. Lu Ning noted that 'the 
office (FAO) is often regarded as a bastion of MFA influence" (Lu Ning 1997: 108). 
Figure 5.3. indicates the flow of the policy-making process in which the MFA 
positioned. 
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The department of Arms Control and Disarmament now consists of four di\isions 
and these are the Nuclear Division, the Chemical and Biological Division, the 
Conventional Weapons and Missile Division and the Research Division. This ne\\ 
establishment is led by Sha Zukang, a Chinese Ambassador on CD and the head of the 
department (zhongguo waijiaobu junkongsi from http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn).25 
The new organization is the most active in the international ACD-negotiated treaties 
and regimes. The development of ACD institutions under the MFA started late and 
did not attract significant concern until the 1990s. Before the ACD department was 
upgraded to department status in 1997, the fourth division within MFA's Department 
of International Organization and Conferences dealt with China's ACD issues and 
interaction with multilateral ACD institutions. This department was set up in the 
early 1980s to handle UN-related multilateral arms control. The technical and 
personal expertise of participation in the CD and related activities led to the creation 
of a group of ACD experts in MFA. It contained fewer than 20 overworked officials 
in the mid-1990s. A US government expert on China's ACD policy noted that the 
only office in the MFA whose budget was increased in 1993-4 was the fourth division 
of MFA along with the department (Johnston 1996: 40). The staff of this department 
was extremely well-informed about both technical and policy issues. This might be 
the only agency in the bureaucracy where technical and policy expertise were 
combined. 
The department of Arms Control and Disarmament defined its responsibility as 
the implementation and management of foreign policy in the field of arms control. 
25 As a Consequence of the CTBT, the reorganization of the MFA's ACD branch will be discussed in 
Chapter 8 in detail. 
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disannament, nonproliferation and arms transfer in both regional and global areas 
(zhongguo waijiaobu junkongsi from http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn). The institutional 
function of the MFA is defined as the processing of information and reporting to the 
superior decision-making body, not as the general coordinator of China's ACD 
policy. This is because of the traditional responsibility and role of the MFA, given 
the fact that Chinese political system featured two bureaucratic organs (the State 
Council and PLA) under the Party. The MFA, therefore, competed with other 
bureaucratic interests such as the PLA and the COSTIND in dealing with the ACD 
issues. Its limited technical expertise was also an undermining factor in enforcing the 
ACD regime or nonns in the Chinese ACD milieu. With the growing activities in the 
multilateral frameworks, the MFA realized that few had real expertise in the areas of 
economy and trade, military strategy, arms control and the environment, while foreign 
policy became increasingly complicated (Wang Hongying 2000: 488-9). When 
China's arms sales and its regime violations were disclosed, the MFA was locked into 
the awkward position of being caught between the protests from abroad and criticism 
at home from the military. The necessity for reorganization of the MFA's ACD area 
was suggested inside the MFA. The following statement shows the necessity of 
reorganizing the MFA and enhancing its role. 
In 1988 I attended as a Chinese official representative a US-Soviet 
international conference in Moscow on the inspection issue of INF Treaty. 
After the meeting, I submitted a report to the leadership of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. In the report, while stating that our (China's) current 
research and policies on anns control have lagged much behind of the 
situation, I suggested in particular: (1) to strengthen both the research and 
coordination on arms control issues; (2) to set up a special institution 
responsible for arms control affairs - under the jurisdiction of either the 
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MFA or the Party Central Committee's Leading Small Group of Foreign 
Affairs. The report was approved by then Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian, but 
was disapproved by the Senior Vice Minister Qian Qichen who at the time 
was in charge of arms control affairs at the Ministry. Qian's main concern 
was possible opposition from the Chinese military and to be seen as 
"overstepping MFA's authority" (Jia Hao's interview, Jia Hao 1999a: 103). 
The idea of establishing an independent and "special institution" for international 
ACD matters, like the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the United States, 
has not materialized so far. One of the reasons for this is the difficulty created by the 
fragmented interests of Chinese bureaucracy. The military is a very serious part of 
this difficulty. 
5.2.2. The Military (PLA) 
The influence of the PLA has traditionally been powerful in national security 
policy-making. Given the fact that the international ACD issues could affect the 
PLA's interests in defence posture, military doctrine and military modernization, the 
PLA represents a strong voice about views on ACD issues. Michael Swaine's 
examination of Chinese national security policymaking shows that the military's 
presence and influence in central-level party organs are even stronger in the post-
Deng era. He concl udes that, 
"Military involvement is evident in all four policy subarenas, albeit to widely 
varying degrees (from virtual total control over defence policy to limited but 
significant influence over foreign policy). Overall, the dividing line between 
military and civilian spheres in the formulation and implementation of 
national security policy is not as clear and absolute as in the past" (Swaine 
1997: 126). 
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The PLA's organizations had a strong influence on China's ACD policies, 
especially on questions of arms transfer and military transparency. The PLA's ACD 
experts were attached to military intelligence in the General Staff Department (GSD). 
A few of the military experts on arms control served in the GSD, had experience as 
foreign military attaches, and also were attached, at some point, to the China Institute 
of International Strategic Studies (CIISS). They were assumed to be connected with 
the GSD's military intelligence office, the Second Department (G-2). According to 
Johnston, G-2 officers and other PLA personnel had been sent to the Fourth Division 
to gain expertise on arms control (Johnston's interview, Johnston 1996: 41). While 
the GSD was representative in articulating the military perspectives on ACD i ue 
the National Defence University (general background research and doctrine analy i 
and the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for ational Def n e 
(COSTIND) also influenced the ACD i ue "in bit and pieces" (Lewi Di nd ue 
1991: 90). In th mid-19 0 ,th PLA et up a mall Ie ding ACD gr up In th 
I: _ 
Central Military Commission (CMC) and GSD. This group's task was to coordinate 
arms control policy research across the GSD system. The GSD's key role in the ACD 
policies might be replaced by another newly established military institute. The 
General Armaments Department, which takes charge of China's procurement of the 
various weapons, was set up in 1998. This institute also has a voice in ACD issues 
(Chapter 8). 
There are some structural factors that enhance or reduce the military's influence 
on ACD issues. It is the military's representation in the highest decision-making 
body, the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) and the Party's Politburo 
Standing Committee (PBSC), that affects its degree of influence. The FALSG and the 
PBSC are the most important communicating and coordinating bodies in Chinese 
foreign and security policy. The Party's Central Committee General Office (CCGO) 
serves to co-ordinate and facilitate routine bureaucratic information flows among the 
FALSG, the CMC and the PBSC. When it comes to making decisions on critical 
issues, the Chinese high command probably gathers at the level of the PBSC, not the 
FALSG. Decision-oriented contacts of a more routine nature might take place in the 
CCGO or through personal communications among the PBSC members (Swaine 
1997: 42-3). 
Through much of the 1980s, the military had no official representation at the 
FALSG and PBSC. A. Doak Barnett described: 
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"One striking thing about the core membership of the group (F ALSG) is that 
it is composed entirely of key government leaders dealing with foreign 
affairs" (Barnett 1985: 45). 
The PLA's representation at this level appeared since the military began to 
empower its political credit since the early 1990s. Defence Minister Qin Jiwei's 
membership was significant at the 14th Party Congress in 1992 since it was the first 
time that the FALSG was represented by a professional soldier of the PLA. Lu Ning 
argues that the PLA's involvement in the Chinese foreign policy decision-making 
structure had its origin in China's anns sales in the international market (Lu Ning 
1997: 123). The international criticism and blame for China's anns transfers made 
PLA officials take part in the coordination of the foreign policy process. The PLA' s 
representation was primarily intended to ensure a regular infonnation flow regarding 
relatively routine policy areas that might overlap or produce conflict (Swaine 1997: 
110). Qin's membership was necessary for better policy coordination between the 
military and the government under the Party system. It also gave rise to the 
emergence of the PLA with deeply entrenched vested bureaucratic interests in ACD 
policy as well as foreign policy in general. The PLA thus became entangled in 
Chinese ACD policy decision-making. 26 
The PLA's more critical input into the high-profile decision making process was 
also substantiated at the Party's 14th National Congress. General Liu Huaqing (CMC 
deputy head) joined in the Party's PBSC after the Tiananmen Incident. While Liu's 
26 There was also large military representation in the CCP Central Committee. In the l.tth Central 
Committee. military leaders represented 2.t percent of the total. with 46 of the 189 full seats. By 
contrast. only 17 percent of the full members of the 13th CCP Central Committee were mil1tar) leaders. 
The figures show that military elites in 1992-1997 occupied the highest percenta~c in the Central 
Committee since 1977 (Gurtov and Hwang 1998: 37). 
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rise can be interpreted politically as Jiang Zemin' s political coalition to strengthen and 
secure his position (Saich 1992), Liu's representation in the PBSC meant an 
increasing role for the PLA in China's foreign policy, including the ACD policy. The 
PLA also had a representative in the Central Committee General Office (CCGO). 
General Wang Ruilin, Deputy Director of the General Political Department (GPD) 
and a member of the CMC and senior secretary to Deng Xiaoping, was deputy head of 
the CCGO. 
However, it is important to note that the influence of PLA is basically constrained 
by the external (the MFA) and the internal (the COSTIND) division of labour. In 
fact, in formulating and implementing China's ACD policies, the responsibility is, in 
principle, allocated to the MFA and the PLA has not encroached on it. The PLA's 
duty is, therefore, very restrictive (Lu Ning 1997: 165). The only field that the PLA 
was concerned about was that of arms sales, regarding military modernization. That 
is one of the reasons why China has been so critical of the MTCR and reluctant to 
accept the regime. The PLA's influence in ACD policy remains only in inter-agency 
policy bargaining and in the high-ranking policy-making decision area. However, 
those influential points started to erode in the late 1990s when the PLA lost its seat on 
the PBSC due to retirement of General Liu Huaqing. And the CCGO came to be 
headed by Zeng Qinghong, Jiang Zemin's close protege. The administrative office of 
the FALSG, the Office of Foreign Affairs (FAO) under the State Council, was 
reinstituted and given higher status under the Party's Central Committee. Liu Huaqiu, 
a high ranking official of the MFA became head of the new FAO that reports to high 
command leaders of the FALSG (Shambaugh 1998: 9-11). The PLA itself lacked 
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technological expertise in the ACD issues. The COSTIND had been the main actor 
taxed with ACD issues within the PLA. 
5.2.3. Science and Defence Establishment (COSTIND) 
As an institutional branch of the PLA, the Commission of Science, Technology, 
and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND) played a substantial role in ACD 
issues with its technical and scientific expertise.27 The COSTIND supervised 
virtually all of China's military research, development and production. While it was 
officially administered by the State Council, the CMC provided professional 
leadership. The predecessor of the COSTIND was founded by a group of renowned 
military leaders such as the late Marshall Nie Rongzhen and General Zhang Aiping. 
The middle and top officials had military ranks and the personnel interchange and 
overlapping continued until the mid-1990s. For instance, General Liu Huaqing, a 
retired former First Vice Chairman of the CMC, was once the minister of the 
COSTIND. 
Although the COSTIND was formed by military personnel, the institute was 
never fully under military control. In the 1950s and 1960s, then-Premier Zhou Enlai's 
intimate involvement with the nuclear weapons programme gave the COSTIND's 
predecessors their own channel of communication with China's leadership. Since its 
creation, COSTIND had always been led by a protege of Marshal Nie Rongzhen 
(Pollack 1992: 173-8). 
27 The COSTIND was formed in 1982 by merging its predecessor, the National Defence Science and 
Technology Commission (NDSTC) with the National Defence Industries of the State Council and the 
Science, Technology and Equipment Commission of the CMC, so as to facilitate the management and 
coordination of the respective ministries (Ostrov 1991). 
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Figure 5.4. COSTIND ACD Institution 
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ACD research within the nuclear establishment was led by COSTIND. The Arms 
Control Office coordinated all such research within COSTIND and the nuclear 
weapon laboratories. The COSTIND had been involved in and influenced China's 
ACD policies in three ways: anns export control, training and communicating ACD 
agenda and technical consultation, and participation in multilateral institutions like the 
CD on behalf of the PLA. First, the COSTIND was involved in anns export control, 
upervi ing China's defence industries (Lewis, Di and Xue 1991' Pollack 1992' Hu 
Weixing 1994). In the nuclear arena, China became a member of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984 and acceded to the NPT in 1992. The e 
mmitment required a bureaucracy to admini ter China' inter tion with the 
IA and f r ign tat When the Mini try f uel r Indu tr i ted it 
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was natural to have the ministry handle the interactions with lAEA. But when the 
MNI was reorganized as the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) in 1988, it 
meant that a commercial entity would be representing the state in important 
international matters. To endow CNNC with the proper authority, it was given 
another name: the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA). The CNNC brochure 
stated that "CNNC is also known as CAEA to deal with matters between China and 
IAEA" (Hsu 1999: 156). While this dual representation of the institute reflected a 
mixing of government functions and commercial activities, the CNNC (or CAEA by 
1998) carried out the authority to review and issue licences for nuclear materials since 
the COSTIND had been granted the authority to supervise and manage the trade in 
military products of the entire defence industry in 1986. (Lu Ning 1997: 128).28 
The movement away from a central budgetary system opened a wide array of 
commercial opportunities for the individual units of the military system. The 
defence-industrial complex was characterized by decentralization among its 
organizational units and this decentralization had a profound impact on the 
fonnulation of Chinese export control policy. The compartmentalized nature of the 
Chinese political-military structure explained why the assurances of the MFA meant 
little in the face of foreign condemnation of China's anns transfers (Lewis, Di and 
Xue 1991: 96; Pollack 1992: 171; Mullins 1995: 149). For instance, Poly 
Technologies was one of the most successful anns sale corporations. The MFA 
28 The downsizing of the PLA from 4.2 million to 3.4 million in 1984 and drastic cuts in the defence 
budget provided a new environment for the military and defence establishment. The Chinese 
government allowed the military and the defence industry to sell its surplus arms and military products 
in the international market in line with general economic reform. The military and defence industry 
had to find new sources of revenue to alleviate the pains of the budgetary cuts and to accomplish 
"military modernization." For economic reform and Chinese military, see Shambaugh and Yang 
( 1997) and Segal ( 1995b). 
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warned the corporation to be more prudent in selling relatively sophisticated weapons 
and military equipment to sensitive regions and to consider the possible impact of 
arms sales on subtle diplomatic relationships with foreign countries. In theory. the 
corporations must consult with the MFA and other ministries. The Premier of the 
State Council is responsible by law for settling disputes between the ministry and 
corporations. Nonetheless, in reality, the corporations affiliated with the GSD and the 
COSTIND, which were assigned to produce weapons and military technologies for 
scheduled deliveries, had the final say on where and what to sell.29 
Second, the scientists under the sub-units of the COSTIND played an important 
role in setting up the ACD programme for disseminating new ideas and information 
related to ACD issues and training and nurturing the arms control community in 
China (Johnston 1996; Frieman 1996; Garrett and Glaser 1995). This was one of the 
most conspicuous contributions to China's ACD area. Like other countries, the new 
ideas and norms of the ACD issues were introduced by scientists rather than 
politicians or the military. Research on more specific nuclear ACD issues, such as 
deterrence, treaty provisions and verification systems, was conducted at the nuclear 
weapons research laboratories. 
29 Personal and family networks with Chinese leadership explains the success of Poly Technologies' 
untouchable arms business. The most of the key players in the firm are connected with the high-ranked 
Chinese political leaders. He Pengfei (the first president), the son of the late Marshal He Long, was 
concurrently the head of the PLA General Staffs Directorate of Equipment and held the position as 
deputy chief of the GSD and vice commander of the PLA Navy later. Wang Jun (Chairman of the 
Board of Directors), the son of Wang Zhen (the former state's vice president), later became president 
and chairman of the Chinese International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC). He Ping (the 
former second president and president) is Deng Xiaoping's son-in-law. Wang Xiaochao (executive 
vice president) is the son of the former state's president, Yang Shangkun (Lewis, Di and Xue 1991: 9-'-
4). 
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The Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics (lAPCM) 
became a pathfinder when Hu Side founded the ISODARCO-Beijing Seminar on 
Anns Control in 1988 with the help of organizers from the Italian International 
School on Disannament and Research on Conflicts (lSODARCO).30 IAPCM and the 
China Institute of Contemporary International Relations have since jointly hosted this 
seminar once every other year in China. lAPCM also set up the Program for Science 
and National Security Studies (PSNSS) in 1988 with the goal of promoting research 
on ACD issues, training younger scientists and enhancing ties with domestic and 
foreign organizations. Out of this also came a regular series of more informal 
academic seminars on technical and policy issues attended by ACD experts from the 
technical community, the GSD, and the MFA. This series was important in 
developing cross-unit contacts and in floating new ideas and proposals. During the 
CTBT negotiations, several scientists from IAPCM provided technical support to the 
Chinese delegation. The PSNSS was replaced by a new Arms Control Research 
Office in the IAPCM in 1996. The new office focused on CTBT OSI, fissile material 
production cut-off, verification, and nuclear non-proliferation (Johnston 1996: 40-3; 
Frieman 1996: 16-8). 
Under the COSTIND, the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP) was 
an umbrella organization which was comprised of institutes specializing in various 
30 Hu Side, a Chinese ACD specialist, in 1985, was inspired to recommend that China's weapons 
community set up a working group to focus on arms control research, when he attended a major 
conference on the 'nuclear winter' hosted by the ISODARCO in Italy. He thought that it could be 
useful for China' s arms control diplomacy. In the 1980s. China' s perception of the destabilizing effect 
of the lIS Strategic Defence Initiative pushed its top leaders to develop a position on arms control 
(Glaser and Garrett 1996: 28-44). 
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aspects of nuclear weapons research and development.3) These institutes were 
compartmentalized, with little horizontal integration across bureaucratic lines. The 
technical experts at the CAEP, mostly civilian scientists and engineers, clearly had a 
technical consultant role in fonnulating Chinese positions on ACD agenda. The 
CAEP reports to the COSTIND, whose purview was considerably broader than 
nuclear weapons. When Hu Side was promoted to director of CAEP, he also helped 
to fonn the Program for Verification Technologies Studies (PVTS). This programme 
was launched in 1995 to investigate technical solutions to support anns control 
verification. Within the COSTIND, the ACD Program served as a clearing house for 
anns control infonnation (Hsu 1999: 157). 
Another institute controlled by COSTIND was the China Defence Science and 
Technology Infonnation Centre (CDSTIC). Its role has been to gather, collate, and 
disseminate materials relevant to national security. The Northwest Institute of 
Nuclear Technology (NINT) has been the laboratory in charge of conducting and 
analyzing nuclear tests. It is known that it has the lead role in handling on-site 
inspections for CTBT verification. 
Third, the COSTIND itself sent technical experts to represent Chinese positions 
and joined Chinese international negotiation teams (led by the MFA) and provided 
consultation, mainly at the United Nations' ACD forum and the Conference on 
31 These institutes included the Southwest Institute of Fluid Physics (SIFP)~ the Southwest Institute of 
Nuclear Physics and Chemistry (SINPC); the Southwest Institute of Chemical Materials and 
Technology; the Southwest Institute of Electronic Engineering~ the Southwest Institute of Structural 
Materials; the Southwest Institute of Applied Electronics~ the Southwest Institute of Computer 
Application; the Southwest Institute of Environmental Testing~ the Shanghai Institute of Optics and 
Fine Mechanics (SOFM) High Power Laser Laboratory; the Shanghai Institute of Nuclear Research 
(SINR) (Frieman 1996: 16-8). 
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Disarmament (CD) in Geneva (Johnston and Evans 1999; Jia Hao 1999a). In general. 
the COSTIND personnel and CAEP scientists seemed less informed about foreign 
policy and the larger context of their work than their counterparts in other countries. 
They were called on primarily for technical assistance. However, the PNE (peaceful 
nuclear explosion) issue that Chinese government tried to put on the agenda in the 
CTBT negotiation demonstrates that Chinese ACD policy-making process was, to 
some extent, influenced by the technical experts from the COSTIND (Chapter 7). 
This fact indicates that the COSTIND's role in China's ACD policy was increasing. 
Modem science and technology complicated the ambiguous and controversial nature 
of many technologies related to weapons of mass destruction, while China became 
further involved in the multilateral ACD process. With the MFA's lack of 
technological expertise, the reliance on the COSTIND was expected to have a 
significant impact on China's ACD policy in the future. Yet, regarding China's ACD 
policy, the COSTIND's institutional power was weakened by the reorganization of 
the bureaucracy in 1998. The extensive shakeup and dismantling of the COSTIND in 
the wake of General Liu's retirement was testimony to its waning influence. Most 
important research organs, such as CAEP, IAPCM and CDSTIC, are now under the 
PLA's GAD (Chapter 8). 
5.2.4. Research Institutes 
In general, China's foreign and security research institutes have less influence on 
the policy-making process than the prominent think-tanks in other countries. It is 
mainly because the development of the research institute has been constrained by the 
Chinese leaders' traditional distrust and a brain-drain problem that the political 
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tunnoil like "Cultural Revolution" caused. Frieman observes the current stage of 
China's ACD field that, 
A senous shortage of trained people inside and outside the government 
compounds this problem. The field anns control as a profession and an area 
of professional specialization or scholarly inquiry is just beginning to emerge 
in China. No single organization has more than a handful of knowledgeable 
individuals in this field; most of the people are either over 60 or under 40. 
One reason for the small supply of experts is the absence of a training 
program, curriculum, and open source information. Universities can offer 
courses in U.S. or Russian security policy, but not in Chinese security policy. 
Texts and primary source materials are difficult to obtain, especially outside 
the military complex (Frieman 1996: 16). 
Policy-makers in general do not find any necessity to consider the outcomes of 
the research institutes because they have their own research ann inside the 
organization. An even more difficult problem than the inaccessibility to vanous 
levels of infonnation and decision makers is the political sensitivity of the field, 
especially ACD issues. In this context, the research institute affiliated with 
government, the party and military bureaucracy played a relatively more significant 
role rather than that of academia. This was largely because bureaucracy-affiliated 
institutions have better access - (l) to processed, often confidential infonnation 
generated through the bureaucratic system, such as diplomatic cables for the MFA 
affiliated institute, and (2) to top decision makers through well-established 
bureaucratic channels (Lu Ning 1997: 131). 
Increasingly during the 1980s, experts In the ACD field grew and emerged in 
several institutes under the government and military. The inter-agency and 
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transnational conferences provided a place for learning and exchanging new ideas and 
information about the ACD field. The ACD training programme was also commi tted 
to the production of experts. This expertise has spread into a number of institutions, 
which have a certain degree of vested interest in parent-bureaucracy. The following 
table shows the Chinese research institutes in the ACD field. 
Table 5.1. China's ACD Research Institutes 
Institute Journal Associated Institute 
Government CICIR Contemporary International State Council 
Relations 
CIIS International Studies MFA 
Military CIISS International Strategic GSD 
Studies 
ISS - NDU under PLA 
AMS - PLA 
CDSTIC Contemporary Military GAD 
Academic IWEP World Economics & CASS 
Politics 
CACNS American Studies lAS under CASS 
Acronym: CICIR, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations; CIIS, China Institute of 
International Studies; CIISS, China Institute for International Strategic Studies; ISS, Institute for 
Strategic Studies; NDU, National Defence University; AMS, Academy of Military Science; CACNS, 
Centre for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Studies; IWEP, Institute of World Economics & Poltics; 
lAS, Institute of American Studies; CASS, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 
Within the State Council, the China Institute of Contemporary International 
Relations (CICIR) is currently the most prominent and influential civilian research 
institute. It publishes the journal Xiandai guo}i guanxi (Contemporary International 
Relations). Through this journal, the institute articulates the ACD issues and mostly 
represents the position of the MFA. The MFA also has its research institute, the 
China Institute of International Studies (CIIS). The latter's significant influence on 
formulating foreign policy has eroded since the political decline of Zhao Ziyang and 
death of Huan Xiang, the head of the institute (Lu Ning 1997: 166). Currently, the 
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role of the CICIR has became more prominent than that of the ClIS. However, the 
crrs also represents the MFA's voice on ACD issues in its journal Guo}i wenti yanjiu 
(International Studies). 
Several research institutes are affiliated to the PLA - the China Institute of 
International Strategic Studies (CrrSS, formerly BlISS); the Institute for Strategic 
Studies at the National Defence University; and the Academy of Military Sciences 
(AMS). These research institutes analyze international ACD proposals and 
conventions as they affect Chinese defence posture, force planning, strategy, doctrine, 
training, and tactics. The crrss is linked to the Second Directorate of the GSD. Its 
periodical, Guoji zhanlue yanjiu (International Strategic Studies), increasingly 
contains articles on ACD issues and generally represents the PLA's interests on these 
issues. In order to improve the general quality of ACD research for the military, the 
AMS set up an ACD group in its Strategy Department. The group is researching the 
history of arms control, the conceptual basis of arms control, the content and scope of 
ACD processes, guiding principles in the international ACD struggle and models of 
decision-making (Johnston and Evans 1999: 243). It is known that the military 
research institutes played an important role in releasing the Chinese white paper 
regarding military transparency and booklets on ACD.32 The CIISS and AMS 
participated in the military-led inter-agency drafting team which included experts 
from the GSD, the new department of the MFA and the Information Office of the 
State Council (Gill and Medeiros 2000: 73). Technical research was implemented by 
several institutes under the COSTIND. These institutes have now been associated 
32 These books are 'China: Arms Control and Disarmament' (1995), and 'China's National Defence' 
(1995 and 1998), both published by the Information Office of the State Council. 
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with the PLA since its reorganization in 1998. Among them, the China Defence 
Science and Technology Information Centre (CDSTIC), founded in March 1959 and 
staffed by near 500 scientific and technical personnel of various specialties, plays a 
key role in processing technical expertise and integrating it within the ACD issues in 
general (http://www.cdstic.canet.cn). 
In contrast to the research institutes affiliated with bureaucracies, a small number 
of Chinese academic organizations address national security and ACD issues, 
independently. Within the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), the Institute 
of World Economics and Politics (IWEP) addresses political-military issues at a very 
general level in its research papers and conferences. In addition, the CASS witnessed 
an emergence of a new research organ in the ACD field recently. The Arms Control 
Centre at the Institute for American Studies was established in early 1999 under the 
CASSo The American Centre at Fudan University in Shanghai is unique in its 
establishment of an academic programme of instruction and research focused on 
national security policy and arms control.33 The ACD experts affiliated with the 
Centre have a solid understanding of the issues, but seem to have only limited access 
to individuals and information from other official sectors.34 
33 There are only two Chinese universities (Fudan university and Beijing university) that have arms 
control programmes (programme in Arms Control and Regional Security at Fudan university; 
programme in Arms Control and Disarmament at Beijing university) with only limited and rudimentary 
teaching and research personnel tHsu 1999: 157). 
34 One of them is Zhu Mingquan. He was a deputy director of the American Centre at Fudan 
University. In 1995. he published a book titled 'Nuclear Proliferation: Danger and Protection,' which 
was one of rare books about the ACD field in China. He asserted the necessity of nonproliferation in 
the post-Cold War for the sake ofChina's interest as well as global stability (Zhu Mingquan 1995: 178-
95). 
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The largest assembly of arms control personnel (in pure numbers) was found in 
the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament (CPAPD). This was a 
mass organization rather than a research institute. Its main task was to organize the 
international conference on ACD field where the Chinese participants in the 
Conference were known by the name of the CPAPD rather than that of the institute to 
which the individuals were actually affiliated with. For example, members of the 
Scientists Group on ACD issues have, since 1991, held bilateral, annual conferences 
between the CPAPD and the Committee on International Security and Arms Control 
of the U.S. National Academy of Science (Garrett and Glaser 1995: 60). The effort to 
establish a coordinating body for the ACD issues was made recently. In August 2001, 
there was the first meeting for establishing the China's Association of Arms Control 
and Disarmament (CAACD). It was initiated by the Chinese People's Association for 
Peace and Disarmament (CPAPD), the China Institute of International Studies 
(Guojiwenti yanjiusuo) and the China Institute of Contemporary International 
Relations (Xiandaiguojiguanxi yanjiusuo) (Interview with a Chinese expert 18th July 
2001).35 
In conclusion, most of these institutions do research on ACD related subjects. 
The discussion of ACD subjects necessarily led to sensitive issues such as nuclear 
doctrine and operational strategy. Yet, it was hindered by the leadership's view that 
publicly criticizing the government's foreign and security policy was to challenge 
China's "national interest." Moreover, the general deference to the PLA on those 
35 This information was given a month before the initial meeting actually took place. The progress of 
the establishment has not been available while the research is done. According to the interviewee. 
China's institutional agency "less communicates each other (than the US agency) and this institution 
will coordinate the ACD function, exchange studies and discuss the issues." 
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questions are major barriers to demilitarizing the discussions. Henceforth. "the 
political space for independent, fundamental criticisms of Chinese arms control policy 
is extremely narrow" (Johnston 1996: 60). 
5.3. Inter-Agency Institutions for Arms Export Control 
As most observers have noted, the PLA's most critical interest lies in the control 
of the export of the weapons within ACD policy. It has been asserted that the sales of 
arms by the Military has been promoted by arms corporations (such as Poly 
Technologies and New Era Corporation) without paying attention to the MFA's 
interest in the maintenance of good relations with other countries. By the early 1990s, 
China had became one of the top arms merchants in the Third World. Before China 
joined the NPT, in 1991, China ranked fourth place in major conventional weapons 
exporters sharing 9.1 % of total exports (SIPRI Yearbook 1992: 272-3). Chinese 
nuclear, missile, and chemical-warfare technology and materials also began to be 
transferred to Iran and Pakistan, apparently in violation of international treaties. In 
the face of international criticism and US-China disputes on China's arms transfers, 
an inter-agency administrative body for arms export control was created, at the time 
when the role of the PLA was increasing in importance after the Tiananmen Incident 
in 1989. The Military Products Exports Leading Group (MPELG, Junpin chukou 
lingdao xiao::u) was formed in September 1989. Its main task was to oversee China's 
foreign arms sales. It consisted of leaders from the CMC, the PLA, the COSTIND, 
the MFA and the former defence industry. It met regularly to discuss arms sales and 
sensitive exports and made decisions on disputed arms export issues. With its office 
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(known as the 703 office) at the General Office of the CMC and the composition of 
participants, PLA clearly exerted prominent dominence over the MPELG, even 
though the organization was under the dual leadership of the State Coucil and the 
CMC (Jia Hao 1999a: 104-6). 
In the early 1990s, with the eclipse of Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing, the 
brothers who had influenced the organization, the MPELG was downgraded and put 
under the jurisdiction of the PLA's GSD. Instead, a new administrative organization 
and operating mechanism was substituted for the role and functions of the MPELG. 
The State Administrative Committee on Military Products Trade (SACMPT), under 
the leadership of the State Council and the CMC, took charge of the centralized 
control of the transfers of military equipment and related technologies. Its main 
function was to draft laws and policies governing such transfers. It was comprised 
mainly of leading personnel from the MFA, the GSD, the COSTIND, MFfEC and 
other relevant departments. As the administrative arm of the SACMPT, the State 
Bureau of Military Products Trade was responsible for handling day to day affairs 
(China: Arms Control and Disarmament 1995: 22-3). A Chinese official statement 
adds the following instruction, 
Governmental departments and compames engaged in transfers of military 
equipment and technologies must be authorized, registered and approved by the 
government. Their business activities must remain strictly within the scope of 
operation approved. Contracts for transfer of military equipment and technologies 
require approval before gaining effect. Major transfer items and contracts must be 
examined by the SACMPT and approved by the State Council and the CMC. Stem 
legal sanctions shall be taken against any company or individual who transfers 
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military equipment and technologies without proper governmental examination and 
approval (China: Arms Control and Disarmament 1995: 19). 
Meanwhile, regarding arms export control, two new important policy-consulting 
and coordinating organizations were established in the 1990s. The "Arms Control 
Group" and the "Inspection Group," were created under the jurisdiction of the 
COSTIND. These groups took over the MPELG and the replacement was related to 
the decline of the "Yang Brothers" in Chinese politics. These COSTIND-affiliated 
groups were distanced from direct involvment with the PLA, for some time, but later 
transferred to new Department of the PLA, the GAD (Chapter 8). 
5.4. Institutionalization for Policy Coordination 
5.4.1. Horizontal Linkage: Inter-Agency Channel 
China's entanglement with multilateral ACD frameworks necessarily made the 
Chinese experts build up inter-agency channels to exchange information and 
coordinate ACD policy. After the Chinese took part in the Conference on 
Disarmament under the United Nations (CD), a small group of Chinese experts 
gathered to discuss current ACD issues. Although the early channels were scattered 
rather than regularized and specialized, the more regularized and institutionalized 
inter-agency channels had their origin in these early meetings. 
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According to Johnston's research, in the early 1980s, there were meetings 
between MFA's Fourth Department, the GSD and COSTIND specialists to discuss the 
drafting of documents and papers that China presented at the CD. Within the 
COSTIND there was an umbrella group of senior scientists and experts that set up 
working groups on several topics, including non-proliferation, nuclear testing, major 
reductions in nuclear weapons, anns control in space and military conversion. The 
Anns Control and Disannament Program, which was set up by the COSTIND's 
CDSTIC in 1983, became an inter-agency channel in 1990s. When the ACD agenda, 
like the CTBT, became a hot issue among the institutions, this programme was 
assigned the responsibility for organizing most of the cross-unit exchanges on anns 
control in Beijing and brought together experts from NDU, CIIS, CICIR, MFA, 
Nuclear Materials Association, CAEP and the Aerospace Ministry. The COSTIND 
also sponsored conferences on the global anns market, controlled anns transfers, and 
major reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. These have drawn on experts from the 
IIR in the MFA, the PLA's Strategic Missile Forces, the Ninth Academy, the Beijing 
Institute of Systems Engineering, the IAPCM, and the Anns Control and 
Disannament Program in the COSTIND's CDSTIC. Johnston also tracked down the 
MFA-hosted inter-agency meetings to discuss international ACD issues. These 
meetings took the fonn of "preliminary meetings" (wu xu hui) and discussed the 
implications of new international issues as the first step in devising a policy response. 
These particular wu xu hui usually included about 30-40 people from different 
agencies (Johnston 1996: 42-3) 
Seemingly, the first major inter-agency conference, the ·'Conference on 
Disannament Issues," was held in October 1986 and most Chinese ACD institutions 
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participated.36 The fourth Division of the MFA, the CICIR, the CllS, the IWEP. the 
GSD, the NDU, the AMS, the CDSTIC, and the Beijing Association of International 
Strategic Studies all took part in the Conference. In advance of the newly emerging 
US-Soviet disarmament negotiations, 50 Chinese ACD experts discussed international 
disarmament "struggle" and made efforts to establish the Chinese position during the 
ongoing negotiation. Its importance above all was that for the first time, the Chinese 
government, military and academic sectors officially launched the inter-agency 
channels and exchanged their ideas and information. Most presenters at the 
conference reflected the previous Chinese ACD policies that had been described in 
international disarmament talks as "pseudo-disarmament" and the "real arms race." 
Being emancipated from "leftism," Chinese ACD policy suggested that Chinese 
security interests and world peace would be served by the new international ACD 
trends (Pan Zhenqiang 1987: 21-8; Wang Shuzhong 1987: 68-9). 
A co-authored article from the CICIR stressed the necessity for China's 
disarmament strategy. The authors asked for the break-up of the leftist dogma, which 
denounced the US-Soviet disarmament negotiations in the 1960s and 1970s. 
According to them, the phenomenon of international disarmament was so complicated 
and grand that cooperation between the individual ACD institutions would be 
necessary. They made three proposals for expanding horizontal channels for the 
future: 1) a national conference on disarmament to discuss the whole issue of 
international disarmament trends and policy options; 2) intensi ve research on urgent 
36 By the CICIR, the articles of the conference were published in 1987. The book title was 
/llfcrt1atiol/al Disarmamellf Struggle and China (Guoji Caijllll Douzheng yu Zhollgguo). The term 
'struggle' (dollzhel/g) used in the book reflected the Chinese realpolitik view in some sense. In 
I'nglish, there is no accepted term like 'disarmament struggle.' The Chinese seemed to use the term in 
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items on the disarmament agenda; 3) an exchange of information and research 
material among the individual institutes (Huang Tingwei and Song Baoxian 1987: 6). 
Another Chinese expert stressed the need for cooperative and comprehensive research 
between the three sectors, foreign policy, national defence and academia. "The 
enhancement of lively ideas (among the three sectors) will be needed to provide 
policy options and consultations and nurture the experts for disarmament negotiation 
and research" (Xu Guangyu 1987: 49). 
These suggestions demanded information exchange through inter-agency 
channels from the government side and the PLA was blamed for not being more 
forthcoming with ACD-related information. Because the technical information and 
materials on ACD issues was, by its nature, handled by the COSTIND that belonged 
to the PLA, the government side relied heavily on this expertise. It was still difficult 
to set up communication between the military establishment and civilian 
institutions?7 Others in the ACD community complained that the top leadership did 
not understand or pay much attention to ACD, and they believed that this hampered 
the expansion and professionalization of the community. Yet, since the government's 
disarmament policy was to restore the importance of foreign policy priorities and 
recover them from the influence of "leftism," training young experts would be 
necessary (Pan Zhenqiang 1987: 24-6). 
an extended sense of 'arms race' (struggle). The term that viewed the disarmament as a kind of race 
disappeared in the 1990s. 
37 To circulate information within the community, the COSTIND's CDSTIC published a few internal 
journals; the Arms Control Bul/etill (Jullkong tongxllll), the Bulletill Oil amlS control research (Jullhei 
kOllg;:."i yalljill tOIl:Wll), the Short reports Oil arms control illjomwtioll (Jllllkollg xillxi jiallbao) and the 
Select('(/ Readillgs ill Arms COlltrol alld Disamwment. New channels of information was set up to 
disseminate arms control-related information and research (Johnston and Evans 1999: 244). 
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This inter-agency channel evolved into a decision-making agency involving the 
MFA, the GSD (PLA) and the COSTIND in 1990s. Indeed, for the CTBT 
negotiations, the MFA's fourth division, COSTIND's testing community (CAEP and 
IAPCM scientists) and the GSD held regular, intensive, policy coordination meetings, 
prior to and after each session of the CD in Geneva (Interview with a Chinese expert 
18th July 2001). 
5.4.2. Policy Coordination: Fragmented Institutions 
The literature on Chinese bureaucracy recognized the fragmented and disjointed 
nature of policy coordination (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Lampton 1987). Ng-
Quinn attributed it to: 
A lack of effective functional differentiation within the Party and government 
bureaucracy [which] often means overlapping of responsibilities and loyalties (Ng-
Quinn 1984: 211). 
Due to this bureaucratic structure, informal politics seemed to be more persuasive 
in explaining the Chinese policy process (Fewsmith 1996). The second characteristic 
of Chinese policy coordination was the relatively dominant role of the PLA in the 
security arena. Many observers argue that in this top policy coordination process, the 
PLA's influence was highly significant in decisions on the national security agenda 
(Frieman 1996; Johnston 1996; Swaine 1997; Lu Ning 1997; Shambaugh 1999b: 
Wang Hongying 2000). For example, Wang Hongying attributes the fact that China's 
socialization into the principles of multiateralism is limited to the influence of those 
who have experience of the international scene. He argues that "MFA officials are far 
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less influential than military leaders, who have long championed strengthening 
China's unilateral defence capabilities" (Wang Hongying 2000: 488-9). For the most 
part the security policy remains indebted to the interests of portions of the military. 
While such military views, on occasion, were over-ridden, the PLA still preserves a 
powerful, sceptical and unilateralist voice on ACD (Johnston 1996: 60). 
In Chinese ACD policy coordination, it is clear that in some respects it is 
adequate but in others inadequate. First, China lacks the bureaucratic procedures and 
personnel required for negotiating and enforcing the ACD agenda. Policy 
coordination often encompasses sharply competing notions of which policies best 
serve the national interest. Consensus on the role of ACD in China's overall national 
strategy appears to be poorly developed at this time (Manning, Montaperto and 
Roberts 2000: 72). There is no single and overarching government agency in China 
(comparable to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the United States) with 
experts and a specialized mandate on ACD issues. There are about two dozen 
organizations within China that play some role in formulating the Chinese position on 
the international ACD agenda. The prestige and influence of the different 
organizations continue to shift. It can be argued that Avery Goldstein's 
characterization of China's institutions, "institution for those durable organizational 
practices that undergird the structure of a stable political system" (Goldstein 1994: 
720), does not make sense. Instead, there is weak policy-coordination process with 
fragmented institutions entrenched in the vested interests created by the economic 
reform. Inefficient policy-coordination was reflected in the process of the CTBT talks 
without overall purpose and strategy (Chapter 7). This was partly because the state is 
beginning a new stage and the field is developing, and partly because personal 
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prestige and networks are often much more important than institutional mechanisms. 
In Chinese circumstances, a single individual can easily determine the status of an 
institution. 
Individual Chinese individual institutes have some role in fOnTIulating policy. 
Each unit can be assigned to one of several categories; academic think tanks, a 
department of the MFA, units involved in nuclear weapons research and production, a 
department of the PLA, industrial ministries, or a mass organization. Nonetheless, 
each unit has begun to play some role in formulating ACD policy with its newly 
vested interest, fostered by the process of economic reform and development. 
Initially, throughout the early 1980s, China's ACD policy was relatively simple, and, 
primarily, the responsibility of the fourth division of International Organization 
Department of the MFA. By the mid-1990s, however, there was a relatively well-
developed routine process for devising bargaining positions on CD-related issues in 
particular. The Ambassador for the CD affiliated with the MFA now takes the lead in 
organizing the interagency meetings. Senior political leaders now interfere in the 
process only to resolve disputes among the three groups of actors and to establish 
broad parameters for policy (Gill and Medeiros 2000: 87-93; Johnston and Evans 
1999: 240-4). As has been mentioned, the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group 
(FALSG) and the Party's Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) are the highest point 
for coordination and decision making in the Chinese political system. The FALSG 
functions as the key policy coordination, communication, supervision and 
consultation mechanism. Regarding the ACD agenda, the MFA, the GSD of the PLA 
and the COSTIND take part in the FALSG meeting over ACD agenda in general. 
When agreement could not be reached about a critical issue (eg. whether to join the 
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CTBT), the head of the FALSG would either make a decision or submit a proposal to 
the PBSC for ratification or approval. However, the continual and contentious 
competition among the three actors (the MFA, the GSD and the COSTIND) 
exacerbated the efficiency of policy coordination and made it more complicated. 
It is difficult to stress the influence or predominance of the PLA's role in the 
Chinese ACD policy coordination process as in other security issues. The multilateral 
ACD agenda was always implemented and formulated by not the PLA but the MFA. 
The PLA's influence could permeate the policy coordinating bargaining process 
among the institutions and the high-profile decision-making process. The military's 
vociferous nationalist voice and its suspected arms sales in the Middle East made the 
military appear to have dominant bargaining power over the MFA. This was the main 
reason why observers did not expect China to join the CTBT by the end of 1996 
(Malik 1995; Johnston 1996; Bachman 1998). According to them, the PLA, 
especially the COSTIND was not expected to agree with the test ban, which would 
freeze China's nuclear development and modernization and would leave China a long 
way behind the United States and Russia. In reality, the decision was already fixed by 
the top party decision-making process in the early 1990s (Chapter 6). Moreover, 
General Liu Huaqing's retirement weakened the influence of the military in the 
PBSC. 
In conclusion, the bureaucratic in-fighting in the Chinese context may be 
moderated by the "unitary decision system," where a small group of top leaders from 
the PBSC act as a unit that checks bureaucratic infighting and controls the bargaining 
process by a more rational and comprehensi ve calculation of the national interest. A 
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new development in Chinese political leadership might provide such a "unitary 
decision system" in the post-CTBT period (Chapter 8). 
5.5. Conclusion: Institutionalization, a dynamic of state and 
institutions 
The development of Chinese ACD institutions during the last decade suggests 
that an external factor, the international ACD agenda, penetrated Chinese institutions 
and played some role in nurturing Chinese domestic ACD institutions. Since the 
international ACD agenda became a critical issue in the late 1980s, each security-
related institution researched the issues and developed its own expertise. With its 
own bureaucratic interests, the MFA, the PLA and the COSTIND emerged as main 
actors and exchanged their views at the inter-agency bargaining process. The nascent 
domestic institutions were in flux and vulnerable to a new need for reorganization, 
which was brought about by the incremental participation in multilateral frameworks 
at the international level. 
Despite these developments, the overall ACD and nonproliferation community 
appeared disjointed and lacking cohesiveness. Each organization had parts of the 
relevant knowledge, but the insulated and compartmentalized nature of Chinese 
organizations hindered the formation of a centralized system. Furthermore, the 
intermixing of government and commercial functions resulted in a regulatory 
approach that relied more on good faith than on setting comprehensive guideline for 
enforcement (Hsu 1999: 156). 
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Like other institutions in China, the fragmented character of domestic ACD 
institutions, means that two main domestic agencies have played and will play key 
roles in the policy-coordinating process of China's ACD policy. While the MFA 
mainly formulates and implements the ACD policy, the PLA, with a sophisticated 
backup from the COSTIND and with vested interests preoccupied with arms export 
and military modernization, will not abandon its grip on security-related issues. 
However, its direct influence on the ACD decision-making process seemed to have 
been eroded. Thus its influence would only be indirect. Participation in the inter-
agency bargaining process was the only avenue of influence open to it. 
The state's participation in the international ACD framework has had an impact 
on the restructuring of domestic institutes. This dynamic interaction has been 
presented in this chapter. The case of the CTBT, more concretely, elucidates these 
impacts. The negotiating consequences for the ACD institutions of the CTBT will be 
illustrated in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 6. Participation and Pre-CTBT Development 
We now see the NPT as enhancing China's security" as well as global 
security. After the NPT treaty came into effect, in such fields as the 
prevention of nuclear proliferation, the promotion of nuclear 
disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, it has played a 
key role. To maintain this treaty is of great importance to the 
enhancement of the international non-proliferation mechanism (Bu 
Ran, A Chinese ACD expert). 
6.1. Introduction 
China's ACD policy has been described as ambivalent or contradictory. Like 
other parts of Chinese foreign policy, the discrepancy between its declared policy and 
actual behaviour made it ambiguous. Thus, observers reserve their clear evaluation of 
China's ACD behaviour. Frieman states that China's participation over the 15 years 
does not "demonstrate a clear pattern of either compliance or violation" (Frieman 
1996: 28). In spite of its declaratory policy adjustment, China's behaviour "remained 
inconsistent with non-proliferation norms in the post-Cold War period" (Davis 1995: 
595). The adaptation feature of Chinese ACD policy has not seriously changed (Segal 
1997; Johnston 1996), and this is mainly because the Chinese perspective "still aimed 
at keeping the Chinese nuclear deterrent out of arms control negotiation" (Malik 
1995). 
In fact, those critics in the international community who were not happy with the 
ACD behaviour were more concerned with China's arms transfer behaviour than 
China's increasing participation in the major multilateral frameworks. Since its first 
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nuclear test in 1964, China has gradually developed its nuclear capabilities. including 
the deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles. During this period, the Chinese 
government's declaratory policy supported nuclear proliferation as a means of 
"breaking the hegemony of the superpowers." As the Chinese defence industries and 
technological sector developed, commercial factors have also become more 
important. This is particularly true with respect to nuclear missile-related 
technologies, and in the past decade, the role of the Chinese military-industrial 
complex in such exports has increased. China's behaviour with regard to weapons 
transfers as well as the production of certain classes of weapons leaves room for doubt 
about how fully it is complying with international regime and treaties (Lewis, Oi and 
Xue 1991; Hu Weixing 1994; Gurtov and Hwang 1998).38 
Nonetheless, it is remarkably true that Chinese involvement in international ACD 
institutions has dramatically increased in many respects over the last two decades. 
The number of treaties to which China is a party, as well as the number of ACD 
negotiations in which China participates, has been growing. China speaks more often 
and tables more presentation proposals. The question is not whether China supports 
the norm of ACD, but rather, how China embodies its national interest within the 
rules of the game. One of China's historical complaints about ACD issues was that 
the rules had been made by the great Western powers and then imposed on the rest of 
the world. Now, China is deliberately and strategically becoming involved in 
multilateral frameworks in order to form part of the international regime and seek for 
its national interest. This shift of behaviour is apparently congruent with the 
38 China ranked at sixth position in the arms suppliers of major conventional weapons from 1992-1996. 
China possessed the 3.6 percent of whole arms trade during the period (SIPRI Yearbook 1997: 268). 
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constructivist approach which is gaining more credit among Chinese ACD experts 
(Chapter 4). 
This chapter is concerned with Chinese external ACD policy and behaviour at the 
international level. Two approaches to the evolution of China's ACD policy are 
described. The clear distinction between Mao's and Deng's approach indicates a 
significant shift in the ACD policies. The shift brought growing participation in the 
multilateral ACD frameworks. The scope and pattern of the current participation in 
the multilateral ACD institutions will be explored in both global and regional terms. 
The precondition for moving towards the CTBT, that is, China's accession to the NPT 
and the formation of its international normative structure will be examined in the 
following sections. These were conducive to creating China's path towards entry to 
the CTBT. 
6.2. The Evo/ution of China's ACD Policy 
6.2.1. Mao's Ideological Approach since 1949 
Prior to 1978, the historical record of China's participation in ACD regime was 
extremely thin and was described by Johnston as at best dismissive (Johnston 1996: 
34). Given the fact that the Soviet Union was the "big brother" in the socialist camp 
and played the monopolizing role in the ACD talks with the United States, China's 
interest lay in strengthening the security of the socialist camp. It was natural that 
China followed the Soviet Union's views. However, with the deterioration of Sino-
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Soviet relations China began to distance itself from the Soviet Union. The ACD deals 
between two superpowers were likely to undennine its security and China's support 
for the Soviet Union on the ACD issues came to an end completely when the Soviet 
Union signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT, 1963) with the US CWU Yun 1996: 
578-9). 
Mao Zedong was the paramount leader in charge of foreign policy. He saw the 
world as highly polarized between the East and West. He once simply regarded the 
atom bomb as one fonn of conventional weapon and held the view that the atom 
bomb could be countered by the "people's war." While developing nuclear weapons, 
he considered their development as support for the world's "oppressed people" (Zhu 
Mingquan 1997: 40-2). China regarded the regimes established by the Partial Test 
Ban Treaty (PTBT, 1963), the NPT (1968) and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (ITBT, 
1974) as targeted at preventing China from gaining nuclear weapons or improving its 
nuclear arsenal. China denounced the multilateral process as well as the US-Soviet 
bilateral ACD agreements as "sham" disannament in order to institutionalize and 
perpetuate superpower hegemony. The Chinese government often criticized the 
major military powers for recklessly engaging in nuclear testing and transfers of 
advanced-weapons technologies. It sought to act as the Third World's spokeperson 
for disannament, on the argument that since the superpowers were the chief source of 
nuclear threat, they should be the first to reduce and destroy nuclear weapons 
thoroughly. Its long-standing official position, dating from the year before the 
Chinese first atomic test in October 1964, called for the "complete prohibition and 
thorough destruction" of nuclear weapons under a system of general and complete 
disannament (Gurtov and Hwang 1998: 238). 
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Regarding China's ACD behaviour and policy in this period, one important thing 
was that China pronounced its NFU (no first use) policy. The next day after China 
successfully tested its first atom bomb, the Chinese government made its NFU 
assurance to the world. It said that, 
The Chinese government declares solemnly: At any time and under any situation, 
China will not use nuclear weapons fIrst (Zhu Mingquan 1997: 44). 
In fact, the NFU was a strategic choice to complement the inferiority of its 
nuclear weapons to those of the US and the Soviet in tenns of deterrent strategy. 
However, China recognized that it had made a serious commitment, unilaterally, as a 
first step toward the goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of 
nuclear weapons. Since then, China consistently insisted that other nuclear weapon 
states should follow this Chinese step, and as a prerequisite to Chinese cooperation in 
the international ACD agenda. 
Once China successfully tested its own weapon, it said that pending the creation 
of a disannament system, lesser powers like China would have to develop nuclear 
forces to break the great powers' "nuclear monopoly." Agreements such as the one 
that the United States and the Soviet Union had concluded on the PTBT were 
unacceptable to China, inasmuch as they amounted to a freeze on nuclear-weapons 
development in order to maintain the superpower monopoly. The Chinese 
government argued then and since that China's nuclear force is defensive in nature, as 
illustrated by its small size and its consistent support of the principle of no-first-use of 
184 
nuclear weapons. 39 China criticized the discriminatory nature of the NPT reached in 
1968 and refused to adhere to it. Instead, China declared that it would avoid nuclear 
proliferation and would not help other states in their efforts to develop nuclear 
weapons. As a result, China remained isolated from arms control activities in the 
international regime. During this period, the only international ACD regime that 
China supported was the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones. China signed 
the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and Caribbean 
(Treaty of Tlatelo1co) in 1967. 
6.2.2. Deng's Constitutive Approach since 1978 
As in other sectors in China, Deng Xiaoping's paradigmatic shift of foreign 
policy brought a gradual change in China's position on international ACD regimes. 
With the open-door policy, China recognized that a peaceful environment would be 
necessary for economic development and modernization. The arms reduction treaties 
between the United States and the Soviet Union such as START I and START II 
made substantial progress in disarmament. Moreover, after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, China realized that, in the absence of a major superpower competition, it 
would be wiser to try to influence the international ACD process rather than remain 
isolated from it by doing nothing. The intricate verification regimes might offer 
China potential access to technologies, and at least Chinese scientists would have an 
39 Segal distinguished China from the medium nuclear powers, such as Britain and France. According 
to him, China is the only poor peasant state to have achieve the status of a nuclear power and it is also 
the only nuclear power to have been at war with both the Soviet Union and the United States. China is 
also distinctive for having engaged in a number of territorial disputes with its neighbours and it has 
frequently displayed a willingness to use military force against them. Segal called these features 
"maverick qualities," which make China unique compared with other nuclear powers (Segal 1991: 
189). 
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opportunity to benchmark their capacities against other countries. For instance, one 
Chinese scientist, the director of the Shanghai nuclear engineering research and 
development institute, acknowledged that since China joined the IAEA in 1984, it had 
benefited from the many technical and safety standards for nuclear power stations 
established by the organization (Beijing Review 23-29 Dec. 1991). By participation in 
the mutilateral ACD framework, China would present its commitment to other 
countries, especially developing countries, as a major power. 
China has enunciated the key principles of its ACD policy several times since 
1978, when Deng Xiaoping took office. The preconditions for China's participation 
in the international ACD were withdrawn in stages on the basis of the US-Soviet 
strategic anns negotiations. First the total destruction, then substantial reduction 
(without defining them) and finally 50 percent reduction of all types of nuclear 
weapons and means of delivery were suggested. Even after the US-Soviet strategic 
arms negotiation reached a reduction of over 70 percent, China remained unwilling to 
join multilateral ACD negotiations, requesting that the US and Soviet cut their nuclear 
arsenal to the level of China's arsenal until the Chinese government joined the NPT in 
1992 (Malik 1995; Zhu Mingquan 1997). 
Despite the Chinese rhetoric on the surface, China prepared to abandon the 
general disannament precondition that it had insisted on and called upon the 
superpowers to take a lead in disannament. In the early 1980s, China made quiet 
inquiries at the UN about possible participation in the IAEA. Table 6.1. demonstrates 
the modest increase in the interaction with the international ACD agenda during the 
1980s. The early treaties, such as the NPT, the TIBT. the PTBT and the BT\VC, 
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were agreed by China in late 1980s and the early 1990s. In 1992, China joined the 
NPT that it had rejected in 1968. In 1996, China also agreed to accession to the 
CTBT, which is the highest nuclear test ban treaty that covers the content of the PTBT 
and TTBT. 
Table 6.1. China's participation in international ACD institution in 1980s 
year Participation Non-participation 
1963 PTBT 
1968 ~ 
1~2 BTWC 
1974 TTBT 
1978 UN Special Session on Disarmament 
1980 The UN First Committee on Disarmament 
(Conference on Disarmament, CD) 
1981 Inhumane weapons 
1983 Antarctic Treaty, Outer Space Treaty 
1984 IAEA, BTWC 
1986 PTBT 
1992 NPT 
1996 CTBT 
Acronym: BIOlogIcal and Toxin Weapon Convention (BTWC); Threshold Test Ban Treaty 
(TTBT); Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) 
Source: Monterey Institute of International Studies 2000, Inventory of International 
Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes. 
Since China first took part in the UN special session on disarmament in 1978, 
Chinese engagement in and interaction with multilateral ACD frameworks has 
increased gradually and continuously. In 1980, China joined the UN Committee on 
Disarmament (now, CD). More significantly, China gradually started to develop its 
overall cooperation with a group of international nuclear safety arrangements 
associated with the international non-proliferation regime. China formally joined the 
IAEA, stating that it would apply IAEA safeguards to any nuclear technology exports. 
In 1985, China declared that it would, of its own free will, submit part of its civilian 
nuclear facilities to the IAEA for safeguards. In 1988 China and the IAEA signed an 
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agreement on voluntary safeguards, under which China provided the IAEA with a 
listing of facilities subject to such safeguards. In November 1991, China officially 
announced that it would report to the IAEA on a regular basis any exports to or 
imports from non-nuclear weapon states involving nuclear materials of one effective 
kilogram or more (China: Arms Control and Disarmament 1995). 
Johnston argues that China's participation necessarily involved formative 
"learning" (Johnston 1996: 34). It had a substantial constitutive effect on changing 
and formulating China's ACD behaviour and policy. More involvement with the 
international ACD institutions brought China a more challenging agenda and 
technical information. That process certainly required more Chinese experts and 
domestic ACD institutions that could deal with ACD issues. The constitutive shift 
resulted in China's accession to the NPT in 1992 and to other international institutions 
and treaties later on. The shift culminated in China's entry to the CTBT, which could 
freeze China into a permanent position of inferiority with respect to a gi ven type of 
nuclear weapons system or technology. The detailed chronology of China's 
incremental participation and engagement in the multilateral ACD framework will be 
explored in the next section. 
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6.3. China's Growing Participation in Multilateral ACD 
Institutions 
6.3.1. Participation in International Institutions 
China, a nuclear-weapon state since 1964, opened itself to wider international 
exchange not only of trade but also in the security area in the late 1970s. China began 
to export arms and military technology on a significant scale and it also became a 
supplier of sensitive nuclear technology. China's exports posed major problems for 
the international ACD regimes because of China's failure to apply the safeguards and 
controls exercised by states complying with the NPT. As a result, the international 
community sustained efforts to draw China into the international ACD regimes 
through the multilateral ACD frameworks step by step. Over more than two decades, 
China's interaction with multilateral frameworks has achieved incremental but 
important progress. The engagement posture with China has produced Chinese 
participation in a number of international ACD frameworks. Table 6.2. shows details 
of China's overall participation. 
Major International Regimes 
Since China opened its doors, it has joined two important major international 
regimes, the CD (1980)40 and the lAEA (1984).41 The CD is a multilateral 
40 The Conference on Disarmament (CD) was formed in 1979 as the single multilateral disarmament 
negotiating forum of the international community after agreement was reached among member states 
during the first special session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) devoted to disarmament in 1978. 
41 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 and consists of all 130 
member states. Its functions are to encourage and assist the research development and practical 
application of atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world. To achieve the purpose. the 
IAEA established and administers safeguards designed to ensure that such activity, assisted by the 
Agency, is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose. 
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Table 6.2. China's participation in the international ACD frameworks 
Name of Year Year Member 
the Regimerrreaty China established -ship 
joined 
International International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 1984 1957 130 
Regimes Conference on Disarmament (CD) 1980 1979 66 
Supplier Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) n 1975 38 
Regimes Zangger Committee (ZAC) 1998 1971 35 I 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) n 1987 32 
Australia Group (AG) n 1985 30 
Wassenaar Arrangement (WASS) n 1995 33 
International NPT 1992 1968 187 
Treaties CTBT 1996 1996 155 
PTBT n 1963 131 
Moon Agreement n 1979 15 
Antarctic Treaty 1983 1959 44 
Outer Space Treaty 1983 1967 123 
Seabed Treaty 1991 1971 116 
BTWC 1984 1972 162 
Geneva Protocol 1929 1925 133 
CWC 1993 1993 172 
Inhumane Weapons Convention 1981 1981 79 
Convention on the Physical Protection 1989 1980 110 
Convention on Nuclear Safety 1996 1994 118 
UN Register of Conventional Arms 1992 1992 *42 
Nuclear Treaty of Tlatelolco 1973 1967 
Weapon- Treaty of Rarotonga 1987 1985 
Free Zones Bangkok Treaty n 1995 
Treaty of Pelindaba 1996 1996 
Acronym: Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 
Technologies (WASS); Treaty Banning Nuclear-Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere. in Outer Space and Under 
Water (PTBT); Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon 
Agreement); Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty); Treaty on the Prohibition of the 
Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and in 
the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Treaty); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development. Production. and 
Stockpiling of Biological and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC); Protocol for the Prohibition of 
the Use in War of Asphyxiating. Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva 
Protocol); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development. Production. Stockpiling. and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC); Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 
(Inhumane Weapons Convention); Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Physical 
Protection); Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of 
TlateloIco); South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (Treaty of Rarotonga); Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuc1ear-
Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty); African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty). 
Note: n means China's non-participation. 
Source: Monterey Institute of International Studies 2000 Inventor;: of International Nonproliferation 
Orgalli::.ations alld Regimes; China's National Defence 1998; Arms Control Association Fact Sheets. 
42 All UN member states were invited to participate by providing information for each calendar year. 
The purpose of the UN Register of Conventional Arms is to serve as a universal and non-
discriminatory confidence-building measure designed to give early warning and to prevent the 
excessive and de-stabilizing accumulation of arms. China has consistently contributed annual 
submissions of its arms imports and exports. and China has participated in subsequent reviews of the 
treaty prcK'ess (http://domino.un.orgJregister.nsf). 
190 
Disarmament negotiating forum of the international community. The importance of 
the CD lies in its special relationship with the UN. The CD adopts its own rules of 
procedure and its own agenda, taking into account the recommendations made by the 
UNGA and the proposals presented by its members. It also reports to the UNGA 
annually and is funded by the UN. The agenda of the CD covers all multilateral arms 
control and disarmament issues. China participated in the CD in the early days of its 
activities in 1980, just one year after its establishment in 1979. This was a significant 
first step in China's engagement in the multilateral ACD frameworks. The CD 
negotiated such critical and numerious multilateral ACD agreements as the NPT, the 
Seabed treaties, the BTWC, the CWC and the CTBT during the last two decades and 
China's subsequent accession to those treaties had its origin in its prior participation 
in CD. Participation in the CD made the Chinese delegation aware of the 
international ACD issues and encouraged the Chinese ACD expert community to 
make China rethink its national interest. 
The CD provided China with the negotiating opportunities of the ACD agenda. 
The IAEA, however, is a regulating body which applies safeguards to relevant 
acti vities at the request of member states under the NPT and other international 
treaties. The Agency's safeguard system made China reluctant to comply with it. 
Since China joined the IAEA in 1984, on many occasions, it was suspected of 
transferring missile and nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan and other sensitive 
technologies to the Middle East (Steinberg 1998). In 1992 China's ratification of the 
NPT made China commit itself to obtaining IAEA approval and safeguards for any 
exports of nuclear reactors and other major facilities covered under the NPT/IAEA 
system. In the face of international criticism, China formally announced that it would 
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not provide further assistance to nuclear facilities which were not subject to full lAEA 
safeguards in 1996. In addition, China tightened its export policy in 1997 (Chapter 
8). 
Supplier Regimes 
China long regarded participation in the Supplier Regimes as unattracti ve. China 
only joined the Zangger Committee, formed in 1971, in 1997. The regimes have 
limited membership and are concerned with the control of transfening sensitive 
weapons and technology.43 The Supplier Regimes have no multilateral enforcement 
or verification mechanism. Moreover, the lack of "universality" among its 
membership freed the Chinese from considering themselves as representating the 
Third World states. The control exercised by the supplier regimes was not in China's 
interest, especially concerning military defence establishment who wished to gain 
currency from weapons sales for military modernization. China's reluctance to join 
the MTCR not only illustrates this but is also very controversial in evaluating Chinese 
ACD behaviour and cooperation. China frequently denounced the regime as a means 
whereby the US and western states were trying to impose their rule on China. China 
43 The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was established in 1975 and popularly referred to as the 
'London Club.' The NSG seeks to restrict the export of sensitive items that can contribute to the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Zangger Committee was formed in 1971 when Claude Zangger 
drafted a 'trigger list.' The list covers sources of special fissionable materials and equipment or 
materials especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable 
materials. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established in 1987. Initially. 
France, Germany, Italy, UK, and US gathered and discussed controlling the proliferation of nuclear 
capable ballistic missiles, including dual-use missile items. The MTCR's goal is to limit the risks of 
proliferation of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons), by controlling the 
transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems for such weapons. The Australia Group is 
an informal association to limit the spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) through the 
control of chemical precursors. CBW equipment. and BW agents and organisms. The Wassenaar 
Arrangement succeeded to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) 
and promotes transparency and greater responsibility with regard to transfers of conventional arms and 
dual-use goods and technologies. 
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believed that the regime was drawn up to target China, which was criticized for its 
missile sales to Middle Eastern states, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Syria.+t 
In 1992, under pressure from the US, the Chinese government agreed in writing 
that it would observe the MTCR's guidelines. However, those guidelines were less 
restrictive than those accepted by the members of the regime, and included only partly 
revised guidelines. From the Chinese point of view, the MTCR applied double 
standards in that it did not cover fighter aircraft, which is a major source of American 
and European export income, nor the military buildup of Taiwan, while it did cover 
missile technology, a main Chinese export. It is clear that China is not likely to 
change its policies in the near future and that the MTCR as a regime, therefore, has 
failed to obtain Chinese cooperation. In evaluating Chinese ACD policy and 
behaviour, China's violation of the MTCR and its recalcitrance is of most importance 
to observers. No sign of cognitive acceptance of the MTCR has most observers 
assess China's ACD policy as an adjustment rather than cognitive learning, even 
though the Chinese have learned what the MTCR involves. They have not 
incorporated it in their policies. 
International Treaties 
In contrast to the supplier regImes, China signed a number of international 
treaties. The percentage of all possible agreements which it has been eligible to sign, 
has increased rapidly over the last two decades, when the total number of signed 
treaties has increased to 14. By 2000, the only international treaties that China had 
~~ Significantly, China's White Paper on arms control and disarmament in 1995 made no men.tion of 
the MTCR, even though it specifically addressed China's commitment to a number of other 
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not signed were the PTBT and the Moon Agreement.45 However, China unilaterally 
committed itself to the PTBT, pledging to end atmospheric testing in 1986. The 
PTBT became meaningless in 1996 when it was substantially replaced by the new 
CTBT. In the 1980s, China acceded to the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty. 
the BTWC and Inhumane Weapons Convention. Some accessions were not 
significant because they did not require a dramatic shift of China's ACD policy or 
constrain China's military power. China's agreement to the BTWC and the Inhumane 
Weapons Convention indicate a potential commitment to further constraints on 
military options.46 
In the 1990s, China's ACD policy and behaviour featured more conspIcuoUS 
participation In the multilateral frameworks. Following its entry into the NPT in 
1992, China signed numerous contemporary ACD treaties and took part in many 
negotiating processes. China has formally acceded to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC, 1993), the UN Register of Conventional Arms (1993), the CTBT 
(1996) and the Convention on Nuclear Safety (1996). China also supported 
multilateral negotiations on a fissile-material production cutoff convention. Among 
those agreements, the accession to the NPT was one of the most critical landmarks of 
China's ACD policy. China opposed the NPT vociferously, prior to 1992, because of 
its "discriminative nature," placing no constraints on nuclear powers while severely 
international ACD regimes (China: Arms Control and Disarmament 1995). 
45 The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (Moon 
Agreement) was opened for signature in 1979 following an initiative by the Soviet Union. The treaty 
confirmed the demilitarization of the Moon and also prohibited the use or threat of use of force on the 
Moon. which is reserved exclusively for peaceful activities . 
.J.6 China is nonetheless believed to have maintained the offensive biological warfare programme it had 
prior to its accession to the convention. including the manufacture of biological warfare agents. The 
US Arms ('ontrol and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) recently reported that it was highly probable that 
China remains noncompliant with its obligations (Tracking Nuclear Proliferation 1998: 60). 
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restraining the activities of non-nuclear states. At the 1995 NPT Review and 
Extension Conference, China supported the consensus that the Treaty should continue 
in force indefinitely. China's accession to the NPT also created the potential for the 
negotiation of subsequent treaties, like the CTBT and the CWC, which entailed a high 
cost for China's military modernization. In particular, Chinese adherence to the 
CTBT was both a major Chinese step toward the acceptance of constraints on its 
nuclear arsenal and a significant international ACD accomplishment. Being far 
behind the United States and the former Soviet Union in nuclear weapons 
development, China argued that it was sacrificing its nuclear capability. The case 
study of the CTBT will be explored in Chapter 7. 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones 
China signed the regional nuclear weapons-free zone treaties soon after they were 
opened for signature. Like other nuclear powers, China had no reason to hesitate to 
join the treaties, given the fact that the treaties would not restrain China's nuclear 
power. In the case of the Bangkok Treaty, none of the nuclear-weapon states has yet 
signed the Protocols. The parties to the treaty are mostly the Southeast Asian 
countries. 
6.3.2. Participation in Regional Institutions 
Since heping yu Jazhan (peace and development) has been the most primary 
catchphrase of the last two decades, regional stability has become the most critical 
security interest for the Chinese modernization drive. After the end of the Cold War, 
China readjusted its foreign policy on a regional leveL the Asian-Pacific region. The 
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centrifugal regionalization that resulted from the breakup of bipolarity fostered 
regional security dialogues. Emerging multilateral security mechanisms in the Asia-
Pacific region could be important vehicles for promoting long-term peace and 
stability. China has actively participated in regional security frameworks since then. 
Table 6.3. China's participation in the regional security frameworks 
Name Year China joined Year established Membership 
ARF 1994 1994 22 
CICA 1993 1993 15 
CSCAP 1996 1993 16 
NEACD 1993 1993 6 
WMPCS 1991 1990 11 
APSF n 1997 
KP 1988 
Acronym: ASEAN RegIonal Forum (ARF)~ Conference on Interaction and Confidence-
Building Measures in Asia (CICA)~ Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific 
Region (CSCAP)~ Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)~ Workshops on 
Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea (WMPCS)~ Asia-Pacific Security 
Forum (APSF)~ Kathmandu Process (KP). 
Source: http://faculty .law .ubc.ca~ http://www .kazakhemb.org~ http://www .aseansec.org~ 
http://www.cscap.org~ China's National Defence 2000). 
China's involvement in the regional arrangements has been significant. It has 
been party to the ARF since the beginning.47 China has also made itself available for 
multilateral non-governmental dialogue on security issues through a number of other 
regional forums, such as the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building 
Measures in Asia (CICA), and Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD).~8 
47 The ARF was initiated by the ASEAN countries and established in 1994 to intensify its external 
dialogue on political and security matters as a means of building cooperative ties with states in the 
Asia-Pacific region. Its main objective is to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political 
and security issues of common interest and concern~ and to make significant contribution to efforts to 
CBMs and preventive diplomacy in the region (http://www.aseansec.org). For China's participation in 
ARF, see Johnston (1999). 
48 The NEACD was organized by the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and 
Cooperation (lGCC). The aim of NEACD is to enhance mutual understanding, confidence. and 
cooperation through meaningful but unofficial dialogue among China, Japan, Russia, the United States 
and both South and North Korea. Although North Korea has not participated in any of the eight formal 
NEACD meetings held since 1993. the NEACD brought together senior officials and academicians and 
security specialists from the other five countries for dialogue on political, security, and economic issues 
of concern to all parties. 
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China also began to attend the multilateral security dialogue on maritime issues like 
the workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea. At the end of 
1996, China also joined the largely non-governmental Council for Security and 
Cooperation in the Asian Pacific region (CSCAP), which focuses on security dialogue 
and includes individual Taiwanese scholars and security specialists in their private 
capacities.49 
China also participated in the unofficial meetings, known as the "Kathmandu 
Process" (KP) that the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and 
the Pacific has sponsored for the past ten years. Regional scholars and government 
officials gather in Kathmandu to discuss various regional and global disarmament 
issues. China did not join the APSF, which was established in 1997 and sponsored by 
the Taiwan Institute for National Policy Research. Its agenda includes PRC-Taiwan 
cross-straits relations, a topic which is specifically not on the agenda of any dialogue 
in which China participates formally. 
China is gradually commg to accept the usefulness of military transparency, 
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), and preventive diplomacy, especially on 
territorial questions. More significantly, China has taken concrete steps toward 
enhancing security on a multilateral basis. For instance, in April 1996, China, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed an agreement on confidence-building 
in military matters that concern their mutual border areas.50 
49 The esc AP has been described as 'the most ambitious proposals to date for a regularizing non-
governmental process on Asia-Pacific security matters. It is now looking forward to consolidating its 
links to the ARF (http://www.cscap.org). 
so In April 1996, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan met in Shanghai for the first 
time and signed the Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field Along the Border Areas. 
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Multilateral regional security forums provide a framework for enhanced US 
involvement in Asian security that complements the United States' current bilateral 
security arrangement. In a similar way, China's active involvement can be interpreted 
as supporting both sides of the coin. China's White Paper describes China's position 
on regional security frameworks: 
China supports regional security dialogue and cooperation at different levels, 
through various channels, in different forms and in a step-by-step manner pursuant 
to the principles of participation on an equal footing and reaching consensus 
through consultation in the spirit of seeking common ground while reserving 
differences (China's National Defence 2000: 51). 
The above paragraph indicates that China supports the relaxed form, 
"consultation," of regional security cooperation. Given the kaleidoscopic 
opportunities In the regIon, China sought to reorganize the regional political and 
security terrain while keeping a sharp lookout for the rapid institutionalization of the 
dialogue. Stressing the "equal footing" and "consensus," the White Paper made clear 
the object of its caution. 
China maintains that the multilateral security dialogue and cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific region should be oriented toward and characterized by mutual respect 
instead of the strong bullying the weak, cooperation instead of confrontation, and 
seeking consensus instead of imposing one's own will on others (China's National 
Defence 2000: 51). 
One year later. the five states also signed the Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the 
Border Area (China's National Defence 2000: 53-56). 
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In this paragraph, the white paper states that the "dialogue" and "cooperation" 
should be based on mutual respect and opposed to hegemonic intervention like the 
"'strong bullying the weak" and "imposing one's own will on others." Even though 
the paper does not elucidate who bullies and imposes, it alludes to and targets the 
United States which has woven the political and security structure in the Asia-Pacific 
regIon. China wanted to expand its influence in the region and to counterbalance the 
Unites States' dominance by encouraging a multipolar system in the regIOn. 
Moreover, the Asia-Pacific regIon allows more room for China to be a new 
stakeholder because the regIon can develop the flexible and consultative type of 
multilateral framework which China favours. 
In the face of the developing unipolar world order after the Gulf War, China 
launched an initiative to promote a multipolar system in the region. In 1992, China 
made a five-point proposal on the Asian Pacific security order. The proposal included 
the following principles: no foreign military bases; no military alliances against third 
parties; peaceful resolution of territorial disputes; prevention of arms race; and no first 
use of nuclear weapons (Renmin ribao 19 August 1992). Qian Qichen's proposal was 
further articulated by Sha Zukang, the Chinese ambassador to the UN Conference on 
Asia Pacific Security and Mutual Confidence Building (Renmin ribao 3 Feb. 1993). 
Although the proposal expressed the general principles of the Chinese position, it was 
a clear indication that China would play an active role in regional security dialogues 
and seek to reorganize the regional political and security structure. The Chinese 
government has called for the abandonment of the cold war mentality and the 
establishment of a "new security concept" under which security would be based, not 
on military alliances and arms build-ups, but rather on the principles of mutual trust 
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and serving the common interest. Countries should cooperate and promise to solve 
disputes and conflicts by peaceful means (Chapter 8). 
China's approach to regional-security cooperation would seem to serve its 
interests quite well. It aligns China with regional sentiment in favour of nurturing the 
"habit of dialogue" through gradual confidence building founded on economic and 
other kinds of nonmilitary cooperation. To defuse U.S. influence in the region, which 
is backed by security treaties, China seeks to establish multipolar "cooperation" and 
the "equality" of states as norms of political relations. 
6.3.3. An Evaluation of China's International Participation 
A recent study of China's involvement in multilateral ACD institutions concluded 
that China "is at a crossroads" in this matter (Evans 1996). An evaluation of China's 
ACD policy gave more credits to "adaptation" than to "learning" (Chapter 2.3.3.). 
China's involvement in the international ACD frameworks already extends for two 
decades. One can wonder if it is not likely to remain indefinitely at this crossroads. 
China's contradictory behaviour confused observers over the question of "learning" or 
"adaptation." The contrast between the participation rate and the reluctance to adhere 
to specific regimes (as have seen in most supplier regimes) is an ambiguous factor in 
evaluating China's ACD policy. 
Some observers paid more attention to the optimistic reasons. Inspired by the 
"epistemic community" theory, the role of the growing Chinese ACD community and 
its transnational linkage has increased over time and hypothetically has resulted in the 
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shift of China's ACD policy (Johnston 1996; Godement 1997). Others have focused 
on the epistemological level and made efforts to characterize the Chinese ACD 
perspective (Garrett and Glaser 1995). There are also observers who seek for the 
institutional factors that caused China's contradictory ACD behaviour and crippled its 
international reputation to apply norms (Lewis, Xue 1994; Lewis, Hua and Xue 199 L 
Hu Weixing 1994; 1999). 
It is not clear that the growth of China's ACD expert community which has 
presented more flexible and norm-oriented views has been salient to Chinese 
discourse. There is no evidence that the discourse has decisively influenced the 
China's ACD decision-making process or that it has produced a significant 
paradigmatic shift in China's policy. Nonetheless, over time, there is a record of 
China's having turned passive or negative participation into more constructive moves 
as has been demonstrated. As the chronological evidence indicates, there is no doubt 
that there has been a dramatic increase in China's participation in the numerous 
multilateral ACD frameworks. 
Chinese participation In the international ACD frameworks has been a 
complicated process which has entailed a reconsideration of the state's preferences 
and interests, unless they were given exogenously. The explanation may be found in 
the broad and the long term. Johnston developed this argument and explained the 
dramatic increase in participation with a path-dependent logic. He argued that 
China's initial involvement in international security institutions "placed China in an 
environment where there were incentives to become more involved." Increasing 
levels of involvement lead to increasing returns from participation. These returns 
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included access to new information and resources of use to these organizations, and 
social backpatting from participation in a legitimate community (Johnston and Evans 
1999: 239-40). 
Expanding Johnston's conceptualization, the "dynamic of state and institution" 
contains two logical steps: the previous impact on the state to by dynamic interaction 
tJ; a,nd the impact on the state t1 by dynamic interaction t2. For instance, when the 
question about why China joined the CTBT (institution (2) is raised, the answer is to 
seek for what the important footpath to the CTBT (the NPT, institution tJ) was. The 
next question would be about how the Chinese CTBT experience (Dynamic 
interaction t2) might affect China itself (state tl ------7 state (2) and led to the next 
engagement step (institution tJ). Historically, China's participation in the CD in 1980 
corresponded to the subsequent participation growth in the UN agenda. Once 
engaged in the CD, this gave some incentives to stay there, for example, information 
and prestige, as a responsible power. The incentive structure consolidates the 
relationship between the state and the institution. The continuous interaction between 
the state and the institution features a dynamic influence on the state itself; domestic 
institutions and perspectives. Participation in the CD required and fostered a level of 
expertise and sophistication in the domestic institutions, which, in tum, influence and 
play some role in the decision-making process at the next step on the international 
ACD agenda. 
In the next section, the question of why China joined the CTBT will be explored 
at an international level. There are some factors at the international level that 
influenced China's decision to agree to join the CTBT in international level. First, as 
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a footpath to the CTBT, China's accession to the NPT (institutionl) will be described. 
Then, the normative structure that underpinned the CTBT negotiations will be 
explored along with the US regime leadership which was also an important factor in 
creating the momentum to proceed to the CTBT negotiation. 
6.4. The International Engaging Force for the CTST 
6.4.1. Entry into the NPT: the pathway to the CTBT 
The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the fulcrum of 
the international nonproliferation regime, with a universal membership of 187 
countries in 2000. The relative universality that more countries have ratified the NPT 
than any other ACD agreement gives the treaty preeminent significance. Membership 
of the NPT was, itself, not seriously onerous for China and it gave China the potential 
for further ACD negotiation. The CTBT was one of the critical debates at the NPT 
conference. The linkage between CTBT and NPT was the issue that had consistently 
generated disputes during the conferences to review the NPT since the 1980s (Rauf 
and Johnson 1995; Howlett and Simpson 1992). China's entry into NPT was a 
stepping stone to the CTBT agreement. 
China had criticized the NPT as "the discriminatory treaty on the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons," even though China formally pronounced as its 
basic position that it would not "advocate, encourage or engage in nuclear 
proliferation." The "imbalanced and unfair" relationship between nuclear and non-
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nuclear states was the main point of Chinese argument, because, from the Chinese 
point of view, the treaty only limited "the horizontal proliferation" but imposed no 
limit to "the vertical proliferation" (the continuing development and improvement of 
the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear states). Thus the treaty was thought to be a 
rationale for imposing unreasonable restrictions on the nuclear cooperation of the 
Third World countries (Yu Zhiyong 1988b; Tan Han 1992). Deng Xiaoping's ACD 
policy, as explored in the previous section, made an adjustment to its policy on the 
Treaty in 1990s. With the end of the Cold War, the Chinese government, trying to 
break through the international isolation brought about by the Tiananmen Incident, 
sent its first observer delegation to the 1990 NPT Review Conference. At the 
Conference, the Chinese submitted a favourable statement titled "Document on Basic 
Positions." The Chinese ambassador Hou Zhitong also gave a favourable speech at 
the conference on September 11, 1990. He remarked that "the treaty has played a 
positive role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons" (Van Doren and 
Bunn 1990: 8-12). 
China's acceSSIon to the NPT was pushed by international pressure. The 
worldwide nonproliferation sentiment was stirred by China's violation of the NPT 
regime in the early 1990s. The April 1991 revelations about China's secret reactor 
project in Algeria put China in an awkward position. And the announcement by 
French President Mitterrand in June 1991 that France would join the NPT, also 
pressured China to accept the NPT regime. These events were factored into a 
contentious US Congressional debate over China's most favoured nation (MFN) trade 
status. The MFA signalled the change, stating that "China has not yet decided 
whether or not to join the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty," but was continuing to 
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study the question of participating (Xinhua News Agency 27 June 1991 from Jia Hao 
1999a: 151). The turning point came in August 1991 when Li Peng stated China's 
decision "in principle" to join the NPT when he met the then Japanese Prime Minister 
Toshiki Kaifu. Chinese leaders also promised the Secretary of State, Baker, during 
his November 1991 trip to Beijing, that China would join the NPT by April 1992. It 
was approved by the 144-member Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress at the end of 1991, and took place on March 9, 1992 (Beijing Review 13-19 
Jan. 1992).51 China became the fourth acknowledged nuclear-weapon state to accede 
to the NPT before the French accession which came five months later, in August. 
Accession to the NPT was an important landmark in China's ACD policy and 
behaviour. The NPT is the most influential and cooperative regime of the 
international non-proliferation frameworks. This meant that China's long detachment 
from the international ACD regimes would be ended and that Chinese behaviour 
would be restrained by the NPT regime.52 As a "responsible" nuclear weapon state 
and a new member of NPT, the post-NPT ACD policy and behaviour would conflict 
potentially with the domestic institutions' vested interests, mostly the PLA, in arms 
sales. It would also lead to the unprecedented involvement in future negotiations of 
international ACD agenda like the CTBT. 
51 In his speech at the Standing Committee, Li Peng said that "China's participation would clearly 
demonstrate its independent foreign policy of peace and expand its image of reform as well as promote 
the treaty's role in world peace and stability" (Beijing Review 13-19 Jan. 1992). 
52 Before the entry into the NPT, the only international constraints on Chinese arms sales were the 
lAEA's safeguards. However, the lAEA was a cooperative body regarding nuclear weapons rather 
than an establised regime with effective verification tools. Since 1984, China officially was a member 
of the lAEA and accepted its safeguard obligations, but was frequently suspected of violating them by 
international society. 
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China's calculations and motives for joining the NPT are complicated. Most 
observers regarded them as showing a cost-free and benefit-seeking attitude, given the 
Chinese realpolitik approach. According to these views, China's calculation and 
motivation lay in some categories, such as securing the US ~ status for potential 
economic benefits and concern about its image as a responsible power. 
First, without the NPT membership, China would remain the only acknowledged 
nuclear-weapon state not to be a party to the treaty, and would continue to share non-
NPT status with threshold nuclear states such as India, Pakistan, and Israel. Not only 
would this associate China with lesser powers in a general sense, it would also link 
Beijing with its arch rival, New Delhi, as the main critics of the treaty. With world 
interest in nonproliferation growing, the prospect of observing the 25-year NPT 
Review and Extension Conference in 1995 with the same status as India, was 
probably distasteful. China found the marginal rewards of joining the NPT as a 
nuclear-weapon state preferable to continued isolation and China also hoped to deflect 
criticism from its nuclear export policy. 
Second, signing the NPT was a step toward securing normal MFN trade status 
from the United States, as the signature removed the possibility that MFN status could 
be denied if Congress were to link MFN with NPT membership. In trying to promote 
a constructive bilateral relationship, President Bush supported China's accession to 
the treaty and its increased support for global nonproliferation efforts when he 
recommended normal trade tariffs for China in June 1992 and vetoed legislation to tie 
conditions to MFN status in September 1992. 
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Third, NPT membership would secure China's ability to purchase nuclear goods 
and services for Chinese nuclear power plants, particularly from France and other 
countries increasingly unwilling to sell nuclear technology to non-NPT states. The 
loosening of some U.S. controls over sensitive exports to China and new reactor deals 
with France, Canada, Japan, Russia, and South Korea in 1994 seemed to confirm the 
benefit in Beijing's signing the NPT. 
Fourth, China would accept the NPT on account of its security. China was 
concerned about the dangers of nuclear proliferation in volatile ethnic, religious, 
cultural and political conflicts and the NPT could contribute to China's security 
(Davis 1995: 587-94~ Johnston 1996: 50-1). Many Chinese ACD experts were 
enthusiastically concerned with the proliferation problem on a global level (Chapter 
4.4.). Whatever concrete cost-benefit calculation was evaluated by Chinese 
government, in the long tenn, Chinese analysts confinned that joining the NPT would 
be more advantageous to China than remaining outside the NPT regime (Garrett and 
Glaser 1995: 50). The policy change meant that China would play an active role in 
the game of the international ACD regimes. 
China's objective can be interpreted in a constructivist fashion from its official 
statement. On October 21, 1992, at the First Committee of the 4ih Session of the 
UNGA, the Chinese Ambassdor Hou Zhitong acknowledged China's accession to the 
NPT and stated that, 
China is ready to put forward the following proposals ... NPT is one of the most 
universally accepted international instruments in the field of arms control. 
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Although not free from defects and inadequacies, it plays a positive role in 
preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons ... We believe that in order to 
increase the universality of NPT and strike a balance between the rights and 
obligations of its states parties, it would be of the utmost importance for the major 
nuclear weapon powers to accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament and 
abandon the policy of nuclear deterrence, for all nuclear weapon states to provide 
security assurances to non-nuclear states and unconditionally undertake the 
obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, for nuclear industry capable 
states to actively promote international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy in benefit of the economic and social development of various countries, and 
for the international non-proliferation regime to be strengthened with the full 
participation of non-nuclear-weapon states (Beijing Review 9-15 Nov. 1992).53 
It was important for China to accept the NPT as a substantive entity rather than to 
dismiss it as a discriminatory one. China began to admit that the NPT was a 
"universally accepted international instrument" and played "a positive role" in 
international ACD efforts. Apparently, this acceptance was associated with China's 
active involvement in UN activities. Since the open-door policy, China has 
recognized the importance of the UN as a "focus of China's multilateral diplomacy." 
China has actively participated in many UN activities (Kim 1999) and now the next 
step had to be decided. "With a constructive attitude," China defined its role as a 
balancer "between the rights and obligations of its states parties," identifying itself 
with the non-nuclear weapon states (mostly, the developing countries). China 
requested the nuclear weapon states to "undertake the obligation not to be the first to 
use nuclear weapons" (NFU) and to abandon their nuclear deterrence policy and to 
thoroughly destroy their nuclear arsenals for the non-proliferation regime. 
Apparently, China targeted the US policy and expressed the right to participate on an 
53 The emphasis is added to the phrases by making words bold in the dissertation. 
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equal footing in the ACD discussion rather than let it be monopolized or manipulated 
by a few big powers. The Chinese delegate continually reiterated that, 
In order to enhance international peace and security and to promote disannament 
process, hegemonism and power politics must be completely removed from 
international relations and all states... Such a practice of double standards and 
breach of faith in the field of anns control is both typical of hegemonism and 
power politics, and is detrimental to international peace, security and stability 
(Beijing Review 9-15 Nov. 1992). 
The above statement was the Chinese traditional argument in dealing with 
international affairs and targeting the superpowers, chiefly the United States, in the 
post-Cold War era. The propagandist opposition to "hegemonism" and "power 
politics" can be understood in the sense of the Chinese realpolitik rhetoric, which 
deprecates the infringement of sovereignty and interference in internal affairs by 
foreign powers. Observers found the origin of this in the humiliating experiences of 
China's colonial history (Hunt 1996). Although the rhetoric was used as an excuse 
and propaganda to avoid condemnation from the international community, the 
rhetoric was also China's own principal aim in the international arena when China 
moved in a cooperative way. In some sense, it was intended to create a counter-
ideology or elicit support from other countries, checking and undermining the US 
regime leadership at international level. As a matter of fact, it is not clear how much 
the rhetoric succeeded in attracting international opinion, especially from the Third 
World. However, it is apparent that the rhetoric was unwelcome in the United States. 
China speculated that joining the NPT would be beneficial whereas isolation from 
it was alienating from the international ACD discussion and negotiations. This hardly 
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legitimized China's earlier counter-attack against international pressure and criticism 
and undermined China's reasons and reputation. However, China decided to play 
inside rather than outside the international arena. Certainly, China could gain the 
benefits of an insider, such as technical information and security. Notwithstanding, 
the most important thing was no more alienation but rather, participation in the game. 
China could have a voice in international ACD decision-making and could hope 
strategically to influence the process with the leverage of support from the developing 
countries. However, the consequences went beyond the expectations of the Chinese 
government. Once engaged in the NPT regime, a path-dependence phenomenon was 
generated. With the emergence of the subsequent agenda on the ACD table, China 
had to playas a responsible actor and the cost was more than it ever expected, namely 
acceding to the CTBT. 
6.4.2. Formation of the International Normative Structure 
Linkage of NPT and CTBT 
While the NPT regime was almost universally supported, a few states did wish to 
acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In the 1990s, the 
NPT regime was facing a number of severe challenges. In 1991, the Gulf War 
disclosed that Iraq, an NPT signatory, had conducted a nuclear weapons programme 
under the IAEA safeguards. This revelation made the international community 
rethink the efficiency of the NPT rules. Moreover, the break-up of the Soviet Union 
generated fears that its nuclear weapons and the vast stockpiles of fissile material 
might not be secure and that the potential proliferants could purchase those materials 
and technology. Thus, the NPT regime was given the highest importance bv the 
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international community (Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations 
2000: 2-4; Bunn 1994: 52-60). 
The CTBT had been a controversial issue in the NPT review conference and it 
failed to reach an agreement until 1995.54 At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension 
Conference, the five nuclear-weapon states finally agreed to conclude the CTBT "no 
later than 1996" under the pressure of non-nuclear weapon states. The non-nuclear 
weapon states further pressed for a continuation of the moratorium on testing at the 
NPT extension conference. In fact, numerous non-nuclear states had long appealed 
for the conclusion of the CTBT. They viewed the CTBT as an essential step in 
disarmament and critical to stopping the nuclear arms race. Indeed, concluding the 
CTBT as soon as possible became a condition for maintaining an indefinitely 
effective NPT regime (Dhanapala 1996; Rauf and Johnson 1995). The signing of the 
CTBT by the five nuclear states would not only demonstrate their good faith in 
Article VI of the NPT,55 but also show their willingness to forego an essential means 
to develop nuclear weapons. Though technically the CTBT can only playa limited 
role in preventing nuclear proliferation, the CTBT supposedly gave important 
symbolic significance to the NPT regIme, which was beneficial to all countries 
including China. 
54 Technically, the NPT required one review conference five years after treaty entry into force. and 
allowed for additional review conferences to be scheduled every five years. if desired by a majority of 
NPT signatories (NPT Article VIII.3). The CTBT was clearly a major consideration at each review 
conference. 
55 Article VI designates the duty of each of the Parties for nuclear disarmament. "Each of the Parties to 
the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of 
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" (Monterey Institute of 
International Studies 2000 Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organization and Regimes: 
104). 
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Nuclear Test Moratoria 
The international atmosphere of the CTBT negotiations had been established by 
the pronouncements of a nuclear testing moratorium by the nuclear weapon states 
except China. As a preliminary step toward the CTBT negotiations, four nuclear 
weapon states, the United States, the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom, 
created the momentum and contributed the norm (CTBT)-setting in the international 
community. The normative structure put significant pressure on China. 
Table 6.4. Nuclear Tests and the International Nuclear Moratorium 
year USSR US UK France China 
(Russia) 
1985 10 17 1 8 -
1986 - 14 1 8 -* 
1987 23 14 1 8 1 
1988 16 15 - 8 1 
1989 7 11 1 9 -
1990 1 8 1 6 2 
1991 - 7 1 6 -
1992 - 6 - - 2 
1993 - - - - 1 
1994 - - - - 2 
1995 - - - 5 2 
1996 - - - 1 2 
Total 713 1,032 45 210 45 
nuclear test 
Note: * China announced halting atmospherIc nuclear tests on March 21, 1986. In fact, It 
had ceased since 1981. All Chinese nuclear tests were conducted underground since 
then. 
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1997: 434-5 
Table 6.4. demonstrates that the nuclear weapon states gradually and seriously 
reduced the number of nuclear tests from late 1980s and started the nuclear test 
moratorium in early 1990s. The Soviet Union, which had unilaterally halted its 
nuclear tests in 1985, declared an immediate one-year moratorium on testing in 1991. 
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The United Kingdom and France replied to the nuclear test moratorium in 1992. The 
United States joined the moratorium in 1993. 
Given the fact that nuclear tests were required not only for developing new types 
of warheads, but also for improving warhead safety and maintaining the reliability of 
weapons, the nuclear weapon states had prepared for test moratorium. For example, 
the United States had started an extensive science-based Stockpile Stewardship and 
Management Program to include many experimental facilities. With these efforts, the 
United States was believed to have high confidence in its enduring stockpile with 
nuclear testing (Collin a 1997: 5_8).56 France from 1991 also invested huge money in 
the PALEN (Preparation for Limitations on Nuclear Testing) project to verify the 
quality and safety of the weapons in service in laboratory experiments. The United 
Kingdom had long enjoyed a broad range of technology sharing with the US, 
including data on weapons performance as well as on safety and reliability, since its 
tests were conducted jointly with the US at the Nevada Test Site in 1962 (SIPRI 
Yearbook 1997: 432). Russia could not implement an expensive stockpile 
stewardship programme for political and economic reasons, but with rich data and 
experiences from many tests it would have had fewer worries about the safety or 
reliability of its stockpile.57 
56 The Letter of Submittal by Madeleine Albright to President Clinton confirmed this fact. In the letter, 
Madeleine Albright pointed that "the US decision to pursue actively a comprehensive test-ban was 
conditional on having the capability to ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of 
the US stockpile" (Letter of Submittal 20 September 1997 from http://www.state.gov /www/ 
~Iobal/arms/ctbtpage) . 
. 7 This technical preparedness for the CTBT was, in a way, China's excuse for the six nuclear tests 
during the negotiation process from 1994 to 1996. And also it was China's justification for the request 
for technical support in securing warhead reliability and safety in the post-CTBT era (Sun Xiangli 
1997: 6-10). 
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It is not clear how and why the CTBT norm prevailed in the 1990s. However, the 
CTBT had long been an aspiration, since international efforts on regulating the 
nuclear tests achieved the PTBT, in 1963. Since the agenda of CTBT had been 
debated at the NPT review conference in 1980s, the normative structure of the CTBT 
in UN activities had been conspicuous. The efforts to explore the verification needs 
for the CTBT were undertaken by the Group of Scientific Experts in the CD, while 
strong calls were made for negotiation on a test ban by many non-nuclear weapon 
states. As early as in December 1990, the UNGA resolution called for the conclusion 
of the CTBT, which was favoured by 140 countries (Resolution 45/51, UN General 
Assembly 1990: 52-3). In November 1993, the UN First Committee approved the test 
ban draft resolution with the unprecedented support of 157 countries. This was 
adopted by the UNGA on December 16 without a vote (Resolution 48/70, UN 
General Assembly 1993: 72-3). 
6.4.3. US Regime Leadership 
With the rise of a normative structure in the UN, the United States played an 
important role in agenda-setting. 58 After the demise of the Soviet Union, the United 
States was the only remaining major power with the ability to assure the functioning 
and further development of the existing institutions dealing with nuclear non-
proliferation. Though a nuclear attack on US territory was not very likely, the United 
States wanted to prevent the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), especially in regions of conflict, where American troops abroad and those of 
58 Hegemonic stability theory ascribes an important role to powerful actors, or 'hegemons.· in 
upholding cooperating. Even in institutional theory. where the existence of a hegemon is neither 
sufficient nor necessary to explain the rise and stability of institutions, support by powerful states is 
still important for the stability of the regime (Gilpin 1987; Krasner 1991). 
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their allies could be threatened or where the American reputation in the region could 
be seriously impaired. 
In contrast to the Bush administration's reluctant policy on a nuclear test 
moratorium, the Clinton administration saw a CTBT as primarily a nonproliferation 
tool, throwing a roadblock into the path of nations intent on developing nuclear 
weapons. In the newly adapted US "nonproliferation policy package", the Clinton 
administration proposed to initiate multilateral talks on CD and supported an early 
conclusion of the CTBT. In April 1993, US President Clinton and Russia President 
Yeltsin agreed at the Vancouver Summit that negotiations on a multilateral nuclear 
test ban should commence at an early date and that two governments would consult 
with each other accordingly. After debates over testing policy with the Energy 
Department, the Anns Control and Disarmament Agency and the White House 
Science Advisor, in July 3, 1993, President Clinton announced that the US would 
extend the moratorium, at least, through 1994 unless another nation conducted a test 
and would pursue completion of a CTBT by September 1996 (Chronology of key 
events in the Effort to End Nuclear Weapons Testing: 1945-1999, http://www.clw.org/ 
coalition). 
The US committed itself to set the agenda and, on August 10, 1993, the CD 
finally decided to give its ad hoc committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to begin 
negotiations on the CTBT in January 1994. However, it should be noted that there 
was dichotomy between the CTBT's goal as percei ved by the US and that of the non-
aligned states (G-21). The US believed that achievement of a CTBT would be a 
major step toward further constraining the spread of nuclear weapons -
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"nonproliferation," while the 0-21 countries considered the CTBT as an 
indispensable measure to put an end to the nuclear arms race and achieve the 
complete elimination of those weapons - "disarmament" (Mallin 1995: 4-5). In the 
CTBT submittal letter to US President, the US interest in CTBT was made clear. 
The decision to support a concerted effort to conclude a comprehensive test ban was 
thus based on the careful assessment that any possible risks were outweighed by the 
benefits to United States of nonproliferation and other security objectives in 
constraining the spread and improvement of nuclear weapon capability (Letter of 
Submittal by Department of State 20 September 1997 from http://www.state.gov/ 
gl obal/ arms/ ctbtpage ). 
This dichotomy was at the root of many of the challenges in successfully 
negotiating the CTBT. China was the only nuclear weapon state to argue from a 
disarmament perspective. China repeatedly declared that it has maintained its 
position of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and a 
CTBT in this context. Therefore, China's rationale for the CTBT negotiation was 
ambiguous in that a CTBT needs to be considered as one of a series of measures 
aimed at halting nonproliferation and leading to eventual nuclear disarmament. The 
next chapter will explore Chinese negotiating behaviour at the CTBT talks in CD. 
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CHAPTER 7. China and the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty 
Although the final draft of the treaty probably did not totally satisfy 
any country, it was in general balanced ... The Completion of the test 
ban treaty would be an important and practical step in the gradual 
process of achieving complete nuclear disarmament (Renmin ribao 27 
August 1996). 
7.1. Introduction 
7.1.1. The Process and Nature of the CTBT 
A comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) has long been on the nuclear arms 
control agenda from the 1960s to the 1980s. A ban on nuclear weapon tests was first 
put on the international disarmament agenda in 1954 by Indian Prime Minister 
lawaharlal Nehru, after the United Kingdom had joined the United States and the 
Soviet Union in conducting nuclear tests. Public opinion was gravely concerned not 
only about the escalating nuclear arms race but also about radioactive fallout and the 
consequent health and environmental damage (Hoffmann 1997). However, 
multilateral talks in Geneva throughout the Cold War era were deadlocked over the 
competing security interests of the United States and the Soviet Union and the 
practical problems of establishing an intrusive monitoring and inspection system for 
the treaty (Johnson 1996b: 55). Little progress was achieved in this period beyond the 
Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT, 1963) and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT, 
1974).59 Since a group of non-aligned states demanded that the nuclear powers 
59 The three states, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. settled for the PTBT that 
covered only nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. outer space, and under water. abandoning the 
attempt to establish an intrusive and mutually-acceptable verification regime. The TTBT proposed that 
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committed themselves to a timetable for negotiation of a CTBT in the 1990 NPT 
Review Conference, pressures for a CTBT began to mount. With the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union and growing concern over nonproliferation, some nuclear powers 
started to pursue the cause of a test ban treaty. They considered it as seriously 
performing a nonproliferation function rather than as disarmament that would 
constrain their own capacity, while appeasing the non-nuclear weapon states in the 
run-up to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. 
After negotiations toward a CTBT were placed on the international ACD agenda 
in the wake of the Clinton-Yeltsin summit in April 1993, the five permanent members 
of the UN Security Council joined 156 countries in adopting a consensus resolution in 
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that endorsed a mandate for the 
Conference on Disarmament (CD) to negotiate for a CTBT (UNGA Consensus 
Resolution 48/70). For the first time in its fourteen-year history, the CD was given a 
mandate to negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty, and all the nuclear powers made a 
.. 
commitment to engage in the negotiations (Herby 1993: 1). The mandate, 
to negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable 
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, which would contribute effectively to the 
prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of 
nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and 
security (CD/ 1238). 
was formally adopted. The CTBT represented a major departure from the practice of 
the United States and the Soviet Union limit test yields, but it was never ratified (SIPRI Yearbook 
1997: 531. )45). 
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the CD, which nonnally sought the consensus of all its members before 
recommending a treaty. The CTBT talks started fonnally in January 1994 and ended 
in August 1996. To accelerate progress, the UNGA, in 1995, passed a resolution 
urging the negotiators to complete the treaty text no later than 1996, so as to make it 
ready for signature before its 51st session, in September 1996 (UNGA Resolution 
50/65, UN General Assembly 1995: 84-5). On September 10, 1996, the UNGA voted 
158 to 3 to adopt the treaty and the CTBT was opened for signing on September 24 
1996 (Cerniello 1996: 21). By October 18, 2001, 161 states had signed the treaty and 
84 states had ratified it (Anns Control Association Fact Sheet 2001). In order to bring 
it into force, the treaty had to be ratified by all the forty-four CD participating states 
on June 18, 1996 (CTBT Article XIV). Three of the forty-four states have not signed 
the treaty: India, Pakistan and North Korea. This leaves the CTBT with an inherent 
weakness for its coming into force. 60 
Despite the absence of above three countries' signatures and the subsequent 
nuclear weapon tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998, the CTBT marked an 
important landmark in preventing nuclear proliferation and in advancing the cause of 
nuclear disannament. The rationale for the CTBT was that it would constrain the 
development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; end the development 
of advanced new types of nuclear weapons; contribute to the prevention of nuclear 
proliferation and the process of nuclear disannament and strengthen international 
peace and security. 
60 The CTBT's very demanding entry into force (ElF) requirement stands in the way of its entry into 
force and therefore prevents full implementation of the extensive monitoring and on-site inspection 
system established by the treaty. 
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Firstly, CTBT demonstrated that the nuclear test ban norm prevailed globally and 
unprecedentedly in the nuclear age. For the first time in history, all five declared 
nuclear weapon states, three threshold nuclear states (India, Pakistan and Israel), and 
the non-nuclear weapon states joined together to cooperate over nuclear disarmament 
issues and to establish a legal instrument to ban all kinds of nuclear testing. Secondly. 
the CTBT has a significant role in preventing the development of any new, more 
sophisticated nuclear weapons. For the advanced nuclear weapon states, seeking a 
new generation of highly sophisticated special effects or special purpose weapons and 
for threshold states improving on untested first generation designs, the CTBT has 
constraining consequences. Furthermore, the CTBT will also significantly constrain 
the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear arsenals. Thirdly, the CTBT will 
strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime which has been criticized by the non-
nuclear weapons states because of the NPT's discriminatory division between nuclear 
"haves and have nots". The linkage between the NPT and the CTBT vindicated all 
NPT members that they made correct decision in agreeing to the NPT's indefinite 
extension by demonstrating that the five major nuclear powers were serious about 
their commitment, within the NPT, to nuclear arms control and disarmament. Thus, 
by strengthening support for the NPT, the CTBT will help prevent the further spread 
of nuclear weapons and elicit the obligation of non-nuclear weapons states, under the 
NPT, not to conduct nuclear tests. The CTBT stands as one of the most prominent 
treaties of the nuclear era (Bell 1998: 3-10). 
Some critics doubted that the treaty would totally prevent qualitative 
improvements of existing nuclear arsenals, or the development of new weapon 
designs. gi ven the technological capabilities of the established nuclear-weapons states 
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to experiment without fission testing (Johnson 1997: 78; Wu Zhan 1998b). But it is 
widely recognized that the CTBT, once it comes into force, will be a major advance in 
restraining the nuclear arms competition and inhibiting nuclear weapons proliferation. 
7.1.2. The Implications for China 
The CTBT negotiation marked the first important international negotiation for a 
multilateral disarmament treaty in which China participated from beginning to end. 
China's agreement to sign the CTBT in 1996 marked its first multilateral agreement 
to cap its own weapons capabilities under verifiable conditions. Given Chinese 
reluctance to participate In multilateral negotiations, it provided a litmus test for 
Chinese cooperation in international ACD efforts. China participated in the "ground 
work" of the institutional bargaining for a global and crucial nuclear treaty with 
commitment to observe the international norm which it embodies. 
Because China valued its nuclear arsenal as a symbol of its great power status and 
as the ultimate guarantor of its sovereignty against "nuclear blackmail and 
hegemony", China had consistently refused to take part in real disarmament 
negotiations such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) which would 
quantitatively reduce its nuclear arsenal. Therefore, for the Chinese government, the 
CTBT was "a more complicated decision" (Garrett and Glaser 1995: 53) than joining 
the NPT and "perhaps the most difficult arms control issue" (Johnston 1996: 39). The 
NPT does not infringe China's ambition for self-help security and military 
modernization, although it does restrict the ability of the Chinese to export nuclear 
weapons technology. In contrast, the CTBT would restrict China's ability to develop 
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a wider range of warhead designs. Thus, the CTBT has serious consequences for 
China, given the disparities in size and sophistication between the Chinese nuclear 
forces and those of Russia and the United States. Because China does not have 
sophisticated computers to simulate nuclear weapons, testing is critical to weapons 
modernization, as well as safety and reliability (Frieman 1996: 24). 
Necessarily, there was an undercurrent of anxiety over the implications of the 
CTBT agreement for China's security. Chinese commentaries on the CTB cautioned 
that both the United States and Russia had already conducted enough nuclear tests and 
amassed sufficient experimental data so that they could design and produce weapons 
of this generation without testing (Wu Zhan 1994: 11). One article noted that the 
United States, Russia, France and Britain had long been preparing for a total nuclear 
test ban because "mock non-nuclear explosions in laboratories" are sufficient 
substitutes for nuclear explosion tests (Wang Ling 1993: 8-9). 
7.2. China's Policy Evo/ution toward the CTST 
The Copernican tum of the open-door policy, which started in 1978, brought the 
necessity for the readjustment of Chinese foreign policy, specifically in the ACD 
field. Deng Xiaoping personall y decided that China should send a delegation to the 
UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) and China sent an observer 
delegation in 1979. In the spring of 1980, China sent a formal delegation to the CD in 
Geneva for the first time (China: AmlS Control and Disannament 1995: 4). 
Up to the mid-1980s, the Chinese government maintained that international peace 
and security would not derive benefit from a nuclear test ban without a drastic 
reduction in nuclear weapons, because the nuclear test ban and nuclear disannament 
were interrelated. China argued that the key to success in disarmament lay in the 
positions of the two superpowers and they should take the lead in nuclear 
disarmament. Thus, China criticized the nuclear test ban treaties, the PTBT of 1963 
and TTBT of 1974, reached by the US and the Soviet Union, as discriminatory and 
claimed that those treaties would only serve to consolidate the superpowers' nuclear 
superiority (Xia Yishan 1989; 1990). Consequently, China refused to participate in 
any ad hoc working groups on test bans at the CD. 
In 1985, the year of the fortieth anniversary of the founding of UN, the Chinese 
Ambassador Qian Jiadong signalled China's policy shift at the CD Plenary, that China 
would "be willing to reconsider its position" if the Nuclear Test Ban Ad Hoc 
Committee were to be established that year (CDIPV.292). At that time, China took 
part in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to detect seismic events 
relating to nuclear test ban verification measures. In March 1986, China declared that 
it "has not conducted nuclear tests in the atmosphere for many years and will no 
longer conduct atmospheric nuclear tests in the future" (Zhao Ziyang's statement at 
the Chinese People's Rally for World Peace, China: Arms Control and Disarmament 
1995: 4-5). 
After negotiations toward a CTB were placed on the international ACD agenda in 
the wake of the CIinton-Yeltsin summit in Apri I 1993, the Chinese government 
announced that it would "take an active part in the negotiating process and work 
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together with other countries to conclude this treaty no later than 1996." China, for 
the first time, showed a willingness to participate in negotiations for the CTBT. On 
September 29, Foreign Minister Qian stated, at a meeting of the UN General 
Assembly, that China supported "an early start of negotiations for a comprehensive 
nuclear test ban treaty." (Beijing Review 11-17 October 1993). Initially, China 
maintained a very low profile on test ban discussions and contributed no working 
papers, even after the mandate to negotiate a treaty was formally given to the CD in 
August 1993. When China conducted an underground nuclear test on October, 5, 
1993, the Chinese government reaffirmed in a statement that "China has always stood 
for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and a world 
wide comprehensive ban on nuclear tests." At the same time, China pledged to work 
together with other countries in trying to conclude the CTBT no later than 1996 
(Beijing Review 18-24 October 1993). As the pace of negotiations picked up in mid-
1994, China began to issue detailed working papers on the articles of the treaty, but 
these papers still left China's bottom line as an enigma. 
7.3. China's Participation in the CTST 
7.3.1. The Rules of Procedure of the Conference on Disarmament 
The Conference on Disarmament (CD), established in 1979 as the single 
multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, was a 
result of the first Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General 
Assembly held in 1978. It succeeded other Geneva-based negotiating forums, which 
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included the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1960), the Eighteen-Nation 
Committee on Disarmament (1962-68), and the Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament (1969-78). As originally constituted, the CD had 40 members. 
Subsequently its membership has been expanded to 66 countries so far. 61 The CD 
invites other UN member states that express a desire to participate in the CD's 
substantive discussions. The CD adopts the UN's Rules of Procedure, taking into 
account the recommendations of the UN General Assembly and the proposals of its 
members. It reports to the General Assembly annually (http://www.unog.ch/disarm). 
The Conference has an annual session divided into three parts of 10 weeks, 7 
weeks and 7 weeks respectively. The first part begins in the penultimate week of the 
month of January. The conference decides the actual dates of the three parts of its 
annual session at the close of the previous year's session. The work of the 
Conference is conducted in plenary meetings, as well as under any additional 
arrangements agreed by the Conference, such as informal meetings. The Conference 
may establish subsidiary bodies, such as ad hoc sub committees, working groups, 
technical groups or groups of governmental experts, open to all member states of the 
Conference. The meetings of the subsidiary bodies are informal unless the 
Conference decides otherwise. The Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban was 
established to negotiate "intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively 
verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty." Taking into account all existing 
61 The members of the CD became organized into three groupings during the Cold War: the Group of 
Western States and Others; the Group of Eastern European States and Others; and the G-21 Group of 
Non-Aligned States. The groupings are not necessarily relevant to states' real interests and alliances. 
However. appointments and consultations are still on the basis of group membership. China, with 
Sweden. is outside any of the groups. although Sweden is a member of the European Union. and so is 
close to the Western Group (Monterey Institute of International Studies 2000 Im'emory of /memariullal 
NOllproliferation Orgalli:.ariolls alld Regimes: 25-30). 
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proposals and future initiatives, the Ad Hoc Committee was requested to establish the 
necessary working groups in order to carry forward effectively the negotiating 
process. In discharging its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee decided to establish two 
Working Groups, one on Verification and one on Legal and Institutional Issues 
(CD/1436). At the beginning of each annual session, the Conference adopts its 
agenda for the year. In doing so, the Conference takes into account the 
recommendations made to it by the UN General Assembly, the proposals presented by 
the member states of the Conference and the decisions of the Conference. Any 
member state of the Conference can raise any subject relevant to the work of the 
Conference at a plenary meeting and have a full opportunity of presenting its views on 
any subject which it may consider merits attention. 
7.3.2. Treaty Text and China's Activities 
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty consists of a preamble, 17 Articles, 
two Annexes and a Protocol. The preamble outlines the significance of the treaty. It 
stresses that the CTBT serves the goals of both non-proliferation and disarmament 
and reiterates the international commitment to the "ultimate goal" of eliminating 
nuclear weapons. The 17 articles make up the main content of the treaty, such as 
Basic Obligations,62 Treaty Organization, Verification, Consultation and Clarification, 
On-Site Inspections, Confidence-Building Measures, Compliance, Settlement of 
Disputes, Amendments, Review and Entry into Force. The Protocol describes the 
62 Article I notes Basic Obligations: 1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon 
test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at 
any place under its jurisdiction or control; 2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from 
causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test 
explosion or any other nuclear explosion. 
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verification procedures and contains two annexes. One annex lists the 337 facilities 
comprising the International Monitoring System (IMS) and the other annex describes 
parameters for standard event screening by the International Data Centre (IDC). The 
treaty provides for the establishment of the CTBT Organization in Vienna, and an 
intricate verification regime, including an international monitoring system and on-site 
inspections (CTBTO The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at a Glance 2001: 
2-4). 
During the negotiating process, the key controversies were whether peaceful 
nuclear explosion (PNEs) would be permitted, the conditions for intrusive 
verification, and the terms of entry into force. To a greater extent, the CTBT 
negotiations focused on a "rolling" text of basic treaty language on main provisions. 
The rolling text contained elements of a draft text of the treaty, with alternative 
proposals and wording in square brackets. The square brackets would be deleted once 
consensus was reached. The rolling text was revised over and again as the 
negotiations went on. When the negotiations started in early 1994, the infrastructure 
of the rolling text was based largely on informal drafts submitted by the Australian 
and Swedish delegations. 
Until mid-1994, China kept a low profile in the discussion and contributed no 
official working papers in the CD, even after the mandate to negotiate a treaty was 
formally given to the body in August 1993 and CTBT negotiations were supposed to 
begin in January 1994. As the negotiations were heated, the Chinese delegation in 
mid-1994 began to table a total of 14 official working papers on the articles of the 
treaty (CO/NTBIWP. 121-8). By September 1994, the Chinese delegation had made 
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several proposals, which were added to the rolling text to be considered by its 
counter-parts at the CD (Johnson and Howard 1994: 3). The Chinese delegation made 
proposals with respect to treaty provisions in the Preamble, Verification, Entry into 
Force, Duration and Withdrawal, Scope, PNEs, Amendment, Review, Organizational 
Structure, and Security Assurances for State Parties sections, as well as their proposed 
wording. Approximately half of the brackets in the rolling text are China's. During 
the whole negotiating process lasting about two and half years, the Chinese delegation 
raised almost half of the total 1,200 treaty brackets in the CTBT rolling text. They 
reflected some major policy differences, including China's insistence on conducting 
peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) and its objection to the use of national technical 
means for triggering on-site inspections. 
According to one observer, it would seem that China may have initially entered 
the CD talks with the hope that they would fall apart. Certainly, it appeared that 
China tabled a number of mere "place-holding" proposals in the early phase of 
negotiations and did not politically commit itself to a test ban treaty or fully address 
the security and technical implications of the treaty's options on vital provisions (such 
as scope and verification) until early in 1996. In the final months, China seemed 
more engaged in the negotiations, fighting for its positions with greater openness and 
seeking to win allies and specific concessions (Johnson 1996b: 57). 
The Chinese delegation attached great importance to the verification regime of 
the treaty (Zou Yunhua 1998a: 8). Indeed, the Chinese delegation put forward its 
stances on many key issues regarding the rolling text at different stages of the 
negotiations. 
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7.3.3. Nuclear Testing behind Negotiation 
During the CTBT talks, China conducted six nuclear tests from 1993 to 1996. 
Surprisingly, those tests were conducted on dates adjacent to negotiations. The first 
test occurred on October 5, 1993 just prior to commencement of negotiations in 
Geneva, the second test on June 10, 1994, in the middle of the second session of the 
CD, and the third test on May 15, 1995, less than forty-eight hours after the end of the 
NPT Review Extension Conference. Although, at the Conference, all nuclear-
weapons states pledged to act with the "utmost restraint" in nuclear testing, China 
conducted the third nuclear test before the delegations departed for their capitals 
(Lewis 1996: 10). In fact, Beijing's official position was that China would end 
nuclear testing once a CTBT entered into force. The Chinese government announced 
in a statement that an underground nuclear test was conducted on October 5 1993. 
The statement confirmed China's position on international nuclear issues and said, 
"China fully understands the sincere desire of the non-nuclear states for an early 
conclusion of a CTBT through negotiations and believes that such a treaty has 
positive significance. The government pledged to take an active part in negotiating a 
CTBT and to work together with other countries in trying to conclude the treaty no 
later than 1996" (Beijing Review 18-24 October 1993). 
When China carried out its last two tests in 1996, it reaffirmed its support for the 
deadline and commitment to the CTBT. After the fifth test on June 8, 1996, China 
announced that it would conduct only one more test for the safety of its nuclear 
weapons and that thereafter it would impose a moratorium on nuclear testing (Beiji1lg 
RevieH' 24-30 June 1996). The last test on July 29 took place on the first day of the 
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resumption of the last negotiation session of the CTBT and China announced the 
commencement of its moratorium on nuclear testing (Renmin ribao 30 July 1996). 
China's nuclear testing during the negotiation process provoked sharp criticism 
and suspicion about its commitment, especially from the Asian states. Following 
China's atomic explosion in October 1994, neighbouring Kazakhstan expressed 
concerns about the medical, biological, and environmental impact of Chinese nuclear 
tests. Kazakhstan, sandwiched between nuclear powers Russia and China, denounced 
the blast of the nuclear test in October 1994 as undermining the NPT (China Post 12 
December 1994). The Japanese government announced its decision to freeze most 
grant aid to China for the 1995 fiscal year, based on the fact that China continued 
nuclear testing. China expressed deep regret and warned that the move "could very 
possibly be detrimental to the sound development of Sino-Japanese relations (Beijing 
Review 18-24 Sept. 1995). 
However, China rationalized the inevitability of the tests to ensure the safety and 
reliability of its nuclear weapons illustrating that it had exercised the most restraint by 
conducting the fewest tests of the five nuclear powers. When the negotiations began 
in 1994, the number of nuclear tests of the five nuclear powers were as follows. 
Table 7.1. Nuclear testing of 5 nuclear powers by 1994 
Country 
The United States 
Russia (Soviet Union) 
France 
U.K. 
China 
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1994 
Tests 
1,029 
715 
191 
45 
39 
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Zou Yunhua63 argues that China exercised the utmost restraint by conducting 
only limited nuclear tests to ensure the safety and reliability of its weapons before it 
finally ended nuclear testing, given that the CTBT "caught China in the middle of its 
nuclear weapons program" unlike the United States, Russia, and Britain, all of which 
had completed several development cycles. Zou argues that China consistently 
expressed support for the CTBT in spite of the ongoing tests which were to ensure 
that China would be ready for the CTBT. She even regards the last test, which was 
conducted hours before the resumption of the last negotiating session of the CTBT, as 
a "masterpiece of political timing" (Zou Yunhua 1998a: 4-5). Based on an interview 
with Chinese officials and arms control experts, Garrett and Glaser counter-argue the 
official argument that China's testing programme was also aimed at developing a 
smaller, more powerful warhead, although Chinese officials insisted that Beijing was 
continuing to conduct nuclear tests solely to improve nuclear warhead safety and 
reliability. According to them, some Chinese scientists and arms control experts 
acknowledged that China was seeking to modernize its nuclear warheads before a 
CTBT was finalized. They maintained that China planned its programme for 
development of a high yield-to-weight warhead to be completed before the end of 
1996. Once China had confidence in its warhead design, a halt to nuclear testing 
would not prevent development of advanced nuclear weapon systems to enhance 
survival, accuracy, targeting flexibility, and response time. In addition, warhead 
design may be further refined through computer modeling, and hydronuclear testing 
63 Zou Yunhua is a senior research fellow in the Foreign Affairs Bureau at the General Armaments 
Department of the PLA (formerly the COSTIND) and the coordinator of its Programme on Arms 
Contro\. Zou attended the CD in Geneva as a member of the Chinese delegation. serving as a 
negotiator and expert on the Chinese delegation to the CTBT negotiations. She has also represented 
China as a number of important international meetings related to non-proliferation. 
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(Garrett and Glaser 1995: 56). Gupta also argued that the China would not end 
nuclear testing until its modernization programme was complete. China's support for 
a nuclear test ban starting in 1996 indicated that the nuclear testing component of the 
upgrade would finish before 1996 (Gupta 1994: 31-4).64 
7.4. China's Standpoints and Negotiations on the CTST 
Agenda 
Under the instructions of the Chinese government, the Chinese delegation 
participated in the two-and-a-half year course of the negotiations in a joint attempt 
with other parties, to conclude the final text of treaty by August 14, 1996. About 
several issues, the Chinese delegation proposed different views from the others. 
Table 7.2. demonstrates the overall distinction that China presented at the negotiation. 
Table 7.2. China's standpoint in CTBT negotiations 
Issue China's Proposal Result Assessment 
Preamble NFU dropped Not supported 
Scope PNEs Zero-yield Not supported 
Technical means IMS IMS plus NTM compromised 
OSI decision 2/3 (34 votes) 3/5 (26 votes) compromised 
ElF IAEA list 44 nations compromi sed 
Source: CD.PV. 666-756; ACRONYM 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997. 
7.4.1. No-First Use (NFU): Suggesting a norm in the international agenda 
Delegations from some states first proposed the structural outline of a treaty for 
64 The allegation that Chinese nuclear testing during the CTBT negotiation was for sake of developing 
nuclear warheads is widely supported by most observers (Norris 1996; Goldstein 2000: 239-47). 
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the CTBT talks and later, the Chinese delegation put forward a working paper entitled 
"Basic Structure of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty" dated March 30, 1994 
(CDINTBIWP.121-8). In this paper, the Chinese listed all the key elements of a draft 
treaty beginning with the Preamble, Scope and Verification. In the Preamble, China 
listed disarmament principles and objectives while other countries considered it 
unnecessary to list them as articles of the CTBT. Because the Preamble established 
the overall political context of the treaty, the Chinese delegation stressed China's 
basic, consistent and traditional stance on nuclear disarmament. 
When a rolling text for the Preamble to the treaty was added to the NTB 
Committee's report in the September 1994 revision, China urged the adoption of a no-
first-use (NFU) policy, security assurances and a recognition of the particular 
responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon states to undertake thorough nuclear 
disarmament. For three decades, the Chinese government had consistently made 
those principles a precondition to China's involvement in arms control talks. China 
urged the other four nuclear weapon powers to follow China's lead and commit 
themselves to not being the first to use nuclear weapons against any other nuclear 
weapon state and not to use nuclear weapons, or the threat of nuclear weapons, 
against non-nuclear weapon states or a nuclear-free zone at any time or under any 
circumstances (negative security assurances, NSA). For example, even after the 
CTBT was reached, Chinese MFA minister Qian Qichen stressed China's standpoint 
at the 51 st Session of the UNGA in 1996. 
We always stand for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear 
weapons. In our view. CTBT is only the first step in the entire process of 
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comprehensive nuclear disarmament. There are still huge stockpiles of nuclear arms 
in the world. Some nuclear powers still refuse to pledge not to be the ftrst to use 
such weapons. We still have a long way to go and must continue to work strenuously 
in order to achieve the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons (Beijing 
Review 14-20 Oct. 1996). 
However, there was little support for the proposal, as one Chinese delegate 
conceded (Zou Yunhua 1998a: 9). Instead, the Chinese delegation agreed to the 
relevant reference from the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation 
and Disarmament" adopted by the NPT Review and Extension Conference 
(CDIPV.717). 
7.4.2. Scope: Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs) 
The issue of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) was proposed in the Scope of 
the treaty, the name of which was changed to "Basic Obligations." The Scope, or 
Basic Obligations, defined what the CTBT would prohibit or permit. Throughout the 
whole negotiation process, China was the only country that supported PNES.65 
China's strategy on scope was altogether different from the other nuclear weapon 
states. China opposed any threshold whatsoever, while the others wanted threshold 
tests for marginal use in ensuring stockpile safety. Making a distinction between 
nuclear explosions for military and civilian purposes, China proposed that PNEs 
should not be prohibited, but rather should be subject to rigorous authorization and 
verification procedures (Johnson 1996a: 4). 
65 Originally. there was some support from Algeria and Iran for th~s~ as .an option but both states came 
to the nHlclusion in the summer of 1994 that PNEs should be prohIbIted tn the treaty (LeWIS 1996: 11). 
In the Chinese working document entitled "CTBT Article on the Peaceful Use of 
Nuclear Energy and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions" dated August 23, 1994, the 
Chinese text defined the condition for preparing and conducting the explosions as 
"purely for scientific research or civilian applications", and underlined the 
"inalienable right" of the state to nuclear energy for nonmilitary purposes. As the 
term PNEs covered the use of nuclear devices for large excavations and incineration 
of waste, the Chinese working paper on PNEs remarked that no legally binding 
international document on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation "should 
obstruct or restrain the development and peaceful uses of science and technology, nor 
impair the legitimate right of states parties, the mass of developing countries in 
particular, to make peaceful use of nuclear energy" (CVINTBIWP.167). China 
believed that PNEs had extensive prospects for applications to purposes that would 
benefit mankind (especially for China) and did not want PNEs to be banned, for 
economic reasons (Zou Yunhua 1998a: 10). 
There were many rumours of behind-the-scenes-support from Russia and 
considerable cooperation between Chinese scientists and Russian scientists, who 
were, allegedly, providing extensive data purporting to back China's claim that the 
PNEs could be safe and economically viable for a developing country (Lewis 1996: 
12). In an interview with Sha Zukang, Chinese ambassador at the CD, confirmed the 
fact by saying that "we have been told by their (Russian) scientists that PNEs have 
been very successful and can be useful for oil extraction etc." (Welsh 1995: 18-9). 
China failed to gain support for this issue. Most states, even Pakistan, wanted the 
CTBT to ban all nuclear explosions and would not accept a treaty with any provision 
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for PNEs. The non-nuclear weapon states opposed PNEs and wanted nuclear 
explosions to be comprehensively banned, with no thresholds or exceptions. 
Apart from evironmental damage,66 the main reason for opposition to PNEs from 
most states was the possibility that they could be used as a cover for a clandestine 
nuclear weapons testing programme. Because every explosion produced a critical 
piece of information, the explosion could not be prevented from providing 
information. Moreover, China's PNEs proposal only permitted the declared nuclear 
states to conduct the PNEs, which ironically was "discriminatory" and was in China's 
political interest in relations with the developing countries and the non-nuclear 
weapon states. There was some doubt that PNEs were a ruse to carryon developing 
nuclear weapons. Others suggested that the issue of PNEs was merely a negotiating 
tactic to be used as leverage throughout the negotiations.67 When the US, the UK and 
France resolved the threshold dispute by committing to a true zero ban as the last 
session of the CD in 1995, China had not moved on PNEs. 
In fact, the Chinese delegation was apparently sincere in articulating the benefits 
of PNEs, although China has never used PNEs and has no plan to do so. China was 
merely keen to preserve the right to do so. 
"I sincerely believe that we should not completely close this option (PNEs) ... Since a 
CTBT will be indefinite in duration, and science and technology are continuing to 
66 In the past. the Soviet Union carried out more than a hundred explosions, most for large scale 
excavation and construction work. The drawback to the explosions, however, was the concern over 
long-living radioactive isotopes. 
67 Rebecca Johnson noted that "the PNEs were always intended to provide a grand smokescreen and a 
dramatic flourish of flexibility so that China could avoid giving in too far on the issues it regarded a~ 
fundamental to its national security, such as monitoring and inspections" (Johnson 1996b: 58). 
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develop, we should keep the option of PNEs open while ensuring that it is not 
misused. Misuse can be avoided by appropriate procedures of applications for PNEs 
and on-site verification" (Interview with Sha Zukang, Welsh 1995: 19). 
The possibility of PNEs was preferred by China because China would need a 
tremendous supply of energy for economic development. The main impetus for being 
seen to preserve the PNEs in the CTBT stemed from Chinese scientists who had 
argued that PNEs should not be permanently banned because PNE was potentially 
valuable (Tian Dongfeng and Hu Side 1996; Liu Huaqiu 1995). Many Chinese 
nuclear scientists were confident that PNEs would be technically feasible and 
economically cost-effective for exploiting oil reserves. For instance, in the early 
1980s, the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry requested that Chinese experts probe 
the application of PNEs to oil recovery for increasing the oil output of the Daqing oil 
field. 
In the endgame of the CD, PNEs became one of the obstacles to treaty agreement. 
Many were afraid that China had invested too much in the demand for PNEs to 
relinquish it. Canada put forward an alternative paragraph under article VIII as a 
face-saving formula. "On the basis of a request by any State Party, the Review 
Conference shall consider the possibility of permitting the conduct of underground 
nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. If the Review Conference decides by 
consensus that such nuclear explosions may be permitted" (CTB Treaty Article VIII). 
The Chinese concession, announced at the CD in a speech by Sha Zukang, abandoned 
its demand that an international treaty to ban nuclear testing should exempt PNEs and 
it accepted the "zero-yield" formula in the treaty (International Herald Tribune 7 June 
1996). The CTBT could ban nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes temporarily 
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and that issue would be discussed at a future treaty review conference. On June 1996, 
the Chinese Ambassador, Sha Zukang, stated a compromise at the CD Plenary. 
In order to facilitate the conclusion of the treaty within the time frame as planned, the 
Chinese delegation is now ready to go along with a temporary ban on PNEs 
(CDIPV.737). 
China finally conceded the "zero-yield" formula on PNEs. Nevertheless, it was 
important for China that the "nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes" was included 
as an issue that could be raised in the future (Johnson 1997: 27). 
7.4.3. The Verification Regime 
The purpose of the verification regIme was to provide, at reasonable cost, a 
system for the detection and location of a possible nuclear test. The treaty's 
verification regime, like that of other treaties was one of the most important parts of 
its credibility. The Chinese delegation recognized this and regarded the verification 
regime as the most essential part of the treaty and stated that it "touches upon the 
security interests of all states parties" (Sha Zukang, 7 June 1996 FBIS-CIll-96-111). 
The verification regime consisted of four basic elements: the International Monitoring 
System (lMS), consultation and clarification, on-site inspections (OSI), and 
confidence building measures. 
The most disputed issues of the verification regime during the three years of 
negotiation were: (1) which technologies should be incorporated into the International 
Monitoring System (lMS); (2) the role, if any, of national technical means (NTM) or 
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intelligence information; (3) the decision-making procedure and the level of intrusion 
of the OSI; (4) how much analysis and interpretation should be provided from the 
International Data Centre (IDC) to state parties; and (5) the costs surrounding the 
above issues (Johnson 1997: 39). 
International Monitoring System (IMS) and National Technical Means (NTM) 
The CTBT negotiations established the International Monitoring System (lMS) 
which comprised a network of 50 primary and 120 auxiliary seismological monitoring 
stations, 80 radionuclide stations, 16 radionuclide laboratories, 60 infrasound-acoustic 
stations, and 11 hydro-acoustic stations (CTB Treaty Annex 1). The IMS consists of 
the agreed four technologies (seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasound 
monitoring). The Chinese delegation, backed by Pakistan additionally, insisted that 
an international network of satellites and electromagnetic pulse sensor (EMP) 
technology should be included, to ensure coverage of upper atmospheric and space 
nuclear explosions. The Chinese believed that satellite monitoring was the most 
effective, timely and reliable means of detecting atmospheric and space nuclear 
explosions and that the EMP was also a useful verification technique because of its 
high sensitivity, precise location, and prompt response (Chinese statement, NTB Ad 
Hod Committee, Aug. 17, 1994 CD). Therefore, the Chinese delegation provided 
detailed technical explanations in various meetings to support its argument and 
proposed treaty language for the rolling text for these two techniques from an early 
stage of the negotiation in 1994 (CDI1364: 97-8; CDINTBIWP.217). 
One observer speculated that, in advocating a multilateral satellite monitoring 
system, "China's principal concern" was "the desire to have unrestricted access to 
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high-resolution satellite images of an intelligence quality." information already 
available the US and Russia (Johnson 1995: 45-6). In fact, for China and Pakistan, 
the satellite question was interlinked with the issues of NTM (national technical 
means). The disagreement surrounding the IMS and NTM reflected the disparity in 
the technological development of the parties. Whether the NTM should include 
intelligence gathering technology, specialist satellites, signals and communications 
interception caused controversy. The technologically-advanced states, such as the 
US, Russia and Western and Eastern European states, argued that the information 
could be of relevance for detection and, without it, it would be easy for a cheat to 
calculate the chance of detection and design its clandestine explosion accordingly. In 
contrast, China and several non-aligned states were more worried about NTM being 
available to only a few states, and used in exclusive or discriminatory ways. They 
opposed to any incorporation of NTM, favouring instead their demand for dedicated 
international satellite and EMP monitoring networks as part of the IMS. 
However, most states considered that these two technologies would be 
prohibitively expensive and burdensome for the treaty verification system. As for the 
EMP, a technological problem was raised about its high false-alarm rate. 
Furthermore, the more techniques the IMS included, the more complicated the 
negotiations would become, and the more time would be needed to establish the 
monitoring system.68 After the G-21 countries (non-aligned state group in the CD) 
68 Another source of disagreement that Chinese delegation maintained was the issue of adding a noble 
gas monitoring system to the atmospheric radionuc1ide monitoring network. The Chinese delegation 
objected that adding noble gas monitoring would be superfluous and technically not proved to be 
effective because it was not in widespread use. They also argued the noble gas monitoring would 
significantly increase the whole cost to the atmospheric monitoring network (Zou Yunhua 1998a: 15-
6). Eventually. the IMS included the noble gas monitoring in the treaty language. Chinese delegation 
showed its discomfort and displeasure and expressed the need for "adequate technical studies and 
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recognized that NTM could provide cost-effective enhancement of the deterrent and 
detection capabilities of the verification regime and most non-aligned delegations 
were more interested in restricting its potential for abuse than in banning NTM. They 
came to accept the NTM data, which could be verified or corroborated by IMS 
infonnation and used as a basis for an On-Site Inspection (OS I) request to supplement 
and reinforce the IMS data in a request or evaluation. 
In the end, the chainnan's text pennitted any relevant technical information, 
including NTM, providing it was obtained in a manner consistent with generally 
recognized principles of international law. The text also contained safeguards against 
abuse including any OSI request. Because IMS data would be provided under the 
auspices of the CTBT Organization, which meant that the weight for using NTM-
based infonnation might be lessened, many state parties, including China, regarded 
the text as more objective and accessible.69 
On-site Inspection (OSI): Sovereignty-preserving attitude 
The role of OSI is to inspect the area of a suspected event and to provide 
compelling evidence of violation. Given this function, OSI has the potential to be 
politically sensitive and intrusive in the security interest of a individual state. The 
OSI issue contained divergent views about how the provisions could be robust enough 
to deter anyone from running the risk of cheating (backed by most advanced 
mutual agreement on the relevant technologies" (Sha Zukang's statement NTB Ad Hoc Committee, 
Aug.13 CD 1996, Zou Yunhua 1998a: 16). 
69 One observer predicted that China, in the future, might come to regret its stance on NTM. According 
to him, China's own capability in this regard was growing and it might well be advantageous to China 
that they allow the inclusion of some form of data from NTM for the triggering of OSI (Lewis 1996: 
13). 
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countries) and also be prudent enough to prevent unnecessary intrusion and manage 
legitimate access (backed by China, India, Pakistan and several G-21 countries). 
Negotiating provisions exposed deep differences over national security, equal access 
to information and what constituted a timely and effective inspection regime. 
The Chinese ambassador Sha Zukang pointed out that OSI was crucial to the 
"success or failure of the talks on the treaty" and the "the most essential part of the 
treaty" (Beijing Review 16-22 Sept. 1996). The Chinese delegates took an active part 
in this issue and concentrated their energy on obtaining a more stringent decision-
making process for inspection. The Chinese delegation maintained that OSI should 
be the last resort of the verification system under extreme circumstances and the 
treaty should provide necessary procedures of consultation and clarification to avoid 
unnecessary OSI as well as to establish a stringent decision-making process for the 
Executive Council (EC) of the CTBT Organization to review and approve requests for 
an OSI and to prevent any abuse of the OSI (CDIPV.737). 
The trigger mechanism of OSI contains two key issues: one is the information 
basis for requesting OSI and the other is the decision-making procedure of the 
Executive Council (EC). The United States, Britain and France wanted to ensure the 
prompt collection of time-critical evidence and quick access to any suspect site and 
proposed that OSI be initiated with the use of information obtained through not only 
IMS but also national technical means (NTM). In contrast, China, India and several 
developing countries objected to any incorporation of NTM fearing that the NTM 
included image satellites, signals intelligence, communication intercepts and even 
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human and illegal intelligence sources. The Indian ambassador stated opposition to 
NTM on behalf of 0-21 countries that, 
The judgment by the Organization (regarding OSI) should be based on data received 
from the IMS. The three main concerns over the inclusion of NTM in the 
verification regime of the CTBT were: the disparity of technical capability between 
states; the possible use of information obtained from spying; and the potential for 
mischief-making in the triggering of OSI through NTM information (CDIPV.710; 
Lewis 1996: 13). 
China considered that "only a small number of developed countries possess NTM 
suitable for the treaty, and abuses may lead to discrimination against developing 
countries" (FBIS-CHI-96-111 7 June 1996). According to the Chinese view, the 
incorporation of NTM for treaty verification placed developing countries in an 
extremely unequal position and it would be unacceptable to them. The Chinese 
ambassador argued that it would be unacceptable to any country that one country, 
implying the US, or a number of countries should "take advantage of their exclusive 
NTM and monopolize international verification in disregard of the IMS with a self-
assumed mandate as world police" (CDIPV.717; CDIPV.733). 
Many countries agreed with the United States that NTM should be applicable to 
trigger OSI because the IMS could not be expected to be infallible, especially in 
detecting very low-yield explosions, given the financial constraints that crippled the 
capacity of the IMS to carry out verification according to the requirements of the 
treaty. The Chinese delegation conceded the applicability of NTM, if it was 
considered as having "a supplementary role to play" (CDIPV.737). 
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Another key issue of the triggering mechanism was how to organize the decision 
making procedure for OSI. The Executive Council (EC) of the treaty organization 
would be responsible for OSI decisions. Borrowing the tenns from the CWC 
negotiations, "red light" and "green light" procedures were debated. The "red light" 
procedure means that an OSI request would be carried out by the Technical 
Secretariat, who would seek to clarify an anomalous event unless the EC 
countermanded it. The "green light" procedure meant that no inspection could go 
ahead unless specifically authorized by a majority decision of the EC (Johnson 1996a: 
23). The United States advocated a simple decision-making process to ensure quick 
access, while China, India, Pakistan, Russia, Israel and a number of G-21 countries 
were more concerned about the abuse of OSI procedures. They wanted a much more 
stringent process in which no inspection could be carried out without the specific 
authorization of a two-thirds or three-quarters majority of the EC. In an attempt to 
provide a compromise solution, France suggested that an OSI request, based solely on 
NTM, should be subject to a "green light" process, whereas a request based on IMS 
should trigger OSI automatically, unless cancelled by a "red-light" decision (Johnson 
1996a: 23). 
The Chinese delegation favoured the idea that each phase should be subjected to a 
separate "green light" decision and argued that "triggering OSI through an automatic 
or simplified procedure will make OSI vulnerable to possible abuse" (CVfPV.733). 
During the intensive P-5 negotiations over a package of agreements, Britain, France 
and Russia indicated their willingness to agree with the "green light" process, which 
China was also prepared to accept. The US refused to agree to the simple majority of 
the trigger procedure. The issue was discussed in the endgame of US-China bilalteral 
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negotiations. A deal was agreed by both sides that decisions on inspection would be 
made by a majority of 30 states out of the 51-state Executive Council. 
7.4.4. Entry into Force (ElF) 
The CTBT should enter into force 180 days after the forty-four states, named in 
Annex 2 of the treaty deposit instruments of ratification, but not less than two years 
after the treaty was opened for signature. The 44 states were participating members 
of the CD and appeared in the 1995 and 1996 IAEA lists of countries with nuclear 
research or nuclear power reactors respectively. Under Article XIV, the CTBT will 
not enter into force until it has been signed and ratified by 44 states - including the 
five nuclear weapon states (P-5, the Unites States, Russia, Britain, France and China) 
and the three "threshold states" (India, Pakistan and Israel) - listed by name in Annex 
2. 
The ElF requirements were a subject of dispute in the negotiations, especially in 
the last few months. During 1994-5, little attention was paid to the provisions for the 
treaty to enter into force. Most diplomats considered this as an endgame issue 
(Johnson 1996a: 47-53). The early proposal can be categorized as a list of specific 
states, such as the IAEA identification of 68 countries, a simple number, as in the 
CWC entry-into-force provision and a list plus a waiver mechanism, such as a 
percentage of a list or a conference which could be convened to waive certain 
conditions, if the treaty had not entered into force by a certain date. The political 
challenge of the issue lay in balancing the universality and early implementation of 
the treaty. The dispute came to be over whether the three "threshold states" should 
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have to ratify the treaty before it could enter into force. China, with Russia, Britain, 
Pakistan and Egypt, made clear its requirement that all nuclear test capable states 
(assumed to be the P-5, India, Israel and Pakistan) should accede to the treaty before it 
enters into force, while the US favoured a simple number of 40 plus P-S. 
The most popular proposal was ratification by the list of sixty-eight states 
identified by the IAEA, meanwhile the United States preferred to limit the specific 
requirement to the 5 nuclear weapon states. The US feared that this would give too 
many states the power to hold the treaty hostage regarding early implementation. 
Concerning India, the Chinese delegation opposed the S declared nuclear weapon 
states requirement for ratification. They argued that it would be inappropriate to 
single out the P5 from the perspective of political equality (CDIPV.733). This issue 
indicates that the CTBT was perceived by China as an important back door route to 
bring the non-NPT states (like India) into the non-proliferation regime. At the same 
time China was acting like a representative of the developing countries during the 
negotiation process. 
China, in September 1995, dropped its requirement that all CD member states and 
all nuclear-capable states, as specified in the relevant IAEA list, ratify the treaty. 
China accepted the 44 states provision that bound the "five plus three" declared and 
undeclared nuclear weapon states. On June 20, 1996, India conveyed an 
unmistakable warning that it was preparing to exercise its veto unless the ElF 
provision was made less specific. This provision provided India with a reason for 
vetoing the CTBT. 
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7.4.5. Endgame and US-China bilateral negotiations 
On June 28, 1996, the last day of the second session, the chairman's text was 
tabled indicating that the CTBT negotiations had been concluded. The Chinese 
delegation responded to the "final text" and stated that the chairman's text did not 
reflect China's positions on some important issues, such as NTM, the basis for OSI 
and the decision-making procedure of the Executive Council on OSI (CDI 1436). For 
China's part, NTM and the decision-making procedures of OSI were politically 
sensitive and inalienable issues because they gave room for subjective abuse and the 
possibility of infringement of a state's sovereignty. Furthermore, on June 6, China 
made a number of significant compromises, dropping its proposals about PNEs and 
NFU, and including satellite and EMP monitoring for verification. In a Chinese 
delegate's view, China "showed varying degrees of compromise and flexibility on 
almost every important issue in the treaty in order to facilitate its scheduled 
conclusion" (Zou Yunhua 1998a: 22). 
At the June 28 meeting, the twenty-eight nonaligned countries In the CD, 
including India, Pakistan, Iran and Mexico, also challenged the chairman's 
declaration that negotiations were concluded that day. The Chinese delegation 
requested amendments of the chairman's text in the interest of "safeguarding its own 
legitimate security interests and other countries' concerns about relevant issues." 
Meanwhile, the United States decided to support the treaty text, as it was early July 
and it hoped to discourage any further negotiations. The United States then secured 
public declarations of support for the draft treaty from Britain, France, Russia, 
Indonesia and others (Johnson 1997: 16). 
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Before the last session resumed on July 29, there was a one-month break. The 
deadlock needed the top leadership's intervention from China and US. In the interest 
of US, it was necessary to negotiate with China over the OSI issue. In reply to US 
President Clinton, China's president Jiang Zemin raised the remaining question of 
OSI in his letter: 
I am afraid that China and the US still have some differences over the trigger basis 
and decision-making procedure of on-site inspections .. .It is my hope that the two 
sides can reach agreement on this matter prior to the resumption of the Conference on 
Disarmament on 29 July, with a viewing to avoiding the reopening of talks on the 
chairman's text during the resumed meeting and to facilitating the signing of a CTBT 
within this year (Zou Yunhua 1998a: 24). 
The US side soon discarded Jiang's suggestion and remained opposed to the 
revision of the chairman's treaty text. Instead, the US side proposed that US-China 
bilateral talks be held in Geneva before the resumption of the CD meetings in late 
July. Intensive discussion between US and China took place in the first weeks of 
August. Facing the Chinese delegation's firm stance and the pressure from the other 
nuclear weapon states, the US finally agreed to the alternative that Britain, France and 
Russia had accepted, over a package of agreements, the "green light" process, 
requiring approval by three-fifths of the EC members. In return, China agreed to 
allow information from NTM as a "truly technical, verifiable and substantial" basis 
for triggering an OSI (Johnson 1997: 16). 
Drawing on their personal experiences, several Chinese diplomats added that the 
height of US-China bilateral cooperation occurred when the United States and China 
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met during the end-procedures for on-site inspections; these consultations were 
directly between the United States and China and included no other parties. Chinese 
officials developed a compromise formula which was accepted by the US. The 
Chinese participants argued that without cooperation between the United States and 
China, the CTBT would never have been concluded (Medeiros 2000 Conference 
Report: 7). 
7.5. Making Sense of Chinese CTST Activities 
7.5.1. Filibustering: Tactical Delaying70 
During the negotiation process, many observers and some delegates were puzzled 
about China's real intentions for the CTBT talks. China's subsequent 6 nuclear tests 
made this question even more doubtful. However, one observer of the talks described 
China's negotiating behaviour as follows: 
During the first 18 month of negotiations, China played a back-seat role ... Based on 
China's negotiation posture, it would seem that Beijing may have initially entered the 
CD talks with the hope that they would fall apart. It appeared that China tabled a 
number of mere "place-holding" proposals in the early phase of negotiations and did 
not politically commit to a test ban treaty or fully address the security and technical 
implications of the treaty's options on vital provisions (like verification) until early in 
1996. In the final month, China seemed more engaged in the negotiations, fighting 
70 Observers argued that China conducted a delaying strategy to avoid or block the CTBT results. 
Instead of the term, 'delaying strategy', 'tactical delaying' will be referred in the dissertation. China's 
delaying behaviour was not strategical since that China overarchingly supported and assisted the 
establishment of the CTBT norm during the negotiation process. 
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for its positions with greater openness and seeking to WIn allies and specific 
concessions (Johnson 1996b: 57). 
China's incrementally active participation culminated in the endgame related to 
OSI agenda, as explored in the previous section. John Holum, a director of the US 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, considered the sheer number of China's 
brackets in the rolling text as "a more fundamental policy question" than the simply 
negotiable technical question. It was thought that the intention was to hold up the 
treaty until all China's nuclear tests were done (Holum 1996: 4). Rebecca Johnson 
also confirmed that China's fundamentally different approach from the majority of 
states on several key issues was making agreement very difficult (Johnson 1996a: 29-
34). According to Garrett and Glaser's interview, some Chinese experts recognized 
that some of Chinese proposals, like PNEs, for the CTBT might have the effect, "if 
not the intention," of prolonging the negotiations. They conceded that China's 
negotiators raised the PNE issue in the CTBT talks as part of a "strategy" to delay the 
signing of the CTBT. They further stated that the reason China presented the working 
paper that proposed a number of alternative verification regimes was that people 
would explore and discuss all of them and not reach an accord by 1996 (Garrett and 
Glaser 1995: 55). Without doubt, China basically adopted a "delaying tactic" to aim 
at winning time to conclude its planned series of nuclear tests. 
Johnston also confirms that "the various Chinese positions on agenda appear 
designed to delay the creation of a CTBT regime" (Johnston 1997: 304-5). He even 
argues that almost all China's proposals, such as the NFU, the PNEs and the 
velification regime were "designed to slow down the process." 
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"For instance, China has insisted that the treaty include language whereby the nuclear 
states would pledge no-first-use. None of the other nuclear states has accepted this 
proposal, though developing states support this position. China has also insisted that 
the treaty allow states to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions, which, it argues, might 
be useful for large-scale public works or resource development projects. On this 
issue, it is virtually alone ... China's position on verification has also slowed down 
negotiation. It has proposed a very expensive international satellite monitoring 
system for verifying whether nuclear explosion have occurred - a system that a 
number of states believe is unnecessary" (Johnston 1996: 56). 
However, it is too simple to see China's whole proposals and negotiating 
activities at the CD as designed only to delay the talks in order to implement its 
nuclear modernization programme. This view reduces all aspects of China's 
negotiation behaviour to one motive, a delaying tactic, based on the given perception 
of China's realpolitik. This view perceives China's participation as negative rather 
than positive and norm-conflicting rather than norm-complying. China's negotiation 
stance and manoeuvers were much more complicated than those simply able to be 
explained overall as "delaying strategy." 
Zou Yunhua declared that the "Chinese delegation had always adhered to two 
main objecti ves for the CTBT: the promotion of nuclear disarmament and the 
prevention of nuclear proliferation" (Zou Yunhua 1998a: 21). The "prevention of 
nuclear proliferation" was the prime purpose of the CTBT talks. The "promotion of 
nuclear disarmament" was also sought at the CTBT talks and proposed for inclusion 
in the Preamble of the treaty. The Chinese delegation, backed by Chinese nuclear 
scientists, tried to make efforts to preserve the utility of the PNEs. 
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China showed a nonn-complying attitude against a nuclear test ban during the 
negotiations. China also made its own agenda for the talks, trying to create a new 
nonn in multilateral ACD frameworks. The NFU, China's longstanding proposal on 
the international disannament agenda from the time of its first nuclear test, could be 
interpreted in this sense. A preference for IMS rather than NTM was a necessary 
result of China's traditional foreign policy behaviour which rejected anything which 
was seen as infringing sovereignty. In promoting its own disannament norms or 
agenda, China was working to establish the CTBT at the CD. China's proactive 
participation cannot be defined simply as a delaying strategy. It should be understood 
in the context of all China's CD behaviour in the negotiating process. 
7.5.2. Norm (CTBT)-Establishing Behaviour 
Given the definition of regimes as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, nonns, 
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in 
a given area of international relations" (Kranser 1983: 2), norms are international 
prescriptions for state action in situations of choice. Treaties epitomize the idea that 
states must, themselves, consent to nonns and cannot otherwise be obliged to observe 
them. The regimes created by some treaties can affect state behaviour and make 
states see norms in their security interest, to prevent other signatories from violating 
the nonns, for instance, conducting nuclear weapon tests, in the case of the CTBT. 
Whether a state accepts the norm can be analyzed by looking at its behaviour and, 
additionally, by examining the discourse with which it justifies its actions of 
identifying and emphasizing the nonn's importance (Finnemore 1996a: 140). 
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A norm against nuclear weapon tests has developed over the last 45 years and has 
its origin in the request of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru for a ban on nuclear 
testing. This was followed by 40 years' intermittent negotiations that produced 
agreement only on partial, non-comprehensive bans on testing until the CTBT was 
signed in 1996. This norm has arisen from the practices of states and from the beliefs 
expressed in connection with their votes for UN General Assembly resolutions and 
their decisions to join the NPT and the CTBT.71 Indeed, like other signatories, 
China's final signature to the CTBT text, itself, indicates that China had maintained 
norm-complying or norm-establishing behaviour throughout the negotiations.72 
Chinese leaders set for themselves the expected deadline for concluding the treaty -
"cut-off date" - of "no later than 1996." From the outset of the CTBT negotiations, 
top Chinese leaders and officials consistently maintained their desire to conclude a 
treaty by the end of 1996, which suggests that a political decision to sign the treaty in 
principle had been made by 1993 or earlier. In the early 1990s, Chinese leaders posed 
several preconditions for successful completion of a CTBT. One was that the other 
nuclear powers adopt a policy of "no-first-use" with respect to nuclear weapons. 
Another precondition was further reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic forces, 
presumably to levels below those stipulated in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 
(ST ART) agreements, although the Chinese generally declined to give specific targets 
(Zhu Mingquan 1997: 40-8). 
71 George Bunn demonstrated that "a strong international norm against nuclear weapon testing exists" 
even though the CTBT has not yet entered into force and India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 
1998. He argued that the strong existence of this norm is reflected not just in treaty texts. but also in 
widely supported UN resolutions and international condemnations against the 1998 tests by India and 
Pakistan (Bunn 1999: 20-3~). 
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In practice, however, the Chinese have proceeded with negotiations despite the 
fact that their preconditions have not been met. Before the CTBT talks actually 
started on January 25, 1994, China's commitment to establish the CTBT norm was 
clear. Its participation in the negotiation process, its wish to join the treaty, its support 
of an expected deadline for the treaty's conclusion and its decision to abide by the 
treaty, once it "came into effect," are all on record (Chapter 7.2.). Frieman describes 
this situation as "a no-win situation for the Chinese leadership," which means that 
China was reluctant to accept the CTBT negotiation and could not credibly maintain 
even a rhetorical commitment to disannament without supporting the goals and the 
process of a CTBT (Frieman 1996: 24). The Chinese leadership overruled the 
military's (mainly Second Artillery and COSTIND) recommendation for continued 
testing and accepted a countervailing recommendation from the MFA. China 
announced a nuclear test moratorium in June 8, 1996. 
The compromises that China made in the plenary sessions in 1996 were important 
ones. Unlike India, the Chinese delegation made compromises on controversies, such 
issues as ElF, NTM and OSI, as explored in the previous section. In the endgame, 
China also assisted the US and other nations in circumventing India's opposition. 
72 A speech by US President Clinton pointed out that the signatures would "create an international 
norm against testing. even before the treaty formally enters into force" (President Clinton. Address to 
the UN General Assemhly, September ~-l. 1996 http://www.clw.orgicoalition). 
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7.5.3. Norm (NFU)-Creating Behaviour 
In the early discussions of the CD, the Chinese delegation insisted that NFU and 
NSA should be included in the Preamble of the treaty text, which demonstrated the 
principle and objective of the CTBT. 
Chinese negotiators argued that since the CTBT treaty was a major step toward 
completely eliminating nuclear weapons, the preamble of the treaty therefore should 
include NFU and reflect the universal aspirations of the international community by 
pointing out that more efforts were needed to achieve the goal of eliminating all 
nuclear weapons after concluding the CTBT treaty (UN Disarmament Yearbook 
1995: 38). 
Most of the countries, including the United States, regarded the NFU, as being 
beyond the scope of the CTBT, while the NFU might be favoured by non-nuclear 
states. It is tactically true that the NFU and NSA could be utilized by the Chinese 
delegation to delay the talks. However, this explanation cannot cover the Chinese 
insistence on the NFU as a norm-value in the international disarmament agenda. For 
three decades, China has urged the other four nuclear-weapon powers to follow its 
lead and commit themselves to not being the first to use nuclear weapons against any 
other nuclear weapon state; and not to use nuclear weapons, or the threat of nuclear 
weapons, against any non-nuclear country or nuclear-free zone at any time or under 
any circumstances (Negative Security Assurance NSA). Chinese leaders consistently 
argued this position at UN disarmament meetings including UNGA. Chinese arms 
control experts firmly held the view that halting nuclear testing would have less 
significance than other measures aimed at curbing the spread and preventing the use 
of nuclear weapons. Chinese analysts and officials maintain, for example, that 
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although a CTBT will contribute to international security, it will playa less significant 
role than a five-power pledge of no-first-use (NFU) and negative security assurances 
(NSA), or the extension of the NPT. Most Chinese arms controllers would agree with 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen' s 1993 statement that 
granted that a nuclear test ban is necessary, to undertake not to use nuclear weapons 
at all is far more crucial, because this will not only make their testing, development, 
production or deployment devoid of any meaning, but will give a great impetus to 
nuclear disarmament, which will contribute tremendously to world peace and 
security (Beijing Review October 11-17, 1993). 
They sincerely believe that the benefits of an NFU treaty would include reduced 
risk of war, enhanced security of the five nuclear-weapon states, greater mutual trust, 
reduced likelihood of nuclear proliferation, and advancement toward the goal of 
complete nuclear disarmament (Chapter 4). Because the Chinese also VIew a 
country's willingness or unwillingness to make an NFU pledge as a key indicator of 
its political and strategic intentions, they would feel more secure with NFU pledges 
from the other nuclear powers. Given that the fact of adopting NFU would require the 
nuclear weapon states to abandon extended nuclear deterrence, China tried to gain 
bilateral NFU pledges. China has consistently sought for a US pledge for NFU after 
being threatened in the past.73 China suggested NFU when John Holum, the director 
of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, visited China on October 7 1996, 
just after the CTBT talks concluded. It was reported that the proposal was turned 
down and China and the US only agreed to the non-targeting of strategic nuclear 
73 During and after the Korean War, the United States deployed nuclear-armed B-29 bombers to Guam 
for possible use against targets in China. The United States also deployed nuclear-capable weapons 
systems, presumably with nuclear warheads, on Taiwan in the 1950s (Lewis and Xue 1988: 11-34). 
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weapons against each other (Beijing Review Oct. 28-Nov. 3 1996). Meanwhile, China 
and Russia pledged not to use nuclear weapons against each other and not to aim 
nuclear weapons at each other in a joint communique on September 3, 1994, during 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit to Moscow (Renmin ribao 5 Sept. 1994). 
China's NFU card in the international disarmament agenda was also intended to 
achieve political objectives, as the Chinese acknowledged. One Chinese ACD expert 
noted that "China's role in leading the Third World has been less prominent recently" 
and asserted that by actively suggesting NFU and NSA for non-nuclear states China 
could "demonstrate a leadership role" (Garrett and Glaser 1995: 66-67). By 
suggesting NFU on behalf of the interests of the developing states, China strategically 
tried to draw their support and spread the NFU idea and construct it as a new nonn. 
However, many western analysts dismiss NFU pledges as political statements with 
little security significance and credibility in a crisis. In the CTBT talks, the contents 
of NFU were thought to be beyond the CTBT agenda and thus inappropriate, by many 
delegations. The NFU was therefore dismissed when the final version of the treaty 
draft was reached. The Chinese ambassador, Sha Zukang complained that the treaty 
Preamble "did not reflect that more efforts are needed to achieve the goal of 
eliminating all nuclear weapons after concluding the CTBT treaty" (Zhou Xin 1996: 
7). 
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7.5.4. State Identity in Transition: Some Contradictions at the CTBT 
Negotiations 
Constructivists counter that structural realism mIsses what is often a more 
detenninant factor, namely, the intersubjective ideas, which shape a state's behaviour 
by constituting the identities and interests of actors (Copeland 2000: 187). Alexander 
Wendt seeks to challenge the core neorealist premise that anarchy forces states into 
recurrent security competitions. According to Wendt, whether a system is conflictual 
or peaceful is a function not of anarchy or power but of the shared culture created 
through cultural instantiations. Anarchy has no pennanent determinant "logic," only 
different cultural instantiations. Because each actor's conception of self (its interests 
and identity) is a product of the others' diplomatic gestures, states can reshape 
structure by process; through new gestures, they can reconstitute interests and 
identities toward more other-regarding and peaceful means and ends (Wendt 1992a; 
1994). 
Chinese foreign policy has always recognized itself as a supporter or guardian of 
the developing Third World states. Annstrong termed this character as "revolutionary 
diplomacy" and argued that the self-identification with the developing countries was 
the legacy of Mao's revolutionary experiences (Armstrong 1977; 1993: 176-84). 
Deng Xiaoping stressed in his article that, 
the reason I lay special emphasis on the Third World is that opposition to 
hegemonism and safeguarding world peace are of special significance to the Third 
World. Who are the victims of hegemonism? .. Although the Third World is poor, its 
international political influence has increased considerably (Deng Xiaoping Selected 
Works of Deng Xi{loping II 1994: 415-7) 
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He summed up the directions that Chinese foreign policy should sustain in world 
politics in three phases: opposing hegemonism; safeguarding world peace; and 
strengthening unity and cooperation with the Third World. As for Chinese foreign 
policy, the above three points have been the basic political line in dealing with foreign 
affairs since Deng Xiaoping took office. During the CTBT negotiation process, the 
Chinese delegation always tried to gain the support of the developing countries. Over 
the issues of NTM and as I, anxiety about an arbitrary inspection by the US-
supported trigger mechanism that might infringe Chinese sovereignty, the Chinese 
delegation preferred IMS to be incorporated in On-Site Inspection and opposed NTM. 
In the decision-making procedures, China also opposed the "red light procedure." In 
search for any possible technical benefit, China proposed that the international 
network of satellites and electromagnetic pulse sensor (EMP) technology should be 
included in IMS. The logic of the Chinese insistence upon preserving the right for 
PNEs was for the sake of the "developing countries." All these Chinese bargaining 
positions stemmed from the self-imposed recognition that China should be in line 
with the developing countries. 
However, there was another conspicuous feature of Chinese behaviour at the CD. 
China acted with double standards in terms of the self-identity of the state. Many 
observers agreed that one of main factors that engaged China in the CTBT 
negotiations was China's hope to be regarded as a responsible major power. 
Especially, the position of the MFA was in line with this argument. The MFA argued 
that China's international stature and image as a responsible great power were at stake 
and that China's political and diplomatic manoeuverability and progress required a 
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constructive position in the CTBT. In addition, it was argued that China would gain 
certain concrete benefits from signing the treaty: specifically, that supporting the 
CTBT, would be beneficial to China's great power image. This shift of self-identity 
indicated that China was no longer one of the developing countries and desired to be 
respected as a major power in global politics. Zhao Suisheng observed the change in 
Chinese foreign policy in the early 1990s, creating a regional power base diplomacy, 
harmony with the West and growth of UN activities. He pointed out that, 
the fact that Beijing has adjusted its policy priority to the Asia-Pacific region and has 
taken cooperative actions in international activities may be interpreted as China's 
understanding of the need for a regional base and to be an independent but 
responsible partner in a multipolar world (Zhao Suisheng 1992: 81-2). 
Promoting this image, China unintentionally disclosed a self identity discrepancy 
between that of a responsible power and that of a guardian of the developing countries 
at the CTBT talks. The case of the PNEs where China failed to gain support was an 
example. Over the issues, the Chinese delegation suggested that only the declared 
nuclear weapon states should be permitted to conduct PNEs. From the beginning to 
the end of the CTBT talks, PNEs were the only issue that isolated China from all 
other countries. China was not able to win support here even from its closest ally, 
Pakistan, which supported all other proposals tabled by China at the talks. The United 
States and Russia had already abandoned the PNEs, and NPT parties unanimously 
shared the view that the potential benefits of PNEs were questionable. It was 
technically impossible to detect the difference between explosions for peaceful or 
military uses, and, moreover, the inclusion of PNEs in the treaty would greatly 
complicate the verification regime. Therefore, many observers considered PNEs as a 
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"bargaining ploy or blocking decoy" (Johnson 1995). In contrast, Chinese scientists 
strongly believed that PNEs might be proven useful at some time in the future, even 
though China had never used PNEs, nor did China have any plan to do so in the 
foreseeable future. The Chinese science establishment associated with the defence 
industry pushed the argument during the decision-making process of the CTBT 
(Garrett and Glaser 1995: 60-2). 
PNEs were clearly "inherently discriminatory," which ran counter to Deng 
Xiaoping's basic foreign policy line and damaged the image of China's relations with 
the non-nuclear developing countries. It made China's moral argument illegitimate 
and undennined the image which China wished to promote, that China cannot allow a 
politically discriminatory treaty because China speaks for the developing countries. 
Facing the indifferent response from the developing countries, China insisted that 
PNEs should be included as one way to help developing countries in peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy. But this was called "unwanted help" and dismissed by many 
developing countries as "not warranted under the new circumstances" (UN 
Disannament Yearbook 1995: 16).74 
In a way, PNEs might be judged "a policy failure" due to the poor policy-
coordinating mechanism to "generate more inconsistent and controversial policy and 
behaviour" (Jia Hao 1999a: 248-54). In a broader sense, China took a political cost in 
order to attempt to gain potential technological and economic advantages as a nuclear 
7.t Meanwhile, it also concomitantly brought China's other proposals like NTM into question. China's 
criticism against NTM on account of technical disparity between the developing countries and the 
advanced countries looked groundless. That disparity inherent in NTM was a critical argument Dr the 
Chinese delegation. At this time, China self-recognized itself as a developing country. 
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weapon state. PNEs in the CTBT talks reflected China's split identity as a state which 
took part in and expressed the voice of its own interests in the negotiation process of 
the international institutions. Although only a middle-level power, aspiring to be a 
major power, China began to behave as a major power in international bargaining, 
which would create more tensions and contradictions in Deng Xiaoping's basic line 
and China's traditional challenge against hegemonic powers. 
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CHAPTER 8. Post CTBT Dynamics 
They (all countries) should seek the point where their common 
interests converge, expand mutually beneficial cooperation and work 
together to take up the challenge facing mankind for survival and 
development ... We should take an active part in multilateral 
dimplomatic activities and give full play to China's role in the United 
Nations and other international organizations (Jiang Zemin' s report 
delivered at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China on September 12, 1997). 
The dynamic impact on China of the CTBT will now be examined as the 
framework of this thesis has been proposed in chapter 3. The pre-CTBT period and 
two and half years of the negotiation process have had a great impact on China, in a 
constructive way. The "dynamic interaction" penetrated the state as it was (state tl) 
and created the state as it is (state t2). The developments in the post-CTBT period 
suggest that China's increasing participation in international ACD institutions and 
regimes constitutively reconstruct the state itself, although it is not now clear whether 
these developments are the direct result of the CTBT experience. They might have 
beeen brought about by the overall interaction with international ACD institutions and 
regimes during the 1990s. 
First of all, Chinese evaluation of the CTBT and the Chinese attitude toward the 
test ban norm is a direct indicator of how China has complied with the treaty nonn 
and whether China's accession to the treaty has entailed cognitive learning in the 
post-CTBT period. Then the indirect and resultant developments in China's ACD 
policy will be traced and identified at both perspective and domestic institutional 
level. In addition, the CTBT dynamism encouraged and accelerated Chinese 
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engagement in international ACD frameworks. The processes and consequences of 
the dynamism will also be discussed. 
8. 1. China '5 Evaluation of the Final CTST 
It is important to examine China's own evaluation of its achievements and 
dissatisfactions regarding the CTBT results because of its impact on China's attitude 
towards compliance in the post-CTBT period and because it also indicates what China 
learned throughout the whole negotiating process. In Chinese rhetoric, China's main 
political argument, that of creating norms and spreading policies like the NFU was 
maintained and pronounced repeatedly. 
After the CTBT was concluded in Geneva, Sha Zukang, the Chinese disarmament 
ambassador, showed China's basic attitude toward the results of the treaty. He 
pointed out that the CTBT text "represents the results" of the CD negotiations over 
the preceding two and a half years; it "basically embodies" the actual conditions of 
the negotiations and "is balanced as a whole." He also stressed that the treaty was not 
entirely satisfactory, because it did not reflect the legitimate demands and rational 
proposals of many developing countries, including China (CD/1436). The OSI and 
the NTM were the main problem issues, as examined in chapter 7. Although the 
Chinese delegation expressed its discontent with the treaty, most Chinese ACD 
experts evaluated China's participation positively. They regarded the CTBT as the 
first multilateral nuclear arms control treaty negotiation that China conducted and 
participated in. During the talks, China was seen to demonstrate its genuine interest 
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and willingness to put forward constructive propositions and to show the necessary 
flexibility and compromising spirit. They thought that China had finally gained a 
good reputation and enhanced its negotiating stature (Wang Ling 1997; Zou Yunhua 
1998a). 
Most Chinese ACD experts accepted that the CTBT was indispensable and 
universal, in that the developing countries had been longing for its achievement for 
the long time. They regarded the importance of the CTBT as the embodiment of 
prevention of qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons (Zou Yunhua 1994; Liu 
Huaqiu 1995; Wang Ling 1996; Wu Zhan 1998a). However, there were some 
Chinese criticisms of the CTBT, especially from the military side. One author in a 
military-associated journal, criticized the NTM and argued that China could not 
dismiss the interference of the hegemonic powers in other countries' domestic affairs. 
He also pointed out that the United States and the other nuclear powers rejected the 
NFU and maintained a nuclear deterrence strategy. In this sense, he understood that 
the US tried to utilize the CTBT to strengthen its nuclear supremacy and undennine 
the positive implications of the CTBT (Xia Zhiqian 1997: 44-5). Other Chinese 
observers deprecated the implications of the CTBT, warning that the US retained the 
capability of computerised nuclear testing, new infonnation technology and NMD. 
He argued that "we (the Chinese) need counter-measures and the speeding-up of 
military modernization," because the western military superpowers "are seeking for 
new nuclear testing methods, which can introduce a new and more sophisticated 
nuclear anns race" (Sun Xuegui 1997: 25). The Chinese realpolitik view considered 
the CTBT to be the instrument of consolidation of the US nuclear superiority "by 
restricting other nuclear states." Although the CTBT was a major attempt to 
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strengthen the international nonproliferation regime and to prevent both the vertical 
and the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, "the so-called "cooperation" is 
cooperation with the US at the centre and the so-called "arms control" is arms control 
with the maintenance of US military superiority as the prerequisite" (Wang Zhenxi 
and Zhao Xiozhuo 1998: 31-40). 
The official standpoint about the results of the CTBT was voiced in the statement 
of the MFA minister, Qian Qichen, at the 51st Session of UNGA. He assessed 
China's active participation in the CD positively and argued that China "displayed 
maximum flexibility" in order to facilitate the final conclusion of the treaty. From the 
Chinese point of view, he indicated a further way to head for arms control and 
disannament in the post-CTBT era. 
We still have a long way to go and must continue to work strenuously in order to 
achieve the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons ... All nuclear states 
should assume the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or 
under any circumstances; they should unconditionally renounce the use of the threat 
of use of such weapons against non-nuclear states or nuclear-free zones; and should 
conclude international instruments to this effect without delay (Beijing Review, 14-20 
Oct. 1996). 
Qian, in his statement, reiterated China's traditional position on nuclear 
disannament. He suggested that other nuclear powers (especially the United States) 
"renounce their policy of nuclear deterrence". Henceforth their nuclear arsenals and 
stockpiles should be continuously cut back, even though by how much was not 
mentioned. Then he reiterated the NFU argument that China had proposed in the 
Preamble of the rolling text of the CTB treaty at an early stage of negotiation. 
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B.2. China's Post-CTBT Commitment 
While the negotiations were completed in the requisite time, as mandated by the 
1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT actual , 
implementation of the treaty is unlikely in the short term and uncertain in the long 
term. The standard of commitment should be actual implementation, if not effective 
implementation. In this sense, tracking down the Chinese commitment to the CTBT 
is a necessary litmus test for judging Chinese ACD behaviour and for identifying to 
what extent China has complied with the norm of the CTBT regime. Their 
commitment can also suggest the dynamic interaction that the state (China) has 
demonstrated in the post-CTBT period. 
Even though the goals of the CTBT would contribute significantly to efforts to 
create a new global security order, based on arrangements that are universal in scope 
and employ extensive verification measures, these goals will be unattainable if the 
international community cannot bring the CTBT into force and implement it 
effectively. For the CTBT to enter into force, the group of 44 states identified by 
Article XIV must first ratify the treaty.75 
75 Annex 2 of the CTBT identifies a group of 44 states. The list of countries was defined as those 
countries that formally participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference on Disarmament 
and are identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency as possessing nuclear power reactors or 
research reactors. 
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Table 8.1. CTBT Ratification Status 
Number Signed Number Ratified 
Required States 41 31 
(44 states) 
World Total 161 84 
(192 states) 
Source: Arms ControL AssoclatlOn Fact Sheet 18 October 2001 
China has not ratified the CTBT like other countries, such as the United States, 
Russia, India, Pakistan and Israel. China affirmed its CTBT position in a joint 
statement at the October 1997 China-US summit. "The United States and China agree 
to work to bring the CTBT into force at the earliest possible date" (Beijing Review 10-
16 November 1997). China has reaffirmed its willingness to ratify several times. For 
example, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Chinese President, Jiang 
Zemin, indicated that the Chinese government "will soon officially submit the treaty 
to the National People's Congress for ratification" (Jiang Zemin's address at the 
Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, March 26 1999 http://www.clw.org/coalition 
/jiang99.htm). It is believed by many observers that China will not move to deposit 
its instrument of ratification until the United States does so (Bunn 1999; Parachini and 
Birmingham 1999). 
Despite China's delay in ratification, China has implemented its two 
commitments to the CTBT since it signed in 1996, first its active participation in 
preparation for the entry of the CTBT into force and second, its position on a nuclear 
test ban norm, although India and Pakistan conducted nuclear weapon tests in 1998 
and the US Senate rejected the CTBT for ratification in 1999. 
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China actively participated in the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT and 
made joint efforts with other signatories to facilitate the process of the entry into force 
of the treaty.76 For instance, in order to cooperate with the IMS network, China 
provided its 12 IMS-related stations, including seismic, radio-nuclide, and infrasound 
stations. Upon entry into force, state parties to the agreement will be able to make use 
of the various compliance measures provided for by the treaty. Under the tenns of the 
treaty, a global verification regime to monitor compliance must be operational at the 
time that the treaty enters into force (CTBTO 2001: 5). Under the CTBT China is 
also setting up a National Data Centre as part of the treaty's global international 
monitoring system. 
China has sustained the nuclear test moratorium since 1996. China has also made 
a commitment to the ban on nuclear weapon testing even when the nonn was 
undermined by the May 1998 nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan. The South 
Asian nuclear tests raised questions concerning the sustainability of the NPT and the 
possibility of obstructing ratification of the CTBT in the US congress and START II 
in the Russian Duma. These tests threaten the institutions, nonns and political 
cooperation supporting nuclear ACD and nonproliferation, worldwide. Since a 
signature to the CTBT created an international nonn against testing, even before the 
treaty fonnally enters into force, China did not follow the South Asian nuclear tests 
and preserved its moratorium on nuclear tests. This reinforced China's nonn-
76 The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO 
Preparatory Commission) was established on 19 November 1996 by a Resolution adopted by the 
Meeting of States Signatories at the UN. The PreCom had a strong technical focus to prepare the 
establishment of the global veritication regime. It consisted of two organs: a plenary body composed 
of all the state signatories and the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) (CTBTO 200 1). 
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complying commitment.77 Although the South Asian nuclear tests may seem to have 
derailed the cause of the CTBT and the nuclear nonproliferation regime, concerted 
action, informed by the appreciation of the new circumstances, offers reasonable hope 
of placing nonproliferation efforts on a course consistent with the prerequisites of 
global peace and security in the twenty-first century. 
In a major setback to the test ban norm and US credibility, the US Senate 
decisively rejected the CTBT in October, 1999, by a vote of 51-48. President Clinton 
pledged that he would keep fighting for the CTBT and that the US would continue its 
moratorium on nuclear testing. Despite his assurances, the result of the vote sent 
shock waves throughout the world, drawing strong condemnation from Russia and 
China as well as Europe and Asia (Cemiello 1999). Nonetheless, China supported the 
CTBT and its test ban norm. Sha Zukang, director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Department of the MFA, stated, in his interview with Xinhua New 
Service, that China had not changed its position on the test ban (Arms Control 
Association Factsheets December 1999). 
77 There was some Chinese discourse on the consequences of May 1998 nuclear tests by India and 
Pakistan. Chinese observers were worried over the possible disrupting impact on regional security and 
the international nuclear nonproliferation mechanism, of the tests (Yang Haisheng 1998). Some argued 
that, despite the undermining effect. "the prospect for the CTBT's effectiveness is not at risk" (Wu 
Zhan 1998b: 27) and China should "keep the treaty and nuclear nonproliferation policy and encourage 
international ratification for the early effectiveness of the treaty" (Jia Hao 1999b: 18-21). 
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B.3. The CTBT's Impact on the Construction of China's ACD 
8.3.1. The CTBT's Impact on China's Security Perspective: the "New Security 
Concept" 
It is quite difficult to recognize the impact on the Chinese perspective which 
Chinese participation in the CTBT might bring in. It is difficult to measure the 
specific and concrete consequences of CTBT participation in the Chinese 
epistemological prism on ACD issues. Instead, broadly, as has been argued in 
Chapter 4, growing Chinese participation in the international ACD agenda brought 
about the evolutionary development of various Chinese views, some of which (in the 
late 1990s) went far beyond the traditional Chinese realpolitik and internalized the 
liberalist or constructivist views in IR theory. It has also been argued that there has 
also developed an increasing appreciation of the mutual security perspecti ve. In the 
post-CTBT period, the most conspicuous shift of Chinese perspective has been in the 
nascent Chinese perspective on mutual security that was fonnulated and officially 
pronounced in the name of the "xin anquan gainian" (new security concept). The 
"new security concept (NSC)" represents the Chinese government's official 
articulation of its vision for a future post-Cold War security environment. This 
concept is still being debated among Chinese analysts in various journals. It raises 
very complicated questions not only for Chinese security analysts but also for external 
observers. 
The new Chinese security vision, the "new security concept" (NSC), was first put 
forward by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 
1997. Qian Qichen proposed that security should rely on mutual trust and linked 
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common interest rather than military build-up and military alliance (Renmin ribao 28 
July 1997). Since then, the NSC repeatedly surfaced in Chinese discourse until it was 
fonnulated in a white paper, China's National Defence issued in July 1998. When 
Jiang Zemin and Yeltsin issued a joint statement in Moscow in April 1997. the 
statement was hailed by China as a new mode of security differing from the Cold War 
mentality. In the statement, China and Russia declared that they will "strive to 
promote the multipolarization of the world and establishment of a new international 
order." "Both sides stand for the establishment of a new and universally applicable 
security concept" (Beijing Review 5-11 May 1997). Following the publication of 
Yan Xuetong's article in Contemporary International Relations (Xiandai guoji 
guanxi) in the civilian sector, the PLA published a long editorial entitled, "The World 
Needs a New Security Concept" (liefangjun bao 24 December 1997). The authors 
argued that the tenet of the security concept in the Cold War era "based one's security 
on the other's insecurity," and that the necessity for NSC has been embodied in three 
new modes of security, international peace, a security dialogue and a security treaty, 
in the post-Cold War era (Li Qinggong and Wei Wei 1997). 
The White Paper on Chinese National Defence in 1998, released by the 
Infonnation Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China in July 
1998, reaffinned China's support for this new mode of security thinking that sought to 
enhance mutual security without targeting any third country (China's National 
Defence 1998). In the White Paper, on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, the new security concept was articulated in the following paragraph. 
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All countries should promote mutual understanding and trust through dialogue and 
cooperation, and seek the settlement of divergences and disputes among nations 
through peaceful means. These are the realistic ways to guarantee peace and 
security. Security is mutual, and security dialogues and cooperation should be 
aimed at promoting trust, not at creating confrontations, still less at directing the 
spearhead against a third country or infringing upon the security interests of any 
other nation (China's National Defence 1998: 6-7). 
Viewed from the perspective of military doctrine and security concepts, the 
White Paper integrated several ideas that were mentioned in the regional discussion. 
These ideas included "comprehensive security," "mutual security," "equal security," 
"cooperative security," and "common security.,,78 The 1998 document was also 
devoted to China's participation in regional and global Confidence Building Measures 
(CBMs). The document stated that China placed great stress on and actively 
promoted security dialogue and cooperation at different levels, through various 
channels and in different forms. China's recent agreement with neighbouring 
countries on CBMs and the reduction of military forces in border areas were used to 
illustrate the "new security concept." 
In fact, there was marked progress in China's acceptance of CBMs during the late 
1990s. China also embarked on a very ambitious use of protocol visits as CBMs to 
further its foreign policy objectives, including high level diplomatic visits and military 
exchanges at all levels.79 For instance, Chi Haotian, the vice-chairman of the CMC 
78 These are discussed in a thoughtful Chinese article (Chu Shu\ong 1997) 
79 One of the primary goals of China's military exchange programme is to gain access to foreign 
defence equipment and technology, particularly with the United States, Russia, France and Italy. 
However, this Chinese activities illustrates that China began to accept the CBMs or military 
transparency and utilize them in order to enhance China's position. The White Paper. China's Defence 
ill 2000. demonstrates the significantly increasing military exchange in 1999 to 2000 (Information 
Office 2000 China's Defence in 2000: 77-86). 
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and Defence Minister, visited Japan and called for the "new security concept" to seek 
a "lasting peace." Outlining the NSC at Japan's National Institute for Defence Policy, 
he stressed that China and Japan should enhance trust through dialogues and seek 
security by cooperation (Beijing Review 2-8 March 1998). China came to see clear 
advantages for CBMs, such as agreements with Russia and Central Asia on border 
demarcations and subsequent troops reductions, which, in turn, provided a stable 
external environment in order to facilitate remarkable economic progress. 80 
The Justification of the "New Security Concept" (NSC) 
From a strategic point of view, as some observers argued, the NSC was 
formulated in direct response to the revised US-Japan alliance and the expansion of 
NATO, the efforts made by the United States to strengthen its alliances and security 
ties worldwide (Shambaugh 1999a; Finkelstein 1999). According to these observers, 
the NSC was proposed by the Chinese government with the purpose of countering the 
dominant presence of US military forces and its enhancement of its military alliances, 
which culminated in the promulgation of the US-Japan Revised Guidelines for 
Defence Cooperation, in 1997. The NSC was a response to the Chinese assessment 
that, in the long term, the US will maintain or increase its lead in developing and 
fielding military forces and the advanced technology weaponry needed to underwrite 
and sustain the US position as the sole superpower for the foreseeable future. Chinese 
arguments about "common security" that denounce the military alliance as the legacy 
of the Cold War mentality evince such a strategic view. Moreover, the military's 
involvement made this argument more persuasive. The top PLA leadership actively 
80 For the Chinese views on the CBMs and China's commitment to the CBMs, see Liu Huaqiu and 
Zheng Hua (1997) and Xia Liping (1997). 
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promoted the NSC in the course of its foreign military diplomacy. This role has been 
taken up most visibly by Minister of Defence Chi Haotian and he regularly 
expounded the idea to visiting foreign guests in Beijing. 
Certainly, China's "manifesto" of the NSC was motivated by strategic thinking 
that helped to counter the US unipolarity, which was being consolidated by NATO 
expansion and the lately revised U.S. security treaty with Japan. Nonetheless, as an 
analyst observed, "China's change of mind, however, reflecting tactical rather than 
cognitive learning, is quite remarkable," given Beijing's long-standing opposition to 
the idea of security multilateralism (Deng Yong 1999: 57). The "new security 
concept" is not a simple rhetoric or tactical gesture to alleviate the other countries' 
concern that culminated in 1990s with the "China threat debates." It is a sort of 
blueprint or grand strategy to re-construct China's security environment for "peace 
and development." It can even be argued that the strategic thinking contained 
cognitive learning about mutual security. China began to accept mutual security and 
utilize mechanisms, such as CBMs, military transparency and military exchange. 
Through two decades of integration into the international system and its increasing 
engagement in international ACD frameworks, China came to recognize the utility of 
common security. Now China made efforts to realize the new idea by applying it to 
the regional and global security milieu in order to re-establish its bilateral 
relationships and to undermine the entrenched security system of the US military bloc 
and its influence. In the late 1990s China's establishment of partnerships with other 
countries illustrates its constructive strategy to weave its own relationship net (see 
table 8.2.). Although the partnerships have not actually formed a security partnership, 
they indicate China's intention or readiness to do so. 
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Table 8.2. China's Construction of Partnerships in the late 1990s 
Partner Bilateral Relationship Year 
Russia Cooperative Strategic Partnership 1996 (April) 
France Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership 1997 (May) 
U.S. Constructive Strategic Partnership 1997 (October) 
ASEAN Good-neighbourly Partnership of Mutual Trust 1997 (December) 
EU Long-term and Stable Constructive Partnership 1998 (April) 
Great Britain Enhanced Comprehensive Partnership 1998 (October) 
Japan Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for 1998 (November) 
Peace and Development 
South Korea Cooperati ve Partnership for the 21 st Century 1998 (November) 
Source: Fmkelstem 1999. 
Chinese discourse on the NSC discloses its epistemological and theoretical 
background. The arguments indicate the theoretical and strategic intentions of the 
NSC. Since 1997 there have been numerous articles dealing with the new security 
concept, theoretically and practically. Most of them have imported the achievements 
of western security studies, such as Jervis's "security dilemma," zero-sum game and 
mutual security. They have re-interpreted the most advanced security concept, the so 
called "comprehensive security", in the context of China's security environment and 
multilateralism in the post-Cold War era.81 Table 8.3. outlines the arguments. 
Three points need to be made. First, Chinese analysts sought objectivity, the 
material foundation for the NSC in the new international development after the Cold 
War. According to them, the NSC emerged in keeping with the trend of development 
of the world situation and it was inevitable that the development of the trend of 
multi polarization and the democratization of international relations would gradually 
gain momentum. Economic globalization will prompt major powers to seek 
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cooperative relationships for common security based on common interests and to find 
solutions to conflicts through coordination (Li Ying 1998; Gao Hang 2000). Owing 
to the interdependence of all nations in the world, the ideal of "common security" will 
finally become a reality and will require a change from Cold War security thinking to 
post-Cold War security thinking. Thus, they believe that the new security theory will 
surely and gradually replace traditional Cold War thinking and that this process will 
be evolutionary and slow but it will eventually be accepted by the majority of nations. 
Table 8.3. Chinese New Security Concept 
Traditional Security Concept New Security Concept 
(Cold War) (Post-Cold War) 
Content of Military security Comprehensive security 
security *the confusion of friend and foe Common security 
e.g. US and NATO target at Russia Cooperative security 
in post-Cold War era 
* exaggeration of the level of threat 
e.g. China Threat fallacy 
Methods of Deterrence Strategy No aim against the third party 
preserving Military Alliance Equal consultation 
security Collective Security Peaceful solution 
No interference 
Security Balance of Power Cooperative security 
Theory Hegemonic Stability 
Historical NATO, Warsaw Pact, ARF, CSCA 
example US-J apan Alliance China-Russia Qartnership 
Based on the recognition of an objective change in the post-Cold War 
international milieu, a Chinese analyst unfolds the argument with Hegelian teleology 
and strongly demands the necessity of new thinking that: 
81 For the articles that examine the theoretical trends of common security in western academic, see 
Wang Liang (1998), Su Changhe (1998), Chu Shulong and Peng Chuyang (1999) and Han Li (2000). 
Cai Tuo (2000) relates the security concept to globalization. 
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When mankind enters the new century, the main trend of peace and development in 
the world is becoming stronger and stronger. People can certainly do away with the 
obsolete viewpoints that conflicts are unavoidable and wars eternal (Luo Renshi 
2000: 16). 
Second, this teleological aspiration for NSC explains a way of achieving "real" 
security. The analysts distinguish NSC from the traditional security concept. 
Cooperative security advocates solution of disputes through equal consultation, while 
the traditional security concept applied the deterrence strategy and military alliance 
policy based on military strength. The threat came from the hegemonic and 
interventionist behaviour that targeted other countries. They implied that military 
alliances (US-Japan) or collective security (NATO) should be replaced by the 
cooperative security channels based on common security and interests (Yan Xuetong 
1995; 1997; Chen Fengjun 1997). According to them, security cooperation 
embodying the NSC could be realized in two ways: the establishment of bilateral 
strategic partnership between certain countries which would be the preliminary 
practice for common security. And also multilateral frameworks which should be 
based on four principles; 1) not to target other countries; 2) not to interfere in their 
domestic affairs; 3) peaceful solution to disputes; 4) equal consultation. They put 
forward the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) and the CSCAP (Council on Security 
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region) as the embodiment of cooperative security. 
Third, the Chinese analysts do not hide their strategic motives for NSC and 
express their dissatisfaction with regional security. For example, Chu Shulong argues 
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that the main threat to Asia-Pacific regional security and stability is hegemonism and 
power politics. Instead of the NSC thinking, "the Cold War thinking still exists and 
leads to military build-up, military alliance and intervention to domestic affairs" (Chu 
Shulong 2000: 7-10). The Chinese analysts regard the purpose of US military 
presence in the region as enforcing deterrence strategy and consolidating the military 
alliance which, it is argued, will not maintain world security but help to establish the 
"new world order under the American leadership." They strongly suspect that US 
alliances in the Asia-Pacific region are aimed at China (Ye Zicheng 2000; Zhu 
Yinchang 2000). 
In sum, the NSC contains a very positive and advanced security concept In 
security studies. The Chinese government imported the common security concept and 
officially formulated and pronounced it as the guidelines for Chinese security policy 
in both the global and the regional security milieu. Yan Xuetong, the most prominent 
campaigner of NSC, noted that, 
After the Cold War, China recognized that the Cold War thinking was not 
appropriate to keeping world peace and regional security ... China considers that 
there is a need to establish a new and universal security concept. This kind of 
security concept will be not only admitted by the absolute number of countries in 
the world, but also will gradually develop the primary security concept in transition 
to multilateralism in the post-Cold War era CYan Xuetong 1997: 28). 
China proclaimed NSC as the constructive approach in the post-Cold War 
security environment recognizing that cooperative security is a superior concept to the 
previous "traditional" secUlity concept that most countries including the United States 
adhered to. Shambaugh confirmed that NSC "does represent the most systematic and 
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official exposition of China's prescriptive view to date, of how international relations 
should be conducted and security maintained" (Shambaugh 1999a: 67). In fact, NSC 
reflects the very vulnerable mindset of Chinese strategic thinking. It denounces the 
Cold War thinking and the security system, such as the military alliance and collective 
security, implying that the US alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region should be 
replaced. This siege mentality made the Chinese create and implement their own 
security vision. The NSC was designed to build a security framework, "cooperative 
security," which could undermine and act as a countermeasure to the US-dominated 
alliance system in the region. China is trying to establish its own security structure by 
utilizing the concept of common security, intersubjective meaning in security studies, 
whether this concept contains cognitive learning or not. This approach was expected 
to alleviate the neighbouring countries' growing concern about a rising China, and to 
be "appropriate, effective and promising for world peace and development in the post-
Cold War era" (Zhang Yiping 1997).82 
Jiang Zemin's report at the 15th National Congress of the Chinese communist 
party evinces the Chinese constructivist approach to security strategy. Jiang exhorted 
his civilian and military cadres to adhere to the principles of maintaining Deng 
Xiaoping's theory and keep an initiative in their hands. In the report, he stressed that 
"we (China) should take an active part in multilateral diplomatic activities and give 
full play to China's role in the United Nations and other international organizations" 
82 For example, in his article, Chu Shulong proposed China's regional security strategy. Chu divided 
security concept into 5 competitive systems; hegemonic stability; alliance security; equilibrim stability, 
collective security and cooperative security. He argued that China should form its characteristic 
security strategy based on 'cooperative security.' This strategy included comprehensive security 
strategy, bilateral and multilateral security cooperation and limited defence capacity (Chu Shulong 
1997: 2-7). 
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(Beijing Review 6-12 October 1997). The White Paper in 1998 also noted that it is 
"the aspiration of the Chinese government and people to lead a peaceful, stable and 
prosperous world into the new century" (China's National Defence 1998: 1). Indeed. 
China's activity in foreign policy started to take on a high profile. 
8.3.2. The CTBT's Impact on Institutions: The Restructuring of China's 
Domestic ACD Institutions 
The extent of the development of China's ACD institutions during the last decade 
was remarkable (Chapter 5). It was initiated by a group of scientists to disseminate 
new ideas and information and it produced a significant number of ACD 
communities. These developments were mirrored by the expanding roles and 
growing influence of a number of new bureaucratic actors devoted to examining its 
participation in the international ACD and nonproliferation regime. The three years' 
experience of participation in the CTBT talks and subsequent challenge of new 
international ACD agenda encouraged Chinese leaders to reconsider China's systemic 
and institutional problem for ACD policy. The institutional feedback of the CTBT in 
turn led to restructuring China's domestic ACD institutions. Interpreting those 
changes provides a key clue for understanding the forthcoming direction of China's 
ACD policy. 
Beginning in autumn 1997 and accelerating through 1998, the Chinese leadership 
carried out an extensive restructuring of China's military and government 
bureaucracies including the administration of its defence industries.83 In parallel with 
83 It should be rel'ugnized that the primary motive for restructuring was to ensure that Chinese 
economic growth would be sustained into the foreseeable future. The main purpose of the restructuring 
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this, the domestic ACD institutions were also reorganized. The atmosphere of 
transformation in the ACD field is noteworthy after China's CTBT experience. An 
observation describes the spirit of institutionalization as follows: 
A greater degree of growth, openness, and flux characterizes the Chinese 
nonproliferation and arms control community at present and for the foreseeable 
near-term future. This period of creative germination and development offers 
promising opportunities to engage this community more constructively (US-China 
Conference Report 1997: 10). 
Table 8.4. Restructuring Chinese ACD Institutions in the post-CTBT period 
New Institute Former Institute Head of Note & Year 
Institute 
MFA Department of Fourth Division of Sha Promoted to 
Arms Control International Zukang department 
and Disarmament Organization status in 1997 
Department 
PLA General Equipment Cao Merged and 
Armament Bureau of GSD, Gangchun newly created 
Department Sub-institutes of in 1998 
COSTIND (ACO, 
CAEP, IAPCM, 
NINT, CDSTIC) 
COSTIND SCOSTIND COSTIND Liu Jibin Civilianized in 
1998 
CAEA under CAEA CNNCorCAEA Zhang Functionall y 
COSTIND Huazhu reorganized in 
1998 
CASS Centre for Arms Gu Newly created 
Control and Guoliang under the 
Nonproliferation CASS in 1998 
Studies 
plan was to establish the new relationship between the government and state enterprises. According to 
Li Peng, "unwieldy organization and failure to separate the functions of the government from those of 
enterprises have given rise to bureaucracy, promoted unhealthy practices and created a heavy financial 
burden" (Li Peng Report on the Work of the Government 1998 from Beijing Review 6-12 April 1998). 
By the government restructuring during the first session of the 9th National People's Congress held 
March 5-19 in 1998, the number of ministries and commissions under the State Council was being cut 
from 40 to 29. The 1998's change in military sector was, indeed, the fifth major restructuring of the 
Chinese defence industry establishment. For the separation of Chinese defence industry from military, 
see Frankenstein and Gill (1997) and Lieberthal (1995). 
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The shift covered not only the main bureaucratic actors such as the MFA, the 
PLA and the COSTIND, but also the creation of a new research institute and the re-
estsblishment of an arms export control system. 
First, the Chinese government re-arranged the institutional status and re-
distributed the institutional power relations among the main triangle of actors, the 
MFA, the PLA and the COSTIND. Most notably, the organ of the MFA that was in 
charge of the international ACD agenda was raised to the status of a department. In 
1997, the fourth division (chu) of the International Organization and Conferences 
Department, under the MFA was upgraded to a department (si) with bureaucratic 
status, exclusively devoted to ACD issues. Mainly due to the recognition by the 
Chinese leaders and also because of the expanded workload of the division, the ACD 
field was entitled to more organizational credit for implementing China's ACD policy 
more systematically, given the reality that the agenda of the multilateral frameworks 
of the ACD showed increasing changes (Interview with a Chinese ACD expert 18th 
July 2001). Furthermore, the creation and subsequent expansion of this new 
department occurred at a time when the overall government bureaucracy, including 
the MFA, was downsizing. In principle, this not only meant the potential expansion 
of the number of people working in the ACD field, but also indicated that the MFA 
would possibly have more authority in the interagency bargaining process. The 
Chinese ambassador at the CD in Geneva, during the CTBT negotiation, Sha Zukang, 
is now a department head. This makes him approximately equivalent in rank to Qian 
Shaojun, the former official head of the arms control community in the COSTIND 
(now transferred to the newly created General Armaments Department). Sha's 
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elevation to department head makes him bureaucratically superior to Qian (Johnston 
and Evans 1999: 241). 
The department of Arms Control and Disarmament consists of the Nuclear 
Division, the Chemical and Biological Weapons Division (CBW), the Conventional 
and Missile Division and the Comprehensive Research Division. The Nuclear 
Division takes charge of nuclear issues, such as nuclear testing, nuclear 
nonproliferation, fissile material issues and nuclear export controls. The CBW 
Division covers chemical and biological issues such as China's compliance with the 
CWC and export controls. The Conventional and Missile Division's task covers 
China's position on anti-personnel land mines, missile exports and the MTCR. The 
last division is doing research on ACD issues but also covers South-East Asian 
security issues. The concentration of ACD expertise in the new ACD department 
within the MFA will further entrench the role of politics and foreign policy in China's 
ACD policy-making (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn). for example, on a formal level, 
the MFA's limited involvment in policy making process on exports of controlled 
items (such as nuclear, chemical, missile and military goods). Its influence on this 
process has changed in recent years as China's export control system has become 
more formalized and institutionalized. China's growing acceptance of the MTCR 
reflects the gradual increase in importanceof the MFA's role. 
Second, there have also occurred important changes in the PLA bureaucratic 
apparatus. By the government institutional restructuring during the first session of the 
9th National People's Congress in 1998, the COSTIND was dissolved and some of its 
responsibilities assigned to a new State COSTIND (SCOSTIND) under the State 
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Council. The restructuring plan explained that the role of the SCOSTIND was to take 
over the management of the defence industries that had been assumed by COSTIND. 
the National Defence Department of the State Planning Commission, and the 
government functions that had been assumed by the military corporations (Xiandai 
lunshi April 1998). The new SCOSTIND was headed by civilian leaders,8.t and given 
the task of overseeing civilian defence production directives. Unlike the COSTIND 
in the past, the SCOSTIND would report only to the State Council and not to the 
military. This procedure meant that the long process of civilianization of the defence 
industry was finalized. The Chinese term jundi Jenjia is used to indicate the 
separation of military from civilian departments. The military's programme of 
armament and equipment has been separated from the nation's defence industry, 
leaving the SCOSTIND to be led and staffed entirely by civilian officials (lieJangjun 
baa 9 April 1998).85 
Third, military reorganization was achieved in April 5, 1998. The new military 
department, the General Armament Department (Zang zhuangbei bu) was created 
under the Central Military Commission with the same bureaucratic rank as the GSD, 
the GPD and the GLD. The GAD took over virtually all of the former ACD functions 
of the COSTIND and the Military Equipment Bureau that used to be under the GSD. 
Its main role encompasses arms procurement, overseeing management of the 
weapons, and contributing to discussions in the ACD negotiations affecting the PLA. 
For the first time, all aspects of weapons and equipment management became unified 
84 The new minister of SCOSTIND was Liu Jibin, a former vice minister of Finance and has civilian 
working career for the defence industry. 
85 Six vice-ministers were later nominated to help Liu conduct the new tasks of the organization. The~e 
ministers were former high officials of the five major defence industries and the State Planning 
Commission (lie/aI/gill" bao 17 April 1998). 
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under one command merging compartmentalized organs into the one newly created 
department. 
The main resources of the GAD's influence on the ACD issue lie in the fact that 
it now controls the "old" COSTIND's arms control division which conducts research 
on the full spectrum of ACD issues. The Arms Control Division within the former 
COSTIND's Foreign Affairs Office was moved to the newly established PLA General 
Annament Department (GAD). In addition, the China Defence Science and 
Technology Information Centre (CDSTIC) which, among other tasks, conducts 
research on ACD issues, now reports to the GAD. The results of this research are 
presumably communicated to the office of the Chief of the GAD in inter-agency 
discussions and to PLA representatives in the field at overseas embassies and at 
multilateral disarmament organization such as within the United Nations. The largest 
grouping of Chinese ACD experts in the military is now concentrated in the GAD. 
The transfer of bureaucratic experts to the GAD makes observers predict that the 
COSTIND's role will lose its former prominence in policy-making. Its role might be 
limited to the realm of assisting technical advice and the export control process (Jia 
Hao 1999a: 113; Gill and Medeiros 2000: 85). The expectation that the GAD will 
play a key role in inter-agency bargaining is reinforced because of its personnel 
position in the GAD. It is headed by General Cao Gangchun,86 who was also 
appointed to the CMC in October 1998. His return to a military position from being 
the minister of the former COSTIND meant the "civilianization" of the COSTIND 
86 Cao's background was in the ranks in the Military Equipment Bureau of the GSD. Before his 
appointment to the head of the COSTIND, he was previously a deputy chief of the GSD. 
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and its distancing from military influence. Two other prominent and influential 
scientists on ACD issues became members of the Science and Technology Committee 
within the GAD. Both Qian Shaojun87 and Zhu Guangya88 were involved in the arms 
export control group before they got new jobs. Both of them presided over and 
played an important role in two consulting and coordinating bodies, respecti vel y the 
"Arms Control Group," and "Inspection Group," which were established within the 
COSTIND for the purpose of increasing control over the arms export system in the 
1990s.89 
These recent changes make it difficult to ascertain the preCIse channels of 
authority within the PLA on ACD decision-making. Especially, it IS uncertain 
whether the GAD will replace the GSD as the representative In inter-agency 
discussion. However, as the decision-making structure diversifies and demand for 
expertise grows, the sheer number of PLA-related specialists will be likely to assure 
those organizations a continuing strong influence in the decision-making process, 
especially on emerging questions of proliferation and military transparency. In the 
long term, one possible consequence of restructuring would be the consolidation of 
the military ACD expert group into a single unit that speaks for the whole military. 
The concentration of all the main ACD experts within the GAD could serve to 
promote consensus-building within the military. A division of labour between the 
87 Qian is one of the few Chinese scientists serving as a high-ranking officer in the PLA. He has a 
technical backgroud in nuclear engineering and was the sixth commander of China's main nuclear 
testing base in Xinjiang. Many Chinese ACD experts consider him one of the military's leading voices 
on ACD issues. 
88 Dr. Zhu Guangya is a prominent nuclear scientist recognized for his special contribution to China's 
first atomic bomb (Lewis and Xue Litai 1988: 143-6). He has had very prestigious careers such as, 
president of China's National Association of Science and Technology and the Chinese Academy of 
Engineering (Jia Hao 1999a: 110-1). 
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PLA and the COSTIND no longer exists. Its disappearance could stimulate the 
development of a more formal and institutionalized ACD entity within the military. 
Another possible benefit of the new structure would be to allow the ACD expert 
group a more open access to nuclear weapon management issues. There was a report 
that suggested that the GAD would have the responsibility of managing the full 
lifecycle of all weapon systems (Liaowang 25 May 1998). This responsibility would 
include management of nuclear weapons and material stockpiles, their storage, 
maintenance, transport and retirement. Chinese ACD experts admitted that the 
decision to join the CTBT brought tremendous tasks for China (Sun Xiangli 1997). If 
China becomes involved in future multilateral ACD negotiations, it must be prepared 
to face and deal with even more technically complicated choices than those posed by 
the CTBT. The GAD, with broader knowledge of nuclear weapons management 
issues and procedures, would help the military to approach the future multilateral 
ACD agenda with confidence rather than scepticism. Thus it is expected that the role 
of the GAD will be to expand and to vitalize a broader and more insightful debate on 
ACD issues within the military (Interview with a Chinese expert 9 July 2001). 
However, in the national scene of policy-making and bargaining, the prospect of 
a military voice will erode as the power of Jiang Zemin is consolidated and that of the 
military is separated from the Party. General Liu Huaqing's retirement from the 
Party's Poliburo Standing Committee at the CCP's 15th Congress in late 1997 again 
89 These two groups consisted of the COSTIND's technical experts and administrative staff affiliated 
with the CAEP and the CDSTIC. The 'Arms Control Group' was headed by General Qian Shaojun 
and the 'Inspection Group' was headed by Zhu Guangya (Jia Hao 1999a: 108-9). 
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left the PLA no representation among the seven mam members of the Poli tburo 
Standing Committee, the nation's most important decision making body.9o This 
development was accompanied by a decline (from 23% to 180/0) in the military 
membership of the new Party's Central Committee elected by the 15th CCP Congress. 
At the Congress, Jiang Zemin's technocratic leadership strengthened his power and he 
emerged unrivalled, with the stepping-down of Qiao Shi. The PLA's new leadership 
reflected its rising professionalism, which were unmistakably set it further apart from 
the party (Baum 1997; Shambaugh 1998).91 There was also an important 
development in Chinese foreign policy making and coordination. President Jiang 
Zemin acquired control. This had been manifested by the fact that Li Peng stepped 
down from the premiership in the spring of 1998 and Jiang formally assumed the 
position of head of the FALSG with the new Premier, Zhu Rongji, and the first deputy 
and vice Premier, Qian Qichen. Jiang and his allies have tried to strengthen China's 
foreign and national security policy coordinating mechanism. 
Fourth, along with the accession to the Zangger Committee, in September 1997, 
China promulgated comprehensive nuclear export control regulations: the "PRC 
Regulations on Nuclear Export Control," and the Nuclear Export Control list (Renmin 
ribao 12 September 1997). Subsequently, in June 1998 it also issued the "PRC 
Regulations for Controlling the Export of Dual-Purpose Nuclear Goods and Relevant 
Technologies" (China's National Defence 1998). These new regulations were a 
major step towards the rule of law for nuclear export control and brought China' s 
90 Two military officials were elected to make 15 full members of the politburo at the CCP's fifteen 
Congress. Chi Haotian, the Vice-Chariman of the CMC and Minister of National Defence, and Zhang 
Wannian, Vice-Chariman of the CMC, were two newly elected members (Shambaugh 1998: 6-7). 
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export control system closer to the internationally accepted standards. The improved 
regulation provided principles, application and review procedures and expanded the 
scope of China's nuclear export controls. The CAEA (China Atomic Energy 
Authority) was detached from the CNNC (China National Nuclear Corporation) and 
singled out in both regulations to playa central role in the export control approval 
process. This reorganization, resulting from the concomitant dissolution of the 
COSTIND by the government restructuring in 1998, meant that the two overlapping 
names of the institute ended with a functional distinction between the governmental 
and commercial representation. The CAEA could begin to take a more 
comprehensive approach to regulating the nuclear power industry. In reviewing 
nuclear export applications, the CAEA came to possess the authority to approve or 
reject them with consultation with the COSTIND, Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation and MFA (Hsu 1999: 163-4). 
Fifth, under the CASS (China Academy of Social Sciences), a new institution 
was created in 1998. The Centre for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Studies 
(CACNS) was established by Gu Guoliang,92 deputy director of the Institute of 
American Studies. Given the fact that the academic research institute has had less 
influence on the Chinese policy setting than the government or the military-associated 
institutes, the centre's direct influence seems to be limited. However, it is the first 
91 David Shambaugh assessed that "in general, Jiang and the Party leadership can count on PLA 
support:' although the traditional "interlocking directorate" of the Party and the military is being 
broken and the future relationship is uncertain (Shambaugh 1998: 13). 
')2 Gu Guoliang's career is interesting in that he worked for both the MFA and the military, and now he 
has a position at CASS, the academic sector. He also joined the Chinese delegation to the CD from 
1990 to 1995 after he finished arms control studies at Johns Hopkins University in 1986. It seems that 
his varied social background helped him establish a social network, which could realize the Centre's 
energetic activities. 
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civilian institute under the CASS to research the international ACD issues in the 
context of Chinese security and foreign policy. The centre notes that China lacked the 
capacity, experts and academic exchange in the ACD field, whereas international 
ACD was becoming increasingly important for China's security and economic 
development, readjusting "Chinese defence policy, diplomatic strategy and national 
unification struggle" (http://www.cass.net.cnls29_mgs/center/center.htm). It has put 
its effort into international and domestic academic exchanges and has hosted a 
domestic conference on ACD issues every year since 1999. Many Chinese ACD 
experts from most ACD institutions gathered to discuss the current issues, for 
example "Arms Control and the US-China Relationship" (Fan lishe 1999: 2000a: 
2000b). The participants came from the MFA, government-associated research 
institutes and the most military institutes, such as the GSD, the GAD, the CDSTIC, 
the National Defence University and the Academy of Military Science. By hosting 
the inter-agency conference and establishing this channel, the centre, which has no 
specific bureaucratic interest related with international ACD issues, will certainly play 
a role in Chinese ACD policy-bargaining process in the future. 
8.3.3. The CTBT's Impact on Security: China's Post CTBT Security Concern 
Impact on Nuclear Weapons Modernization 
The obligations of the CTBT will have an impact on the signatory state's 
fundamental security interest. The Preamble of the CTBT recognizes an effective 
measure of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation "by constraining the 
development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the 
development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons" (CTB Treaty: 1). Without 
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doubt, the CTBT will impose severe limitations on any further modernization of the 
nuclear weapons programme. 
Allegedly, China required at least a few more tests to ensure the reliability and 
safety of its nuclear weapons. The tests conducted by China represent only two 
percent of the total nuclear tests conducted in the world. It was argued that China did 
not have enough opportunity to devote its nuclear testing to the enhancement of the 
safety and reliability of nuclear weapons. As a matter of fact, while the MFA urged 
cessation of testing under pressure from the international community, during the 
negotiation process, the PLA pressed for more tests because China's nuclear testing 
objective had not yet been attained (Garrett and Glaser 1995: 58-9). 
Many observers speculated that the real purpose of China's nuclear testing 
programme, which had continued despite an international moratorium and pressure to 
discontinue nuclear testing was to modernize China's nuclear forces. In spite of 
China's argument that the purpose of its test was to ensure the safety and reliability of 
its nuclear arsenal, it was suspected that the purpose of its nuclear tests during the 
CTBT negotiation process was to upgrade its nuclear warheads so as to make missiles 
available appropriate to the maintenance of a strategic weapon programme. Many 
believe that China was testing miniaturized warheads, which potentially give China a 
MIRV capability (Caldwell and Lennon 1995: 30; Gurtov and Hwang 1998: Hua Di 
1997: 10; Ding 1999: 98). 
The technical gap between China and the other nuclear powers was frozen 
forever by the ban on testing (Zou Yunhua 1998a: 27). Indeed, officials in the 
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Chinese nuclear weapons establishment explicitly argued that such a treaty would 
freeze the asymmetries in nuclear capability that currently existed between middle-
power nuclear weapon states like China and the superpowers (Chen Xueyin 1993 
from Jonston 1996: 55). Further they even argued that the overall effect of the CTBT. 
in preventing proliferation, had been exaggerated by its proponents, since crude 
weapons could be developed without testing. In addition, other nuclear powers have 
made considerable efforts to prepare for a CTBT, including the use of computational 
simulation and experimental capabilities in the laboratory so that they can design and 
produce new generations of weapons without testing (Wang Ling 1993: 26; Frieman 
1996: 24). 
No testing logically gives China three alternatives regarding a post-CTBT nuclear 
modernization programme; 1) to develop a new delivery system with fixed warhead 
designs; 2) to increase the number of its existing warheads; 3) to cooperate in order to 
enhance the safety and reliability of nuclear stocks. First, a delivery vehicle designed 
to accommodate an existing warhead would be constrained by the features of this 
warhead. Because the delivery systems are much more expensive than the warheads, 
using existing, rather than custom-designed, warheads is usually said to be less cost-
effective. A relevant option for China would probably be to improve the penetrability 
of its strike force by means of developing MRVs (multiple re-entry vehicles) and 
MIRVs (multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles). Considering the fact that 
the other four nuclear states all possess MIRV missiles, China is likely to adopt a 
similar option. If so, nuclear tests may be needed to develop miniaturized warheads 
and the observers considered this to be the main reason for the Chinese nuclear tests 
during the CTBT negotiations. 
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Second, an increase in the number of warheads and missiles could compensate for 
the weakness of less advanced nuclear weapons, to a certain degree. Given that the 
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) will curtail the amount of stored nuclear 
material, China, supporting the early conclusion of the FMCT, would not consider 
increasing the number of warheads as complementing the restraint of the CTBT and it 
might not have sufficient fissile materials according to its perceptions in a post-CTBT 
period. Third, cooperative programmes between China and other nuclear states for 
the safety and reliability of nuclear warheads would apparently be needed. According 
to a Chinese expert, China's nuclear programme should meet the "new challenge of 
maintaining the nuclear arsenal under a no-test regime" (Sun Xiangli 1997: 12). He 
called for technological cooperation in diagnostics and computer simulation between 
China and other nuclear weapon states for a stockpile stewardship programme. 
In sum, the CTBT will impede China's nuclear modernization programme and 
the technical gap will be perpetuated in the future. Garrett and Glaser observed that 
agreeing to a comprehensive and permanent nuclear test ban is a more complicated 
decision for Beijing than joining the NPT. A CTBT would involve restrictions on 
China's freedom of action in a core area of national security, the viability of the 
Chinese nuclear deterrent. Signing and implementing a CTBT would be the first 
substantial decision by Beijing regarding nuclear anns control that reflected limited 
security interdependence, not just free-riding (Garrett and Glaser 1995: 53). 
As they put it, "limited security interdependence" now characterizes China's 
approach to international ACD and nonproliferation Issues. They continue by 
stressing that "the Chinese realize that a self-help approach alone is inadequate - as 
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well as politically untenable - for ensunng a peaceful and stable international 
environment" (Garret and Glaser: 76). Thus, China's acceptance of the CTBT, 
despite objections to some of its provisions, signalled that Beijing began to see the 
benefits of international security cooperation outweighing the restraints it will impose 
on its nUclear-weapons development.93 
With the disappearance of the unifying Soviet threat, China enjoyed its most 
benign international security environment in many decades. "Heping yu Jazhan" 
(peace and development) sometimes sounds banal in Chinese rhetoric. Nonetheless, it 
adequately sums up the current objective of China's international strategy for its 
modernization. In regional security, one of the most serious concerns is about the US-
Japan alliance and its security relationship. China initially worried that conflicting 
interests could eventually result in the reemergence of a more fully armed, activist 
Japan. The US TMD plan reinforces the Chinese suspicion. 
Post-CTBT Security Interest 
Although the CTBT would not fundamentally change China's security policy, 
which currently focuses on its conventional forces, with the nuclear deterrent, China's 
most serious concern about security is the rapid development and likely deployment 
of the advanced US TMD system under the CTBT restraint.94 The TMD is believed 
93 In addition, there was a positive benefit for China in terms of technology and information that 
Keohane considered as the most important benefit of state's motive based on utilatarianist calculations 
for cooperation among states. China reached agreement with the United States on nuclear cooperation 
in 1997, which was one of the Chinese benefits from cooperation with the US. This will be examined 
in the next section. 
94 Part of the US concern and the justification of the military-oriented US response is that both China 
and North Korea have exhibited a clear desire to develop new and longer-range missiles to threaten US 
friends and allies (Moltz 1997: 64). The threat of Chinese use of its short-range missiles has been 
raised to date largely in the context of the Taiwan Crisis in 1995 to 1996 (Ferdinand 1996; Zhao 
Suishen~ 1999). 
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by Chinese analysts to degrade China's limited retaliatory capability. Over the last 
several years, the Chinese have become increasingly apprehensive about the 
implications of US ballistic missile defence systems, both theatre and national. Until 
recently, the Chinese leadership had focused on theatre missile defences (TMD) as a 
perceived threat to China's core national interest. The Chinese foreign minister Qian 
Qichen expressed his concern about the possible deployment of TMD in his statement 
at the CTBT-concluded 51 st UNGA on September 25,1996. 
All states should refrain from developing or deploying weapon systems in outer 
space and missile defence systems that undermine strategic security and stability 
(Beijing Review Oct. 14-20 1996). 
Especially after China came under the restraint of the CTBT, it has strongly 
voiced its serous concern over the development and the deployment of theatre missile 
defence systems (TMD) in East Asia. Chinese arguments about TMD can be 
summarized into three categories; 1) its offensive nature; 2) its effects on regional 
stability, especially on Taiwan; 3) its retreat from international ACD regimes. Firstly, 
many Chinese experts point out that some advanced TMD actually have the capability 
of strategic missile defence. Chinese analysts see that, basically, the TMD can be 
considered an offensive as well as a defensive system because it has defensive 
capability, as an integral part of an overall offensive design, in that TMD technology 
can be easily converted into offensive missiles.95 China is concerned that a 
successfully developed and deployed TMD system may constitute a threat to its 
95 China fears that the US might overdesign the capability of the TMD interceptor so that it can tly at 
greater speed. A high-speed TMD interceptor. in combination with the US-proposed NMD system and 
powerful space-based surveillance and tracking systems. could substantially increase the impact of the 
missile defence system and enable it to intercept strategic ballistic missiles. For the Chinese argument 
in this regard. see Wen Deyi (1997). Luo Renshi (1999) and Liu Jianmin (1999). 
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strategic security. The TMD may neutralize China's second strike retaliation 
capability, discrediting China's minimum deterrence strategy (Chapter 4.2.4.). Thus 
despite US reiteration that TMD is of a purely defensive nature, the Chinese 
leadership sees it as enhancing the capability of the US strategic missile force, which 
will shake the regional strategic balance (Zou Yunhua 1998b; Zhu Feng 1999). 
According to the Chinese arguments, the development and deployment of such 
systems run counter to the principle of the ABM Treaty, for they set obstacles to 
further nuclear disarmament, cause a new arms race and jeopardize world strategic 
stability. The cooperation between the US and other countries on TMD will lead to 
the proliferation of missile technology and impose a threat to regional security and 
stability (Hu Yimin, 1999: 51). In the eyes of the Chinese, TMD has become one of 
the "most important security issues in Northeas Asia and a major source of contention 
between the US and China" (Zhu Feng 1999; Chu Shulong 2000). The Chinese view 
is that the TMD will undermine Northeast Asian security cooperation, encourage the 
development of preemptive strike capabilities, and set off a dangerous arms race in 
the region. 
Secondly, China has continuously voiced its opposition to TMD, especially in 
that the US may deploy or transfer TMD technology to Taiwan. China has stated that 
such action would contradict the basic norms of international law and seriously 
violates the principles set out in the three Sino-US joint communiques. From the 
Chinese point of view, a country that does not possess advanced offensive missile 
technology and receives TMD from another state might be tempted to convert the 
defensive technology of TMD to offensive missiles, if this turned out to be a plausible 
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way to upgrade their offensive missile capability. Awareness of this fact creates 
concern in China that TMD could be used as part of a US pre-empti ve strike doctrine 
in other regional conflicts. The Chinese leadership also worries that Taiwan's 
inclusion in the TMD programme will restore an alliance relationship between the US 
and Taiwan and and strengthen the US position in the Asia-Pacific region. More and 
more internationalization of the Taiwan issue means foreign interference in China's 
sovereignty and territorial integration. China believes that TMD systems could be 
politically or strategically used by the US to undermine China's efforts at 
reunification with Taiwan (Xia Wenqing 2000; Ding 1999; Garrett 2000). 
China fears that such a linkage might bring the further consequence of 
neutralizing China as the US pursues its own hegemonic ambitions at the expense of 
Chinese security and interests. Japan's participation in TMD in 1998 was regarded as 
"preparation to become involved in potential military conflicts" in the Taiwan Strait 
because of the new guidelines signed by Japan and the US in September 1997 (Yan 
Xuetong 1999: 70).96 As long as China is excluded from the US-Japan joint TMD 
programme, China will feel targeted by the US-Japan alliance as a common enemy 
and will be cautious about taking steps in the direction of China-US-Japan trilateral 
security cooperation (Yan Xuetong: 72). Eventually, TMD would exacerbate 
strategic instability in the Asia-Pacific regIon. The TMD issue will undermine 
possible positive cooperation between China and the US. The TMD system will also 
make Russia hesitate to enter the planned START III talks. 
96 Yan Xuetong implies that excluding Taiwan is China's highest priority regarding the US TMD plan. 
He stresses that China' opposition "rests largely on its concern over Taiwan's potential separation," 
including the potential usage of Japan's TMD in a Taiwan Strait contlict. "TMD would cause fewer 
suspicions between China and the US or Japan if Taiwan were excluded from the US TMD 
programme" (Yan Xuetong 1999: 72). 
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Thirdly, Chinese officials are also concerned that US deployment of even a 
limited NMD system would undermine the progress made in US-China ACD 
cooperation over the last decade, a period during which, they say, "Washington and 
Beijing often worked closely together." In their view, although the US and China 
have sometimes attacked each other's position publicly, they have in fact worked to 
achieve the same ends on arms control and non-proliferation. Chinese ACD officials 
now feel betrayed by the US pursuit of an NMD system that would directly threaten 
China's national security by undermining its nuclear deterrent. Many Chinese 
officials are left wondering why they should bother cooperating with the US. This 
implies that the US TMD programme might weaken the position and voice of Chinese 
ACD experts and institutions in dealing with their national security decision making 
(Conference Report on the Second US-China Conference on Arms Control, 
Disarmament and Nonproliferation 1999). The director of the MFA's new 
department of arms control and disarmament, Sha Zukang, remarked at the US-China 
Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation in 1999 as follows: 
China will be forced to take some steps which it is reluctant to take. It is quite 
possible for China to review its policies on various arms control, disarmament and 
nonproliferation issues, including the FMCT negotiations (Sha Zukang 1999 from his 
opening remarks at the US-China Conference). 
The US TMD programme is still under development and it will take at least a 
decade to accomplish the goal originally set. During this period, China will keep US-
China security dialogue open and seriously reconsider its security strategy. China 
might pay more attention to the role of ACD in its security policies. From now on. 
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there will be more items on the international ACD agenda that require China's 
participation and cooperation, such as the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and 
disarmament talks among the five nuclear states. China would have to pay greater 
attention to the role of arms control negotiations in the post-CTBT era for the purpose 
of safeguarding its security interests while promoting international security, and it is 
likely that the Chinese government would attach greater importance to the domestic 
ACD institutions assigned to work on international ACD negotiations. The signing of 
the CTBT was a great step for China in participating in the international ACD regime. 
In a post-CTBT period, China's ACD policy would playa more important role in its 
security strategy than at any earlier time. 
In fact, China is seeking for countermeasures to check the US TMD system in 
international ACD regimes. China repeated its call for outer space talks in CD in 
order to check the US TMD efforts. The Chinese ambassador, in October 2001, Hu 
Xiaodi requested that negotiations to prevent an arms race in outer space should 
begin. He claimed that the current US effort to amend the ABM treaty will lead to its 
total abolition and such a development would bring the weaponization of and arms 
race in outer space, as well as "trigger off global weapons proliferation" (Arms 
Control Association Fact Sheets October 2001: 3).97 Some Chinese officials 
97 Ambassador Hu Xiaodi concluded that the CD would eventually need to undertake negotiations on 
the disarmament of outer space if negotiations do not start now to prevent the weaponization of outer 
space. Meanwhile. the llnited States. which is seeking to modify the ABM Treaty to permit a limited 
US national missile defence (NMD). maintains that there is no arms race in outer space and that the 
1967 Outer Space Treaty banning the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space is 
sufficient (Arms Control Association Fact Sheets October 200 1). 
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suggested that if the US were to forego NMD development, China would work more 
closely with the US and the other nuclear weapon states to negotiate a new missile 
non-proliferation regime or tum the MTCR into a treaty, dropping its long opposition 
to the MTCR (Conference Report on the Second US-China Conference on Arms 
Control, Disannament and Nonproliferation 1999). 
The broader concern facing the TMD debate on East Asia is the ultimate goals of 
the US and its allies. One option for the US is to move ahead with unilateral military 
measures, despite the likely political costs. The other one is to pursue a new security 
framework that seeks to overcome regional threats, through cooperation and the 
building of nonns. In this context, China's "new security concept" (NSC) challenged 
the notion that the US security alliances and military presence in Northeast Asia have 
been the key components of the region's stability. This was intended to counter what 
the Chinese tenned the "Cold War spirit," the deep-rooted influence of the traditional 
balance of power security views by the Chinese contenders. 
8.4. One Step forward: Further Engagement in ACD 
Frameworks 
During the 1990s, China demonstrated its growing involvement and support for 
international ACD nonns and regimes, as has seen in Chapter 6. In 1992 China 
acceded to the NPT and subsequently promised to abide by the MTCR guidelines in 
1994. China supported efforts to negotiate a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) in 
the CD and voted in favour of indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. In July 1996. 
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it ended its nuclear testing and signed the CTBT in September 1996. The Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) was ratified in 1997. The progressive chain of 
consequences of China's ACD policy in the post-CTBT period suggests that dynamic 
interaction between the state and the international institutions (regime) not only 
penetrates the state itself (perspective and domestic institution level) but also 
galvanizes the state's next step at the international level. Even though it is difficult to 
verify the distinct linkage of China as it was (China tJ) and China as it is (China t2) at 
an international level, progress achieved in the next step virtually indicates further 
engagement in international ACD frameworks. After China went through the CTBT 
negotiation, there were significant developments in Chinese ACD policy in both 
multilateral and bilateral terms. 
8.4.1. Enhancement of Participation in Multilateral ACD Frameworks 
One of the path-dependent effects on China's ACD policy in the post-CTBT 
period was its support for the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). An FMCT 
would serve both nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation objectives, as a logical 
complement to the NPT and the CTBT. The FMCT and CTBT together would place 
a quantitative freeze on the amount of nuclear material available for weapons and a 
qualitative freeze on nuclear weapon design development by stopping testing and by 
banning production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for such weapons 
(Bunn 1998). By signaling each state's willingness to accept such constraints, an 
FMCT would also provide greater confidence to the nuclear weapon states as they 
consider and implement further reductions in their nuclear arsenals. It would also 
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offer a promising possibility of bringing the "threshold states" into the international 
nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime. 
In 1993, the UN General Assembly, for the first time, adopted a resolution by 
consensus calling for the FMCT. By then, both Russia and the US had stopped 
producing plutonium and highly enriched uranium (REV). Though they have 
declared no moratorium, the five nuclear weapon state parties were all believed to 
have stopped producing plutonium and REU. China, like other nuclear weapon 
states, supported negotiations for an FMCT at the CD. China expressed a willingness 
to participate in FMCT negotiations. When Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen 
visited the United States in October 1994, China agreed to the "earliest possible 
achievement of FMCT in a joint US-China statement on stopping production of fissile 
materials for nuclear weapons (http://www.dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acdaJfactshee/wmd 
Inuclear/fissile ). 
In March 1995, the CD agreed, by consensus, to establish an ad hoc committee 
with a mandate to negotiate a FMCT based on the 1993 UNGA resolution. In May 
1995, the NPT conference that extended the NPT indefinitely called for "the 
immediate commencement and early conclusion" of FMCT negotiations as the next 
priority after finishing negotiation of the CTBT (Rauf and Johnson 1995). The CD 
members failed to agree on a negotiating committee for FMCT negotiations until 
1998. There were divergent views of what the scope of the treaty should be 
concerning the production of fissile material. Some wanted it to deal with "future 
production" after the cut-off date. Others wanted it to include "stocks." No nuclear 
weapon state was going to accept that the size of its nuclear forces should be affected 
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by the FMCT having responsibility for stocks. Moreover, members of the non-
aligned movement, led by India, linked work on a cutoff treaty to negotiations on a 
timebound framework for nuclear disarmament, a condition unacceptable to the 
nuclear weapon states. Most non-aligned states agreed with Egypt that a treaty would 
only be effective if it included stockpiles. Otherwise, the treaty would merely be 
another nonproliferation mechanism that has no "real disarmament value" since the 
five declared nuclear weapon states have already reportedly stopped production of 
fissile material for weapons purposes (Boese 1998). 
A breakthrough occurred in the aftermath of the Indian and Pakistan nuclear tests 
of May 1998, when both countries retracted their position. In August 1998, the CD 
decided, by consensus, to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a FMCT. In his 
speech at the CD in March 1999, Jiang Zemin reaffirmed China's support for the 
FMCT saying that "negotiations should be conducted as soon as possible for the 
conclusion of a universal and verifiable FMCT" (http://www.clw.org/coalition). If 
negotiations were to start in near future, the MFA, the GAD and SCOSTIND would 
be expected to be important players in this negotiation process. The MFA, with 
Ambassador Sha Zukang heading the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, 
will continue to lead the ensuing negotiations. The GAD, through its nuclear 
weapons research laboratories, will be likely to provide technical support during 
negotiation. The SCOSTIND is expected to have a voice in the verification scope and 
approach for such a treaty to ensure that the needs and concerns of CNNC are met 
(Hsu 1999: 164). 
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Another milestone that China marked in the post-CTBT period was its joining the 
Zangger Committee. The multilateral efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons are based on suppliers regimes that were formed three decades ago. As has 
been shown in Chapter 6, China was not a party to these regimes until 1997. They 
consist primarily of the 1968 NPT, the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group. Shortly after the NPT came into force in 1970, a number of nuclear supplier 
countries began consultations on the implementation of the limitations on the transfer 
of nuclear facilities and related materials to non-nuclear weapon states. This group 
became known as the Zangger Committee, and in 1974, the members adopted export 
guidelines covering a list of items (the "trigger list"). The Zangger Committee 
established the principle that nuclear-supplier nations should consult and agree among 
themselves on procedures to regulate the international market for nuclear materials 
and equipment in order to prevent nuclear proliferation (Schmidt 1994). 
During the last two decades China has continued to provide weapon-related aid to 
Pakistan and has exported materials and facilities that were useful for weapon 
production to other countries. Even after China joined the NPT in 1992, Chinese 
policy regarding the transfer of dual-use nuclear technology did not change. China 
emerged as a major supplier of technology for Iran's civilian nuclear programme. 
Under intense US pressure, in May 1996, the Chinese government formally 
announced that it would not provide further assistance to nuclear facilities, which 
were not subject to full IAEA safeguards (SIPRI Yearbook 1997: 351). In May 1997, 
China promulgated a new regulation on nuclear exports, "Circular on Strict 
Implementation of China's Nuclear Export Policy," which covered the export of 
nuclear and nuclear related dual-use items on an interim basis. In addition, China 
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issued more specific nuclear export control regulations beyond the dual-use 
technologies covered in the earlier declaration. The consolidation of arms export 
control was a major step that brought its nuclear export controls close to the 
internationally accepted standard. Both control lists were substantively identical to 
the "trigger list" of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
respectively (Renmin ribao 12 September 1997). 
In parallel with strengthening China's arms export control system, in late July 
1997, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, told the Secretary of State, 
Madeleine Albright during a meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, that China would 
formally join the Zangger Committee at its next meeting in mid October (Diamond 
1997). At that time, China was the only declared nuclear weapon state that was not a 
member of the 31 nation exporters group. China joined the Zangger Committee and 
began to take part in the October 1997 meeting, after it had attended as observer in 
May 1997. China indicated that it was not prepared to reverse its policy of not 
requiring comprehensive safeguards as a condition of supply, apparently because of 
its continued civil nuclear trade with India and Pakistan. Hence the Committee's 
earlier plan to adopt this requirement by the tum of century was deferred (Tracking 
Nuclear Proliferation 1998: 307).98 
98 The Committee meets in Vienna twice a year, in May and in October. These meetings are informal 
and confidential. The members also exchange confidential annual reports in April detailing actual 
exports and the issue of any export licences to any non-nuclear weapon states not party to the NPT. 
The Zangger Committee merely requires safeguards on the items supplied and the facilities in which 
they are used. The Committee has held discussions on introducing the full-scope safeguards 
requirement as a condition of supply around the year 2000. However. since China opposed this 
requirement. introducing this requirement was delayed (Tracking Nuclear Proliferation 1998: 307 -10). 
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However, China has not yet joined the Wassenaar Arrangement, which seeks to 
promote transparency and greater responsibility in the transfer of conventional arms 
and dual-use goods and technologies. China has also avoided joining the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) because it is unwilling to end its peaceful nuclear cooperation 
with Pakistan and India. The MTCR still remains a perennial source of controversy in 
US-China relations, even though China agreed, in the US-China summit statement in 
June 1998, to "actively study" MTCR membership (Hu Yumin 1999a: 17). China's 
steps to improve the transparency of its nonproliferation commitments would still 
leave some distance to bolster its credibility in these supplier regimes. 
8.4.2. The Enlargement of US-China Bilateral ACD Cooperation 
Despite China's controversial and doubtful commitment to the international 
supplier regimes in the late 1990s, China participated positively in the international 
ACD frameworks whose function was to improve and enlarge US-China bilateral 
ACD cooperation in the late 1990s. From the US point of view, China is 
indispensable to international efforts to preserve nonproliferation regimes by virtue of 
its status as a nuclear-weapon state; its standing as a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council; its role as a major nuclear supplier and its diplomatic influence. It 
is important to persuade China that it shares a common interest with other world 
powers in curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. In the 1990s, China 
continued to participate in multi-level US-China dialogue on ACD issues. The US 
engagement with China on the international ACD agenda was greatly improved and 
enlarged by various channels. The US policy toward China on nonproliferation and 
arms control issues contributed to a more positive trend for change on the part of 
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China, making these issues a more regularized aspect of discussions between the two 
countries. Thus, the bilateral US-China cooperation will be likely to push these 
positive trends further and should be an important long-term priority for both 
countries. 
With high level strategic dialogue, the US and China reached a nuclear 
cooperation agreement in 1997. In October 1997, Jiang Zemin visited the United 
States and the agreement on nuclear nonproliferation was one of the few concrete 
results coming out of the summit. In the China-U.S. joint statement issued after the 
summit, the two countries agreed to cooperate in implementing the (nonproliferation) 
convention within a multilateral framework. At the summit, nuclear cooperation was 
among the most salient issues on the agenda, and the Chinese leadership sought 
approval for the bilateral Peaceful Nuclear Co-operation Agreement that was 
originally signed 1985 but did not take effect due to both Chinese export policy and 
the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. On March 18, 1998, the 1985 Agreement 
for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation between the United States and China took effect, 30 
legislative days after President Clinton certified that China had met the 
nonproliferation requirements of US laws.99 Under this agreement, US firms and 
institutions are allowed to provide technology and assistance to the Chinese civil 
nuclear power programme. The Chinese declarations regarding nuclear exports led 
the Clinton Administration to agree to implement this agreement (Weeks 1997). 
99 On January 12, the US administration submitted to Congress a package of reports and certificates 
regarding the exclusively peaceful use and security of transferred US nuclear technology and the 
improvements and evolution of China's nonproliferation practices. Congress could have blocked the 
implementation of the nuclear agreement by passing a resolution of disapproval by a veto-proof 
margins (Arms Control Association Fact Sheet March 1998). 
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China's acceSSIon to the Zangger Committee and the declaration by its 
representative Ambassador, Li Changhe, of the Chinese government's new policy 
regarding nuclear related dual-use technolgoies, seemed to be linked to the visit of 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin to Washington in October 1997 and the summit 
meeting with President Clinton. By taking steps to meet the US legal requirements 
for nuclear trade, such as joining the Zangger Committee for nuclear exports, China 
would become more tightly integrated into the international non-proliferation regimes, 
which would help to alleviate the suspicion about Chinese commitment to the regimes 
held by US Congress. The Clinton administration argued that implementing the 
nuclear cooperation agreement with China would provide a continuing source of 
leverage to prevent China from backsliding on its nonproliferation commitments 
(Arm Control Association Fact Sheet March 1998). In fact, both countries had 
economic interests, the positive incentives for the agreement, behind the surface 
nonproliferation justification. China is a big emerging market and also energy is a big 
emerging sector in China. The US Commercial Department predicted that China 
would spend as much as $65 billion between 1995 and 2000 on energy and power 
projects, including eight nuclear plants. US companies are estimated to earn as much 
as $55 billion from the Chinese market over the next 30 years. On the Chinese side, 
China wanted access to US nuclear technology to help meet its rapidly growing 
electricity needs. China planned to add 20 gigawatts of new capacity by the year 
2010, a tenfold increase (Weeks 1997). 
During the US-China summit in June 1998, Clinton and Jiang Zemin announced 
that the two sides had reached agreements on the detargeting of strategic nuclear 
weapons and a Chinese commitment to "actively study" joining the MTCR. These 
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agreements were diplomatic gestures and, in fact, were rejections of requests by both 
sides. The US sought for China's full membership in the MTCR in the summit 
meanwhile China requested the "no-first-use" policy for nuclear weapons. 1DO 
However, confirming the bilateral cooperation, the US and China issued a "Joint 
Statement on South Asia". By agreeing that "our respective policies are to prevent 
the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist 
programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable 
of delivering such weapons, and that to this end, we will strengthen our national 
export control system," China appeared to make efforts to remove all remaining 
uncertainty about its commitment to halt all further missile assistance to Pakistan. 
Both countries confirmed their cooperation in the following statement. 
Close coordination between the United States and China is essential to building 
strong international support behind the goals to which we are committed in response 
to nuclear testing by India and Pakistan. We will stay closely in touch on this issue 
(Joint Statement On South Asia 1998 http://www.clw.org/coalition). 
The US-China cooperation also developed in a vertical direction. The US State 
Department of Energy (DOE) launched the "US-China Lab-to-Lab Technical 
Exchange Program" (CLL) to establish scientific interactions with China in support of 
US arms control and nonproliferation policy in 1996. The US and China each 
recognized that the unique professional relationships which their nuclear scientists 
fostered through the CLL would provide a vehicle for increasing trust and developing 
common approaches on issues of concern to national and international security. Both 
100 The detargeting arrangements are interpreted as not verifiable and largely symbolic proposal 
because the missiles can be retargeted in a matter of minutes (Diamond 1998). The no-first use was 
certainly unacceptable to the US side, because it was believed to undermine US deterrence strategy. 
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countries attach great importance to the ACD issues and agree that ACD issues call 
for international cooperation and mutual exchange. However, there was much less 
technical ACD experience in the Chinese institutes. The US technical community has 
over 30 years experience in developing, deploying and maintaining verification and 
monitoring regimes for bilateral treaties with Russia, as compared to a limited 
engagement of China's technical community in the last decade. The disparity set the 
objecti ves of a programme that focuses on technical training and implementation 
issues for China. Particular emphasis was given to demonstrating technical means for 
sharing selected information on nuclear materials and facilities to comply with 
international agreements and to participate in confidence-building measures, while at 
the same time, protecting sensitive national security information. The three primary 
counterpart institutions in China to the US are the Chinese Academy of Engineering 
Physics (CAEP), the Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology (NINT)lol and the 
China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE, the research arm of the China National 
Nuclear Corporation, CNNC). The three CLL project areas have been initiated to 
date in the areas of nuclear materials management, verification technologies and 
nuclear export control. 102 
Apart from technical collaboration to generate important and unique common 
interests between the US and China, there has developed in the post-CTBT period a 
joint conference attended by prominent key players in the ACD field inside each 
country. The China Institute of International Studies (CllS) under the MFA and the 
101 This institution is known for its developing a key role for verification of the CTBT in China. In the 
past, the NINT was responsible for conducting and analyzing China's nuclear testing programme. 
Since China signed the CTBT, the institution has emerged with the primary responsibility for China's 
field implementation of the technologies for the International Monitoring System OMS) (Prindle 1998: 
113). 
311 
Centre for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies 
(MISS) co-organized a conference titled "US-China Conference on Arms Control, 
Disarmament and Nonproliferation in 1998." The CnS-MIlS track 1 Y2 bilateral 
conference was the first of its kind ever to be held between the ACD communities of 
the US and China. It was the beginning of a series of substanti ve discussions about 
sensitive ACD and security issues between high level officials and experts from both 
countries.103 The conference covered issues ranging over the role of nuclear weapons 
and nuclear disarmament; nuclear export controls; missile proliferation; theatre 
missile defence In Asia; US arms sales to Taiwan and the CTBT 
(http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/eanp/researchlbeijing). 104 As Chinese Ambassador to 
the CD, Sha Zukang mentioned, during his speech at the farewell banquet, the 
conference was an historic and unprecedented milestone in the US-China bilateral 
relationship and the conference will play an important role in developing an unofficial 
channel of dialogue among Chinese and US experts and officials. 
102 For more details, see Prindle (1998). 
103 Track 1 is used to call multilateral forum that involves governmental officials while track 2 involves 
academic scholars. The track 1 Y2 means that both governmental officials and academic scholars 
participate in the forum. Chinese participants were drawn from the MFA, the research institutes and 
several military-associated institutions, such as the National Defence University, the CDSTIC, the 
CWC Implementation Office, the CAEP and the China Aerospace Corporation. The US participants 
came from the Department of Defence, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the 
Department of Energy, national laboratories and scholars from univerisites. 
104 The US-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation has been held 
annually since 1998. The Second (titled 'Missiles, Theatre Missile Defence, and Regional Stability) 
and Third conference (titled 'US-China Arms Control and Nonproliferation Cooperation: Progress and 
Prospects') were held in 1999 and 2000 respectively. 
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CHAPTER 9. Conclusion 
How much of a role we can play in international affairs depends on 
how much we achieve our economic construction. If our country 
developed and became more prosperous, we could playa larger role in 
international affairs. Our current role in international affairs is not 
small; but if our material basis and material capabilities are 
enhanced, our role will be even larger (Deng Xiaoping Selected 
Works of Deng Xiaoping II 1986: 204) 
This research started with the question of whether China has adjusted itself to the 
international order during the last two decades. In the international Anns Control and 
Disarmament (ACD) field, China's socialization occurred in a constructive way as a 
result of its participation in international ACD institutions, like the CTBT. By 
investigating the Chinese perspective and its domestic ACD institutions, whereby 
"dynamic interaction" between China and international ACD institutions or regimes 
was fostered during 1990s, this study aims to find whether the evolution and 
development of this interaction was context-bound and caused by the penneation of 
the ACD norms by intersubjective meaning. The CTBT was used as a case study to 
contextualise and concretise this dynamic interaction and its constitutive processes in 
China before and after it joined the CTBT (from China t1 to China (2). The dynamic 
interaction between China and international ACD institutions resulted in changes in 
perspective both towards domestic ACD institutionalization and in the growth of 
participation in international ACD frameworks. 
The next section will briefly summarise the key findings from the research. As 
the result of dynamic interaction, the reconstruction entailed a change in perspective, 
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domestic institutions and participation in the international ACD frameworks; the 
differentiation in Chinese ACD perspective, domestic ACD institutionalization and 
the growth of participation in international ACD frameworks. The findings of the 
case study of the CTBT will be discussed in the context of those three levels. This is 
followed by a section that discusses the theoretical and practical implications of the 
findings and suggests that a new theoretical model is needed, which integrates 
dynamic interaction between state and international institutions or regimes. The last 
section sets out the limits of the research and suggests possible directions for future 
research. 
9. 1. Key Findings: Constitutive Reconstruction by Dynamic 
Interactions 
During the last decade, China's increasing participation in international ACD 
frameworks necessarily brought into existence Chinese ACD experts and institutions 
that could deal with the ACD issues. The Chinese came to recognize ACD issues as 
being in the interest of their own security and they established appropriate institutions 
to consider them beyond their ideology-driven mindset, anti-hegemonism, which had 
denounced the ACD agenda as attempts at control by superpower hegemonism. By 
investigating Chinese discourse and domestic ACD institutions, it is possible to 
examine the ways and processes by which both sectors changed and developed as the 
international ACD norms permeated China's domestic milieu. The key findings from 
the current research can be summarised as follows. 
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First of all, at the level of perspective, the dynamic interaction forced Chinese 
leaders, officials and analysts to internalize international ACD norms during recent 
decades. The great surge of publishing ACD issues in 1990s indicated that China's 
increasing interest in the international ACD agenda was growing in parallel with its 
involvement with the frameworks. A most dramatic and significant change in the 
pattern of Chinese ACD discourse was shown by the explosive number of 
publications in 1992, when China joined the NPT. More significantly, since 1992, the 
number of Chinese articles on this subject in the journals has increased steadily so far. 
In the late 1990s, the quantitative increase in associated publications heralded a 
qualitative shift. The dominant realist approach to ACD issues, which had been 
typical, has encountered the newly emerging liberalist and constructivist approaches 
within the Chinese discourse. The differentiation and diversification of the Chinese 
discourse on the international ACD provided the momentum for the issues to become 
internalized in Chinese thinking. These three approaches to Chinese ACD discourse 
were derived and evolved distinctively in parallel with China's engagement in 
multilateral ACD frameworks. The constructivist approach is gaining more and more 
credit in dealing with international ACD issues among Chinese analysts. For 
example, even a military analyst regards the proliferation of massive destructive 
weapons and delivery missiles as a global problem (not simply for the US security 
strategy) and assesses China's role within regimes from a state-enhancing perspective. 
Based on an overall reassessment of the world strategic environment, the Chinese 
leadership has realized that the growing danger of horizontal nuclear proliferation will 
erode China's security environment. It has also recognized that the pursuit of anti-
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hegemonism in international relations is at the expense of world stability and national 
security. Instead, Chinese analysts are seeking for a more responsible and influential 
role in the making of rules in the ACD multilateral frameworks. The CTBT was, as a 
Chinese analyst put it, the first multilateral nuclear arms control treaty negotiation in 
which China participated. 
Second, the developments of Chinese ACD institutions during the last decade 
suggest that an external factor, the international ACD agenda, influenced Chinese 
institutions and played some role in nurturing Chinese domestic ACD institutions. 
Since the international ACD agenda became a critical issue in the late 1980s, each 
security-related institution researched the issues and developed its own expertise. 
With its own bureaucratic interests, the MFA, the PLA and the COSTIND emerged as 
the main actors and exchanged their views in the inter-agency bargaining process. 
Those institutions provided new opportunities for experience and helped to realize 
new interests through a complex set of channels, which eventually might transform 
China's identity. 
Like other institutions in China, the fragmented character of domestic ACD 
institutions meant that the two main domestic agencies played and will play key roles 
in the policy-coordinating process of China's ACD policy. While the MFA mainly 
formulates and implements the ACD policy, the PLA, with a sophisticated backup 
from the newly merged sub-institutes detached from the former COSTIND and with 
vested interests, occupied by arms export and military modernization. will not 
abandon its grip on security-related issues. Chinese domestic institutions are nascent 
in nature. They are in flux and vulnerable to a new need for reorganization, which 
316 
might be brought about by incremental participation in multilateral frameworks at the 
international level. The case of the CTBT, more concretely, elucidates these impacts. 
Third, there is a record of China turning its passive or negative participation to a 
more constructive one in international ACD institutions or regimes, as has been 
demonstrated in Chapter 6. As the chronological evidence indicates, without doubt, 
there has been a dramatic increase in China's participation in the numerous 
multilateral ACD frameworks. The current degree of Chinese participation in 
multilateral ACD frameworks virtually suggests that intersubjective ideas 
reconstituted Chinese interest and behaviour. China joined two important major 
international regimes, the CD (1980) and the IAEA (1984). In the 1990s, China's 
ACD policy and behaviour featured more conspicuous participation in the multilateral 
frameworks. From the start of the NPT entry in 1992, China signed numerous 
contemporary ACD treaties and took part in many negotiating processes. China 
formally acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC, 1993), the UN 
Register of Conventional Arms (1993) and the CTBT (1996). Among the 
international ACD treaties, by 2000, the only international treaties that China had not 
signed were now the PTBT and the Moon Agreement. China is also actively 
participating in regional security dialogues, such as the ARF and the CSCAP. 
Despite enthusiastic participation, the contrast between the participation rate and 
the reluctance to adhere to specific regimes (as has been seen with most Supplier 
Regimes), is an ambiguous factor in evaluating China's ACD policy. The regimes 
have limited membership and they are concerned with the control of transferring of 
sensitive weapons and technology. The lack of "universality" in their membership 
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was a deciding factor that relieved the Chinese from considering entry. Neither 
feature met the Chinese military interest, especially that of the military defence 
establisment, which had endeavoured to gain currency with weapons sales for military 
modernization. China's reluctance to join the MTCR not only illustrated this but also 
hindered Chinese cooperation. China believed that the regimes had been set up by the 
US and western states to impose their rule on China. 
Fourth, China's participation and activities indicated that China would playa 
more active role in international ACD frameworks. The delaying tactics of China, 
while it carried out its 6 nuclear tests, turned to active negotiation during the last 
several months before the CTBT agreement in Geneva. China basically adopted a 
delaying tactic to win time to conclude its planned series of nuclear tests. China 
participated in the CTBT talks with two objectives, as a Chinese observer noted. One 
was the promotion of nuclear disarmament and the other was the prevention of 
nuclear proliferation. For the "prevention of nuclear proliferation," China showed a 
norm-complying attitude against a nuclear test ban during the negotiations. Unlike 
India, the Chinese delegation made compromises on controversial issues, such as ElF, 
NTM and OS I, as explored in Chapter 7. In the endgame, China also assisted the US 
and other nations in circumventing India's opposition. 
China also pursued the "promotion of nuclear disarmament" at the CTBT talks. 
China put no-first-use (NFU), China's longstanding proposition on the international 
disarmament agenda from the first nuclear test. in talks to create a new norm in 
multilateral ACD frameworks. The Chinese sincerely believe that the benefits of an 
NFU treaty would include reduced risk of war; enhanced security of the five nuclcar-
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weapon states; greater mutual trust; a reduced likelihood of nuclear proliferation and 
advancement toward the goal of complete nuclear disannament. By suggesting NFU 
in the interest of the developing states, China strategically drew their support, tried to 
spread the NFU idea and to make it a new nonn. However, many western analysts 
dismissed NFU pledges as a political statement with little significance for security or 
credibility in a crisis. In the CTBT talks, the contents of NFU were thought by many 
delegations to be beyond the CTBT agenda and thus to be inappropriate. 
During the talks, the Chinese delegation showed sensitivity to issues of 
sovereignty and sought technical benefits. At the issues of NTM and OS I, worrying 
over an arbitrary inspection by the US-supported trigger mechanism that might 
infringe Chinese sovereignty, the Chinese delegation preferred IMS and opposed 
NTM to be incorporated in On-Site Inspection. In the decision-making procedures, 
China also opposed the "red light procedure." Searching for any possible technical 
benefit, China proposed that the international network of satellites and 
electromagnetic pulse sensor (EMP) technology should be included in IMS. China 
also proposed peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) for peaceful purposes. 
During the CTBT negotiation process, the Chinese delegation always tried to 
gain the support of the developing countries. The logic of Chinese insistence on 
preserving the right of the PNEs was for the sake of the "developing countries." All 
the Chinese bargaining positions stemmed from the self-imposed position that China 
should be identical and in line with the developing countries. Promoting this image. 
China unintentionally disclosed the discrepancy in its position as a responsible power 
and as a guardian of the developing countries at the CTBT talks. At the PNEs issues, 
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the Chinese delegation raised the proposal that only the declared nuclear weapon 
states should be permitted to conduct PNEs. This gained no support from the 
developing countries. 
In a way, the PNEs might be judged a policy failure due to poor policy-
coordinating mechanism which generated "more inconsistent and controversial policy 
and behaviour" (Hao Jia 1999: 248-54). An alternative view is that China took a 
political cost in order to avail itself of the advantages of the technological and 
potential economic interest as a nuclear weapon state. The PNEs in the CTBT talks 
reflected China's transitional identity towards a state which takes part in and 
expresses its own voice in the negotiation processes of international institutions. 
While only a middle-ground power, China started to take advantage of major power 
status in terms of technology and economy in international bargaining, which came to 
contradict to Deng's foreign policy line and China's traditional challenge to the 
hegemonic powers. 
9.2. The Post -CTBT Dynamism: An Explanation of 
Socialization in China's ACD policy 
As gIven the research questions raised in chapter 1, figure 9.1. provides the 
macro-process model of socialization that shows how China came to engage in the 
international ACD institutions. The figure configures the CTBT dynamism and the 
constitutive reconstruction in China t2. The dynamic interaction provides a process 
by which norms (a nuclear test ban norm) penetrate state tJ and create state t~. In the 
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post-CTBT period, the developments 1TI China's ACD policy demonstrate the 
constituti ve reconstruction of state t2. 
Figure 9.1. Interactive processes of CTBT dynamism 
International 
ACD 
Framework 
(CTBT 
.... J!......... Negotiation, 
1994-96) 
C China 12 (post-CTBT) 
• Perspective level 
- cognitive learning on CTBT 
- utilization of common security 
(new security concept) 
• Institutional level 
- restructuring ACD institutions 
• International level 
- further engagement in ACD 
- enlargement of US-China ACD 
cooperation 
• post-CTBT security interest 
- opposition to US TMD plan 
Note: a. nuclear test ban norm history (from norm to CTBT regime); b<bl. international 
engaging force; c. transition in identity; d. dynamic force. 
The CTBT dynamism brought significantly positive elements to China' ACD 
policy in the late 1990s. Firstly, by sustaining the nuclear test moratorium since 1996, 
China made a commitment to the treaty norm, even after the norm was underrnin d 
the May 1998 nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan and the US Senate rejection of 
the CTBT ratification in October, 1999, by a vote of 51-48. 
Secondly, as has been broadly argued in Chapter 4, growing Chinese participation 
In the international ACD agenda brought about the evolutionary development of 
Chinese views in late 1990s, which went far beyond the traditional Chinese realpolitik 
and internalized either liberalist or constructivist views in IR theory. It has also been 
argued that an increasing appreciation of a mutual security perspective was 
developing. In the post-CTBT period, the most conspicuous shift was in that the 
nascent Chinese perspective on mutual security was formulated and officially 
pronounced in the name of the "new security concept" (NSC). Since it repeatedly 
surfaced on Chinese discourse, it was finally formulated in a white paper, China's 
National Defence, issued in July 1998. 
Certainly, China's "manifesto" of the NSC was motivated by strategic thinking 
which helped to counter the US unipolarity, which was being consolidated by NATO 
expansion and the revised US-Japan security treaty with Japan. Nonetheless, the NSC 
is not a simple rhetoric or tactical gesture to counter the US security architecture in 
the Asia-Pacific region and to alleviate the other countries' concern that culminated in 
the 1990s with the "China threat debates." It is a blueprint or grand strategy to re-
construct the Chinese security environment for "peace and development." It can also 
be argued that the strategic thinking contained cognitive learning about mutual 
security. The NSC contains a very positive and advanced security concept in security 
studies. The Chinese government imported the concept of common security and 
officially formulated and pronounced it as the guidelines of Chinese security policy in 
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both the global and regional security environment. China began to accept the need for 
mutual security and to utilize its mechanisms, such as CBMs, military transparency 
and military exchange. Throughout two decades of integration into the international 
system and its increasing engagement in international ACD frameworks, China came 
to recognize the utility of common security. Now, China is making an effort to 
achieve the new idea by applying it to the regional and global security milieu in order 
to re-establish its bilateral relationship and to undermine the entrenched security 
system of the US military bloc and its influence. In the late 1990s, China's 
establishment of partnerships with other countries illustrates China's constructive 
strategy using the "new security concept." 
In fact, NSC reflects the very vulnerable aspects of Chinese strategic thinking. It 
denounces the Cold War thinking and security systems, such as the military alliance 
and collective security, implying that the US alliance system, in the Asia-Pacific, 
region should be replaced. This siege mentality made the Chinese create and 
implement its own security vision. The NSC was designed as a security structure, 
cooperative security, which could undermine and act as a countermeasure to the US-
dominant alliance system in the region. Utilizing the common security concept, a 
highly intersubjective concept of security, whether the Chinese concept embraces 
cogniti ve learning or not, China is trying to establish its own security structure. 
Thirdly, the CTBT dynamism led China to restructure its domestic ACD 
institutions. The Chinese government has re-arranged the status of institutions and re-
distributed the institutional power relations among the main triangle of actors. the 
MFA. the PLA and the COSTIND. Interpreting these changes provides a key to 
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understanding future direction of China's ACD policy. The MFA's newly-upgraded 
department of arms control and disarmament (1997) and the new General Armament 
Department of the military (1998) will playa key role in China's ACD policy in the 
future, while the COSTIND's role might be limited to the realm of assisting technical 
advice and the export control process. Besides, the concentration of all the main ACD 
experts within the GAD could serve to promote consensus-building within the 
military. However, at the national scene of policy-making and bargaining processes, 
the prospect of a military voice will erode because of the consolidation of Jiang 
Zemin's power and the separation of the military from the Party. Under the CASS 
(China Academy of Social Sciences), a new institution, the Centre for Arms Control 
and Nonproliferation Studies (CACNS), was created in 1998, which has 
enthusiastically hosted inter-agency conferences among the Chinese institutes. 
Fourthly, the progressive chain-linking consequence of China's ACD policy in 
the post-CTBT period suggests that dynamic interaction between state and institution 
(regime) not only permeates state itself (perspective and domestic institution level) 
but also galvanizes the state's next step at the international level. Even though it is 
difficult to verify the distinct linkage of engaging force band bJ (see figure 9.1.) at 
international level, the progress achieved in the next step virtually indicates the 
further entrapped engagement in international ACD frameworks. After China went 
through the CTBT negotiation, there were significant developments in Chinese ACD 
policy in both multilateral and bilateral terms. One of the path-dependent effects on 
China's ACD policy in the post-CTBT period was its support for the Fissile Material 
Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). The other was China's joining the Zangger Committee, one 
of the supplier regimes, which China had long dismissed as "discriminatory." 
Positive Chinese participation In international ACD frameworks worked to 
improve and enlarge US-China bilateral ACD cooperation in the late 1990s. At a 
high level of strategic dialogue, the US and China reached a nuclear cooperation 
agreement in 1997 during Jiang Zemin's visit to the United States. The US-China 
cooperation also developed in a horizontal direction involving various channels. The 
US State Department of Energy (DOE) launched the "US-China Lab-to-Lab 
Technical Exchange Program" (CLL) to establish scientific interactions with China in 
support of the US arms control and nonproliferation policy, in 1996. Apart from 
technical collaboration to generate an important and unique common interest between 
the US and China, there has developed in the post-CTBT period a joint conference 
that has been gathered by prominent key players in the ACD field in each country. 
The CIIS-MIIS track 1 Y2 bilateral conference was the first of its kind ever held 
between the ACD communities of the US and China. It was the beginning of a series 
of substantive discussions about sensitive ACD and security issues among the high 
level representatives, officials and experts from both countries. 
Although the CTBT would not fundamentally change China's security policy, 
which currently focuses on its conventional forces with the nuclear deterrent, China's 
most serious concern about security is the rapid development and likely deployment 
of the advanced US TMD system under the CTBT restraint. The TMD is believed by 
Chinese analysts to degrade China's limited retaliatory capability. Since China came 
under the restraint of the CTBT, China has strongly voiced its serious concem over 
the development and the deployment of theatre missile defence systems (TMD) in 
East Asia. The Chinese arguments about TMD can be summarized into three 
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categories; 1) its offensive nature; 2) its effects on regional stability, especially 
concerning Taiwan; 3) its retreat from international ACD regimes. Regarding ACD 
matters, Chinese officials are concerned that the US deployment of even a limited 
NMD system would undermine the progress made in US-China ACD cooperation 
over the last decade. Chinese ACD officials now feel betrayed by the US pursuit of 
an NMD system that would directly threaten China's national security by 
undermining its nuclear deterrent. Many Chinese officials are left wondering why 
they should bother cooperating with the US. This implies that the US TMD 
programme might weaken the position and voice of Chinese ACD experts and 
institutions in their dealings with their national security decision making. 
China would have to pay greater attention to the role of arms control negotiations 
In the post-CTBT era for the purpose of safeguarding its security interests while 
promoting international security. It is likely that the Chinese government would 
attach greater importance to the domestic ACD institutions assigned to work on 
international ACD negotiations. In fact, China is seeking for a countermeasure to 
check the US TMD system in international ACD regimes. China has repeated its call 
for talks on outer space in CD in order to check US TMD efforts. The Chinese 
ambassador Hu Xiaodi requested that negotiations to prevent an anns race in outer 
space should begin. He claimed that the current US effort to amend the ABM treaty 
will lead to its total abolition and that such a development would bring the 
weaponization of and an arms race in outer space, as well as "trigger off global 
weapons proliferation" (Anns Control Association Fact Sheets October 2001: 3). 
Some Chinese officials suggested that, if the US were to forego NMD development. 
China would work more closely with the US and the other nuclear weapon states tn 
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negotiate a new missile non-proliferation regime or to tum the MTCR into a treaty, 
and would drop the longstanding Chinese opposition to the MTCR. The signing of 
the CTBT was a great step for China in participating in the international ACD regime. 
In the post-CTBT period, China's ACD policy could playa more important role in its 
security strategy than at any earlier time. 
9.3. Theoreticallmplications 
The finding that the development of Chinese ACD perspectives and institutions 
were fostered and nurtured by China's increasing participation and engagement in 
international ACD frameworks, may have important theoretical implications for the 
"third debates," metatheoretical debates about structure and agent in IR theory. The 
dynamic interaction between state and international institution (or regime) suggests a 
theoretical model that may avoid making either agent or structure the sole ontological 
primitive, and then attempt to explain the other by reduction to it. The difficulties of 
developing a theory that successfully meets both demands lies in a lack of a "self-
evident way to conceptualize these entities and their relationship" (Wendt 1987: 338). 
Firstly, by tracking the constitutive effects on the state (agent), the "dynamism of 
state and institute" strives to find a resolution of reductionism of the "heaviness" of 
structure. Waltz sees the resolution lie in the state's (agent) strategic choice under the 
constraint rather than generating features of the agent's action. Thus, a model of 
action is conditioned or even determined by the structure of choice situations. whereas 
the dynamism of state and institute tries to reconcile the problem of structure and 
agent by way of investigating generative features of interaction between agent (state) 
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and structure (international ACD institution). The implication of "dynamism" is to 
give weight to the process of the agent's reaction which constitutes structure. 
Through this process, the state may be resuscitated from and relieved of the reification 
of the structure. The constitutive developments in the post-CTBT period indicate the 
generative feature of interaction between China and international institution. 
Secondly, constructivists counter that structural realism misses what is often a 
more determinant factor, namely, the intersubjective ideas that shape behaviour by 
constituting the identities and interests of actors (Copeland, 2000: 187). Because each 
actor's conception of self (its interests and identity) is a product of the others' 
diplomatic gestures, states can reshape structure by process. Through new gestures, 
they can reconstitute interests and identities toward more other-regarding and peaceful 
means and ends. They try to identify adequately the nature and sources of interests 
and preferences, which were untouched and left as a "blackbox." By analyzing a state 
(China in this case) as a unit, the "dynamism" makes it possible to identify the norm-
permeation process through which agent (state) reconstitutes its epistemological map. 
It complements the constructivist's inability or indifference to explaining "agent" 
(state), which overemphasizes the operating norms or ideas among states and 
eliminates the state as an analytical unit. 
Wendt asserts that "if self-interest is not sustained by practice, it will die out" 
(Wendt 1999: 369). According to him, anarchy has no determinant "logic." Anarchy 
is only different cultural instantiations. However, until self-interest dies out and 
anarchy completely deconstructs it, the state (agent) is the most important unit and 
vehicle for generating the phenomenon of international relations. Until then, norms 
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are created and evolved among states which seek national interests within structural 
constraints. They are also digested within the state (agent) organ itself. The 
dynamism recognizes that the state is an inalienable unit to be analyzed. By 
elucidating the evolution of the Chinese perspective on ACD perspectives, it has been 
shown that norms can be formed and developed in close relationship with 
international institutions and regimes. This focus on the state (agent) has used 
dynamism to reveal China's constructive approach within international ACD 
institutions and regimes in the late 1990s. Based on its "state enhancement 
functionalism," China's more proactive role within institutions and regimes has given 
it more formative influence and made it vulnerable to intersubjective meaning. 
Such dynamism relates to how to make analytically operational the core 
assumption that both agents and structures interact reciprocally in determining the 
foreign policy behaviour of sovereign states. It could lead to a fruitful re-examination 
of shifts in preferences and interests that emerge from complex interactions between 
the operation of international institutions and the processes of domestic politics. Both 
Waltz's "second image" and Gourevitch's "second image reversed" are integrated in 
different ways (Waltz 1979; Gourevitch 1978). 
9.4. Research Limitations and the Direction of Future 
Research 
The current research has been conducted within a definite time scale and has been 
subject to some limitations in research methodology and scope. The issues which it 
seeks to address are limited by the accessibility of materials. Since the CTBT case 
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study was selected, it is very difficult to verify its effects and to disentangle other 
factors from it. For example, the institutional reorganization of the domestic ACD 
institutions should be understood as part of overall government restructuring in 1997 
to 1998 and not specifically for the CTBT experience itself. There is no evidence of a 
causal relationship between participation in the CTBT and the reorganization. 
Nonetheless, overall, the reorganization was apparently the product of China's 
increasing engagement in international ACD frameworks during the last decade. 
When given the momentum or motive to restructure the Chinese governmental 
organization, how the Chinese leadership dealt with the ACD associated institutions 
implied something. In this sense, the reorganization is recognized as the consequence 
of the dynamic interaction of state and institution (or regime). It can be even inferred 
that the CTBT experience, by its nature, China's first participation in negotiation 
within a multilateral framework for two years, made the Chinese leadership rethink its 
institutional organization. 
A shortcoming of the research is that the salience of the international ACD norms 
to the Chinese perspective has not been fully addressed. The evaluation of the 
Chinese perspective was dependent on the accessible materials in openly-published 
journals. The analysis was limited to the general evolutionary pattern of the 
perspectives. Moreover, the "CTBT effect" on the Chinese perspective cannot be 
assessed in the limited time available. However, the research demonstrates the 
Chinese utilization of "common security," the "new security concept" (NSC), as 
evidence of a learning effect of the "dynamic interaction," even though whether the 
China's NSC entails a genuine cognition about common security is questionable. 
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More substantial access to more relevant materials will be required for future 
research. The inaccessibility of the source materials for the investigation of the 
Chinese domestic policy-making process, in the case of the CTBT, has made the 
research weaken in saying nothing about Chinese politics. Configuration of the 
policy-making process would have made the research rich and the theoretical 
framework rigorous. The mechanism of the interchange of intersubjective norms and 
the reconciliation of the cost-benefit calculation of Chinese leaders and officials 
would have been elucidated. To capture the process whereby the tension between and 
intersubjective norms and "state enhancing functionalism" melts away remains the 
task of future research. The weakness undermines the third question of the research 
(chapter 1), the question of why China joined the CTBT. Instead, the research strives 
to show the socialization process, the mechanism of the engagement in international 
institutions and China's constructive activities in the negotiating process of the CTBT. 
If the research had encompassed other dynamic areas, its outcomes would have 
been richer and complete. For example, the research focused on the fonnative effects 
in one state (China tl to China t2) of "dynamism." If the research had focused on 
interactions among states in the scene of a specific international institution (or regime) 
or on the historical evolution of nonns and the regimes themselves, the "dynamism" 
might have demonstrated different aspects of the phenomenon. Each of these could 
be a further research topic with a different analytic unit. The fonnation of regimes 
and strategic interactions among states would also show the mechanism whereby 
states can reshape structures by process: through intersubjective meanings, how they 
can reconstitute interests and identities toward other-regarding and peaceful means 
and ends. 
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The current US TMD plan will set the future research agenda. The US TMD plan 
might influence on the recent development of China's arms control and disarmament 
policy. Given the US structural pressure to balance China, what direction China 
might choose will be an important question not only for the international arms control 
and disarmament but also for strategic cooperation between two countries. As for 
China, how the socializing effects on China by the "engagement," both growing 
Chinese arms control community and domestic institutions, will be influenced is a 
critical variable for China's policy decision. The research also raises a theoretical 
point where both neorealism and constructi vism intersect. Gi ven the socializing 
effects on China, how China might react to the US power-balancing policy will 
provide the theoretical test and process that both the variables, power and norms, 
might collide and become reconciled with each other. As constructivists argue, the 
creative use of multilateral institutions explains the emergence of stable and 
cooperati ve relations between the United States and the other major powers. 
However, the US NMD/TMD plan might undermine growing domestic support for 
the "limited interdependent security concept" in China. 
The formulation and promotion of the "new security concept" (NSC) also raise 
future research issues regarding the security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Multilateral regional security forums provide a framework for enhanced US 
involvement in Asian security that complements the United States' current bilateral 
security arrangement. In a similar way, China's active involvement can be interpreted 
as supporting both sides of coin. China has shown itself increasingly open to working 
within multilateral security arrangements as a way of countering the US influence on 
the global and regional scenes as have seen in chapter 6. Will China's promotion of 
:n.2 
the new security concept be effective enough to restructure the regional security 
arrangement? What has been the NSC's impact on making security arrangement in 
the region? The aime of the research is to explore the regional countries' response to 
China's promotion of the "new security concept" in the late 1990s. We can expect 
continued Chinese efforts to expand its diplomatic influence through such channels as 
a means to create some balance in its relations with the United States. Thus the 
findings of the research will provide the effects of the promotion based on "common 
security," at least in its rhetoric. 
The dynamic of state and institution (or regime) makes interactions between state 
and norms more dynamic and complex. The dynamism which integrates the social 
structuring of international relations by reconstructing the state (agent) and the 
international system (structure), provides a tool for comparative analysis which differs 
from existing rationalist approaches. This would make it possible for IR researchers 
to draw a more complete picture of the interaction in interdependent world 
undergoing sovereignty-blurring phenomenon. It also enables observers to see how 
China will emerge in and accommodate itself to the international system. The picture 
provided might be a evolutionary construction of the long term rather than a cross-
sectional view of a moment. 
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